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**Brand social cause activism: the good, the bad and the ugly.**

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved husband Hugh Fenwick and my three children, Rodrigo, Daniela and Felipe for their generous support and patience, and for putting up with my loooong working hours. To my mother and my sister Mariana, who are always there for me. And to Sandy, more than a mentor, a dear friend.

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## **Abstract**

Brands increasingly take a stand on controversial social issues. Is it worth the risk to polarize consumers? To investigate this issue, this thesis conducts 2 studies, a five factor between-subject experiment followed by a social media field study. These studies are undertaken to understand what is the underlying process that explains consumers' responses to social causes in general and to controversial social cause (CSC) advertising in particular. In addition, the studies provide insight into the effectiveness of controversial and non-controversial social cause (non-CSC) advertising, in terms of consumers' responses, i.e., processing, attitudes, intentions and behaviors. I propose, test and find support for a conceptual framework in which moral emotions mediate consumers' responses and the importance of a social cause moderates them. Moreover, CSC ads elicit divergent moral emotions: positive for cause supporters and negative for cause opposers. This investigation also identifies a duality of moral emotions associated with non-CSC ads. The results suggest that managers can use social cause ads (CSC and non-CSC) to boost ad attitudes, positive WOM and boycott behavior. However, only CSC advertising increases social media reach and engagement. Further, while reactions (emojis) and shares are predominantly positive, comments are predominantly negative. Negative comments can take two forms, depending on the cause and brand positioning they can be "against the cause" or displeased with the brand for "not doing enough" capturing consumers' expectations. Overall, the results suggest that CSC opposers may not pose as great a threat to brands as is feared, because boycott intentions are lower than boycott intentions, and negative intentions do not always translate to actual behavior. Contrary to negativity bias, boycott is never greater than buycott, and under some circumstances buycott is greater than boycott behavior. Finally, the thesis uncovers and discusses a number of other theoretical and managerial implications

## **Introduction**

There is fierce competition between multitudes of brands in the very crowded promotional environment that populates traditional media (TV, radio, magazines, and newspapers), internet and social media. For this reason, companies resort to a variety of strategies and tactics to attain consumers' attention, engagement, and purchase intentions. Some brands use humor, some brands use celebrities, some brands use controversial or provocative advertising executions defined as "provocative images, words or situations that utilize or refer to taboo subjects (e.g. violence, sex/erotica, death, indecent/vulgar body parts or functions and political/ racial issues) or that

violate societal norms or values” (Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008, p. 294). These types of advertising are deliberately designed to shock, scandalize and/or surprise the audience (Pope et al., 2004) such as Calvin Klein’s ads that are famous for being sexually provocative<sup>1</sup>.

Controversial advertising executions (CAE) could positively impact advertisement processing and brand information acquisition (Dahl et al., 2003; Dens et al., 2008; Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008; Manchanda et al., 2002; Vézina & Paul, 1997). There also seems to be a positive effect of provocation in advertising on brand awareness and knowledge, and the amount of non-commercial publicity generated possibly plays a determinant part in that phenomenon (Vézina & Paul, 1997). It has been argued that the free publicity obtained by a controversial campaign can add substantial leverage to the cost-effectiveness of the advertising budget. However; at the same time the negative social pressure, mainly due to leakage beyond the target market, can pose a small but significant risk of collateral damage to the campaign and brand (Crosier et al., 1999).

Following a different strategy, many companies are increasingly emphasizing social dimensions and promoting social causes as a means to differentiate themselves and their products (Becker-Olsen & Hill, 2006; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Brønn & Vrioni, 2001; Drumwright, 1996; Gupta & Pirsch, 2006; Hoeffler & Keller, 2002; Nan & Heo, 2007; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; N. C. Smith, 2003; Webb & Mohr, 1998). For example, AVON 39 Walk to End Breast Cancer, is an annual two-day, 39.3-mile trek in seven cities across the United States to raise funds for research, awareness, and education, while helping families of people diagnosed with breast cancer. Since 2003, AVON 39 Walks have raised nearly \$590 million through the dedication of 220,000 participating women and men<sup>2</sup>. As another example, TARGET takes pride in sponsoring wellness and education programs, arts and cultural institutions, to support families recovering from a disaster and to practice sustainability throughout their business<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Evans, J. (2016, July 7). The NSFW History of Calvin Klein's Provocative Ads. Esquire. Retrieve from <http://www.esquire.com/style/news/g2841/nsfw-history-calvin-klein-advertising/>

<sup>2</sup> Retrieved from <http://www.avon39.org/about/>

<sup>3</sup> Retrieved from <https://corporate.target.com/corporate-responsibility/community-impact>



Based on Drumwright and Murphy (2001), I define social cause marketing as *a brand or company marketing initiative that has at least one non-economic objective related to social welfare*. Researchers study these activities from a variety of different perspectives such as corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate societal marketing (CSM), and cause-related marketing (CRM). This has resulted in a somewhat fragmented picture in the literature (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012, 2013; Maignan & Ferrell, 2004) in which findings are equivocal regarding the impact of these activities on brands and companies. Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of over 200 studies that investigated the link between CSR and companies' financial performance providing some clarity to the mixed results found in the literature. They find that there is a small positive, significant effect of CSR on financial performance.

This "morality" strategy of emphasizing social dimensions and promoting social causes only pays off if there are consumers who value it. According to Vitell (2015), for CSR to thrive, it needs to be accompanied by consumer social responsibility (CnSR). The definition I will use of CnSR and adjoining concepts such as "ethical", "moral" and "political" consumerism is "the application of instrumental, relational and moral logics by individual, group, corporate and institutional agents seeking to influence a broad range of consumer-oriented responsibilities" (Caruana & Chatzidakis, 2014, p. 578). This basically describes the phenomenon of consumers' choices in favor of environmental and social causes.

More recently, some brands have combined both strategies, advocating social causes that are controversial. A controversial social cause (CSC) is a contemporary social issue that, unlike a non-controversial social cause (non-CSC), is divisive and may polarize consumers' positions, generating many pro and against discussions about the cause itself and the brand taking a stand on it. Controversial advertising campaigns can at the same time positively affect an issue advocated by one stakeholder community and negatively affect it for an antagonist one (Maignan & Ferrell, 2004). In other words, when a brand expresses a posture on a CSC it will most likely produce a bivalent response, engendering support from consumers who agree with the brand's position on the issue and opposition from those who disagree with it. For example, Frito-Lays' brand Doritos partnered with the It Gets Better Project which aims to support lesbian, gay, bisexual and

transgender (LGBT) teens, to create Doritos' Rainbow chips, a limited edition of the product with chips in the different colors of the rainbow pride flag, resulting in people expressing either outrage or support in social media<sup>4</sup>. As another illustration, one of the pieces of the "Commit to Something" controversial Equinox Luxury Gym's campaign takes a stance on the topic of breastfeeding in public generating much support and much criticism<sup>5</sup>. Another example is Budweiser's 2017 Super Bowl ad which portrays its founder's struggle as an immigrant in the U.S., where he is told he is "not wanted here." This advertisement debuted after President Donald Trump issued an executive order banning immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries and was interpreted as a statement against the President's immigration stance, drawing a lot of attention, with some hailing the pro-immigrant storyline and others decrying it<sup>6</sup>.

This is important because with today's informed, connected and active consumer (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) where internet-based social media has made it possible for people to communicate with hundreds of other people about products (Mangold & Faulds, 2009) the controversy generated by a CSC campaign may translate into increased word of mouth (WOM). This discussion in social media could lead to polarized positions amongst brand consumers', generating different degrees of support or opposition from distinct consumer segments.

What makes a social cause controversial? As times change, old taboos fade and what was unthinkable or unmentionable becomes commonplace, "birth control, radical evolutionary theories, pornography, and exchange rate adjustments have nothing in common except that in various places and at various times they are or have been unmentionable subjects. In fact, such

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<sup>4</sup> García, A. (2015, September 18). Doritos unveils rainbow chips to support LGBT community. *CNN Money*.

Retrieved from <http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/17/news/doritos-rainbow-chips-lgbt/> and Conick, H. (2015, September 22). Social justice or social media? How will Doritos Rainbow campaign affect the company? Retrieved from <http://www.bakeryandsnacks.com/Manufacturers/How-will-Doritos-Rainbow-campaign-affect-the-company>

<sup>5</sup> Hughes, C. (2016, January 28). A Response to Equinox's Latest Ad Campaign: Your Brand Should Stand for Something. *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2016/01/28/a-response-to-equinoxs-latest-ad-campaign-your-brand-should-stand-for-something/#7e805bca5f13>

<sup>6</sup> Gajanan, M. (2017, February 5). People Want to Boycott Budweiser Over Its Super Bowl Immigration Ad. *Fortune*. Retrieved from <http://fortune.com/2017/02/05/budweiser-super-bowl-commercial-immigration-boycott/>

unmentionably unites them with a host of other products, services, and ideas” (Wilson & West, 1981, p. 92). “Unmentionables are products, services, or concepts that for reasons of delicacy, decency, morality, or even fear tend to elicit reactions of distaste, disgust, offense, or outrage when mentioned or when openly presented” (Wilson & West, 1981, p. 92). Based on this definition I define controversial social cause marketing (CSC) as *a brand or company marketing initiative that has at least one non-economic objective related to social welfare that to a group of people for reasons of decency, morality, or even fear tend to elicit reactions of distaste, disgust, offense, or outrage to a group of people when openly presented, while at the same time they are openly supported and defended by another group of people*. CSC advertising is when a company or brand advocates a controversial social cause by taking a stand on a polarizing social issue in an ad or promotion in a specific market. Different cultures may have their own set of unmentionable or controversial products and ideas that are different from other cultures (Chan et al., 2007) and they will evolve over time. In other words, what is a CSC in one country may not be controversial in another, what is a CSC today may not be controversial tomorrow. For the purposes of this study, it is unimportant what is controversial right now since it will change, but the fact that it generates controversy in a specific place and moment.

A CSC campaign can be intentionally or non-intentionally controversial. Unless we have access to the management decision process that generated a specific campaign we can only speculate intentions, and I will assume a CSC campaign is intentional when an organization maintains its position on an issue despite the polarization it generates (e.g. Adidas defending their pro LGTB Valentine’s Day Instagram post<sup>7</sup> or Procter & Gamble defending “The Talk” campaign that “celebrates the diverse beauty of Black women, Black community, and culture”<sup>8</sup>) and non-

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<sup>7</sup> Walano, R. (2016, February 15). Adidas Shuts Down Homophobic Haters on Valentine’s Day. *US Weekly*. Retrieved from <http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/adidas-shuts-down-homophobic-haters-on-valentines-day-w164372>

<sup>8</sup> Morgan, D. (2017, August 3). Procter & Gamble's new ad "The Talk" tackles more than selling soap. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-talk-ad-procter-and-gamble-commercial-racial-stereotypes-stirs-debate/> and <http://us.pg.com/who-we-are/leadership-letters/the-talk> retrieved on August 28, 2017

intentional when a company retracts it (e.g. Pepsi Pulls Ad Accused of Trivializing Black Lives Matter<sup>9</sup>) and even apologizes to its consumers qualifying it as a mistake.

While we see an increase of CSC campaigns in the marketplace, by the time of this thesis proposal there was no empirical research on the effects and consequences that a CSC campaign and the polarization it may generate has on brands and consumers. However, this seems to have become a hot topic and there are some new articles on the subject that will be included in the literature review. This thesis will study this phenomenon bringing together separate insights from CSR, CnSR, and Controversial Advertising literatures and contribute to the incipient literature on Corporate Sociopolitical Activism where controversial social causes advertising fit. Bhagwat et al. (2020) defined “corporate sociopolitical activism” (CSA) as a firm’s public demonstration (statements and/or actions) of support for or opposition to one side of a partisan sociopolitical issue. They differentiate CSA from Corporate Political Activity (CPA). CPA involves efforts by the firm to sway political processes including campaign contributions, lobbying, and donations to political action committees, intended to further a specific goal with direct financial payoffs and it is performed quietly, while CSA implicates publicized support to a social cause. Other authors have called this subject Corporate Activism (Eilert & Nappier Cherup, 2020), Corporate Political Advocacy (Hydock et al., 2019) and Corporate Social Advocacy (Park & Jiang, 2020). Both Corporate sociopolitical activism and CSR fit into Brand Activism (Bhagwat et al., 2020; Hydock et al., 2019). According to Kotler & Sarkar (2017, pg. 3) “Brand activism emerges as a values-driven agenda for companies that care about the future of society and the planet’s health. The underlying force for progress is a sense of justice and fairness for all”. It includes non-controversial societal and community issues such as education, school funding, etc. and also controversial social issues such as equality – gender, LGBT, race, age, etc. Therefore, I will call Brand Activism when a brand engages in social cause advertising, whether it is a controversial or non-controversial social cause. CSC may be presumed to have the intent of improving the competitive position of firms or enhancing their reputation, but these “sociopolitical issues” are divisive, emotionally charged, and institutionally contested social issues.

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<sup>9</sup> Victor, D. (2017, April 5). Pepsi Pulls Ad Accused of Trivializing Black Lives Matter. *The New York Times*.

Retrieved from [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/business/kendall-jenner-pepsi-ad.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/business/kendall-jenner-pepsi-ad.html?_r=0)

This thesis on CSC is differentiated from corporate social responsibility and cause-related marketing literature in that until very recently previous research has not considered the controversy factor of a social cause and the effect that such controversy may have on brands and consumers. Through the study of the consequences of the polarizing stands taken by brands advocating a CSC this thesis will contribute to the discussion of CSR and cause-related marketing by researching the underexplored controversy dimension on these types of marketing activities.

The study of CSC is differentiated from controversial advertising research in that the provocative appeal selected by a brand to generate controversy is to take a stand on a controversial social issue, a controversy generated by a social welfare dimension and not the types of shock appeals used in previous research for controversial advertising executions: disgusting images, sexual references, profanity/obscenity, vulgarity and impropriety. It is also different from the literature on the advertising of controversial products in that in a CSC campaign the product is not controversial per se, but by advocating a CSC a brand is intentionally adding a controversial social dimension to an otherwise non-controversial product. By studying the controversy generated by taking a stand on a polarizing social cause in an advertisement, this thesis will enrich the literature on controversial advertising by opening the cause-related marketing dimension of the discussion.

Given a growing trend in the use of CSC by firms, researching this subject will also be useful to management by helping them better assess the risks and opportunities of this promotional strategy and to develop plans to administer these kinds of campaigns. By answering managerial questions such as: what is more effective, CSC or non-CSC, in terms of consumers' responses? Is CSC good or bad for ad and brand attitude, word of mouth, social media engagement? This thesis will also improve managerial understanding of the potential outcomes of these marketing activities, helping to determine if, when and how to best use this type of polarizing campaign.

The thesis consists of two studies. Study 1 is an experiment using equally likable brands to establish the effect of a brand social cause ad on elaborative processing, ad and brand attitude, WOM, boycott intentions (increased purchase intention and brand choice), boycott intentions (increased purchase avoidance intention and decreased brand choice). These measures correspond

to managerial questions and are used in different studies to assess the impact of CSR and CnSR (e.g. Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Bigne-Alcaniz, Curras-Perez, Ruiz-Mafe, & Sanz-Blas, 2012; Brønn & Vrioni, 2001; Carrigan & Attala, 2001; Chatzidakis, Hibbert, & Smith, 2007; Copeland, 2014; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Hartmann, Ibáñez, Javier, & Sainz, n.d.; Lii & Lee, 2012; Menon & Kahn, 2003; Mohr & Webb, 2005; Nan & Heo, 2007; Paek & Nelson, 2009; Paharia, Vohs, & Deshpandé, 2013; Sandıkcı & Ekici, 2009; Vermeir & Verbeke, 2006; Webb, Mohr, & Harris, 2008; Xie, Bagozzi, & Grønhaug, 2015) and/or Controversial advertising (e.g. Dahl et al., 2003; Dens et al., 2008; Emery, Szczypka, Abril, Kim, & Vera, 2014; Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008; Manchanda et al., 2002; Saad, Ibrahim, Naja, & Hakam, 2015; Vézina & Paul, 1997).

Study 2 is a social media field study. I analyze controversial and non-controversial cause campaigns, using manual processing and social media monitoring software to examine consumers' interactions with real brands, advertised in authentic campaigns. I examine the effect of campaigns on important social media metrics such as consumer engagement (measured as likes, favorable comments, unfavorable comments and shares), WOM or viralization (reach) and brand sentiment (e.g. Barger & Labrecque, 2013; Berger & Milkman, 2012; Berger & Schwartz, 2011; Chamlerwat & Bhattachakosol, 2012; Cho, Schweickart, & Haase, 2014; Ghiassi, Skinner, & Zimbra, 2013; Hollebeek, Glynn, & Brodie, 2014; Jiang, Luo, & Kulemeka, 2016; Kozinets, de Valck, Wojnicki, & Wilner, 2010; Lee & Kim, 2015; Mangold & Faulds, 2009; Murdough, 2009; T. Smith, Coyle, Lightfoot, & Scott, 2007).

This thesis is organized as follows. First, there is a general literature review of the relevant CSR and its more specific aspects such as Corporate Social Marketing and Cause-related Marketing literatures, followed by literature reviews of Consumer Social Responsibility, and on Controversial advertising and the emerging literature on Corporate Sociopolitical Activism or CSC. After the review of the background literature, there is a description of the theoretical framework and hypotheses development. This is followed by Study 1 and Study 2 description of methodologies and results. This thesis finishes with a discussion section of the theoretical and managerial implications, limitations and suggested further research.

### **Background Literature: Fit with the Broader Context**

The objective of this section is to establish the framework and definitions that will be used, to identify the gap in the literature regarding the research of brands advocating controversial social causes, to justify how CSC fit in those literatures and, to explain how by nurturing from disconnected streams of research this thesis will build a link between previously separated literature. Drawing from the literature and findings of this section will be used for conceptual and hypothesis development.

### **Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Social Marketing, and Cause-related Marketing**

Social causes embraced by brands and companies, controversial or not, can be considered amongst corporate social responsibility (CSR) defined as “a company's commitment to minimizing or eliminating any harmful effects and maximizing its long-run beneficial impact on society” (Mohr et al., 2001, p. 47). While some firms may have compelling business cases to commit to CSR efforts and it is widely accepted that CSR is related to the societal obligations of business, there is no consensus about what these obligations are or their scope (Smith, 2003); but certainly no company has any obligation to advocate CSC when they could choose to advocate a non-controversial one.

One of the motivations for a brand to choose a CSC may be that low awareness about companies' CSR doings is a critical obstacle in firms' efforts to maximize business benefits from their CSR (Boulstridge & Carrigan, 2000; Du et al., 2010). In their analysis of what Forbes Magazine's top 50 U.S. and top 50 multinational firms were communicating about their commitment to socially responsible behaviors, Snider, Hill and Martin (2003) find that most companies act very similarly in their dissemination of CSR messages, aiming to a wide range of stakeholders and including a listing of core values statements that are often interchangeable except for the company name and the product category. This lack of differentiation between companies plays against obtaining market results from CSR efforts. However, global brands CSR initiatives that manage to combine visibility to consumers and credibility to the community have a stronger effect on metrics such as brand equity than CSR initiatives to suppliers, investors, and employees (Torres et al., 2012)

suggesting that consumers and communities are in fact the key stakeholders for CRS initiatives and, therefore, marketing a crucial aspect of it.

There is no clear definition of what social responsibility is in marketing, but it encompasses an assorted series of matters such as consumerism, environmentalism, regulation, political and social marketing (Carrigan & Attala, 2001) so there is a wide range of social causes that an organization can embrace. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to “company actions that advance social good beyond that which is required by law” (Kang, Germann, and Grewal 2016, p. 59). A way that social cause marketing is approached in the literature is as corporate societal marketing (CSM), defined as “marketing initiatives that have at least one non-economic objective related to social welfare and use the resources of the company and/or one of its partners” (Drumwright & Murphy, 2001, p. 164). According to these authors, CSM can take many and varied forms like traditional philanthropy, strategic philanthropy, sponsorships, advertising with a social dimension, cause-related marketing, licensing agreements, social alliances, traditional volunteerism, strategic volunteerism, and enterprises. CSM can improve consumer brand metrics such as brand awareness, brand image, brand credibility and brand engagement (Hoeffler & Keller, 2002). Since it fits into this description, CSC is definitively a CSR and a CSM activity.

The most researched area of social causes initiatives in marketing literature is cause-related marketing (CRM), defined as “the process of formulating and implementing marketing activities that are characterized by an offer from the firm to contribute a specified amount to a designated cause when consumers engage in revenue-providing exchanges that satisfy organizational and individual objectives” (Varadarajan & Menon, 1988, p. 60). Although this definition restricts the concept to those fund-raising instances when there is a charitable donation conditional on consumers’ purchases, most authors define CRM as corporate philanthropy formulated around marketing objectives such as increasing product sales or improving corporate identity (File & Prince, 1998). As said by Varadarajan & Menon (1988) seminal article, CRM is a versatile instrument that can be used in a wide range of corporate and marketing objectives, such as increasing brand awareness and recognition; enhancing the brand and corporate image; thwarting negative publicity; promoting repeated purchases and generating incremental sales. Through cooperative marketing, CRM associates corporate identity with nonprofits, good causes, and



noteworthy social issues (File & Prince, 1998; Varadarajan & Menon, 1988), consequently, we can consider CRM activities as social cause marketing as well, and therefore CSC is a type of CRM activity.

A controversial social cause, being a subset of social cause marketing, is therefore a CSR, CSM and CRM activity, it belongs to all these branches of the literature, and can nurture from them.

The literature has been rich, and the subject researched from many perspectives. Aspects of CSR, CSM and CRM that have been addressed are: **justification, scope and dimensions** (e.g. Carroll, Shabana, & Scherer, 2010; Crane & Desmond, 2002; Dahlsrud, 2008; File & Prince, 1998; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Inoue & Kent, 2014; Matten & Moon, n.d.; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2005; Ming-Dong, 2008; Peloza & Shang, 2011; Polonsky & Speed, 2001; Sethi, 1975; N. C. Smith, 2003; Varadarajan & Menon, 1988); **communication and awareness** (e.g. Baghi & Gabrielli, 2013; Drumwright, 1996; Du & Bhattacharya, 2010; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010; Korschun & Du, 2013; Pracejus, Olsen, & Brown, 2003; Samu & Wymer, 2014; Snider, Hill, & Martin, 2003); **consumer perceptions and behavior** (Barone, Miyazaki, & Taylor, 2000; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Boulstridge & Carrigan, 2000; Brink, Odekerken-Schröder, & Pauwels, 2006; Brønn & Vrioni, 2001; Brown & Dacin, 1997; Carrigan & Attala, 2001; Dean, 2003; Du, (Du et al., 2007b)Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007a, 2007b; Ellen, Mohr, & Webb, 2000; Gupta & Pirsch, 2006; Lichtenstein, Drumwright, & Braig, 2004; Menon & Kahn, 2003; Moosmayer & Fuljahn, 2010; Murray & Vogel, 1997; Naderian & Baharun, 2015; Nan & Heo, 2007; Paek & Nelson, 2009; Ricks, 2005; Ross, Stutts, & Patterson, 1991; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Sen, Du, & Bhattacharya, 2016; S. M. Smith & Alcorn, 1991; Szykman, 2004; Webb & Mohr, 1998; Yechiam, Barron, Erev, & Erez, 2003); **credibility and brand-cause fit** (Aqueveque et al., 2018; Bigne-Alcaniz et al., 2012; Ellen et al., 2000; Inoue & Kent, 2014; Nan & Heo, 2007; Pracejus & Olsen, 2004); **reputation, brand image, and brand equity** (Abdolvand & Charsetad, 2013; Aqueveque et al., 2018; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Demetriou et al., 2010; Hoeffler & Keller, 2002; Polonsky & Macdonald, 2000; Ricks, 2005; Torres et al., 2012); **and, financial performance** (e.g. Doh, Howton, & Howton, 2010; Husted & Allen, 2007; Lev & Petrovits, 2010; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2009; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Murray & Vogel, 1997).

Brands advocating CSC are starting to gain scholars' attention and very recently researchers have begun to explore controversial social causes as a corporate marketing activity. Nalick et al. (2016) develop a model that relies on multiple theoretical perspectives—agency theory and a push-versus-pull perspective of stakeholder theory—to provide complementary or at times competing explanations for firm involvement in such controversial issues. Mukherjee & Althuizen (2020) explore consumers' reaction to brands taking a stand on controversial socio-political issues and find that attitudes towards the brand decrease when consumers disagree with a brand's stand while there is no effect amongst those that support the brand's stand. Using a mixed design (within subjects: pre-controversial issue vs. post-controversial issue; between subjects: small-share vs. large-share) Hydock et al. (2020) investigate alignment/misalignment on the controversial issue advocated by the brand and brand share as a mediator of the positive or negative effects of corporate political advocacy and into perceived authenticity as a moderator. Their findings indicate that even though negativity bias suggest CPA is more likely to repel consumers opposing the brand's stand than to attract new consumers who support it -potentially hurting a large-share brand- it may help small-share brands that don't have many consumers to lose and many to gain.

Kim et al. (2020) study positive and negative word-of-mouth (PWOM and NWOM) intentions in response to Nike's campaign featuring Colin Kaepernick -former 49er quarterback who kneeled down during the national anthem in protest of racial oppression in the United States generating both outrage and support. They find that individuals' perceptions of brand's motives for engaging in Corporate Sociopolitical Activism impact their attitudes and behavioral intentions. PWOM intentions increase if individuals perceive it to be based on company values and altruistic concern. On the other hand, perceived motives based on ego-driven, brand image or stakeholders' pressure produce less favorable attitudes and stronger NWOM intentions. Rim et al. (2020) examine the differences between network structure of advocators and boycotters for Starbucks and Budweiser when they respond to President Donald Trump's immigration ban executive order in 2017. Boycotters' network is very dense and highly connected among subgroups while that of advocators is sparse. Also, boycotters engage in boycotting other brands and organizations opposed to Trump's policy. They caution that even though the intention of engaging in Corporate Social Advocacy might not be driven by political ideology, social issues are polarized by nature and are often tied to political ideology.

Using signaling and screening theories, Bhagwat et al. (2020) examine the effect of CSC on firm value by studying the stock market reaction to 293 CSC events initiated by 149 firms across 39 industries. They find that while CSC is a risky marketing strategy that investors are generally wary of, it may also be advantageous. Investors on average react negatively to CSC, especially when it deviates from the values of key stakeholders and signals the firm's resource-intensive commitment to activism. However, investors also reward activism when it closely aligns with stakeholders, especially with consumers, since consumers reward CSC when it resonates with their personal values. Quarterly and annual sales growth were positive and significant for CSC events that have a low level of deviation from consumers' ideology. This shows that CSC can be an effective means for firms to appeal to their target markets. This is also supported by Park & Jiang (2020). Based on social identity and signaling theories these authors propose a model that demonstrates positive effects of CSC activities on brand loyalty. Their study confirms CSC as an effective signal to generate public interest, and brand community engagement on social media as a collective verification process that mediates the link between CSC activity and individuals' identification with the company, which also could lead to a strong emotional attachment with the brand.

As recent as this year, Neureiter & Bhattacharya (2021), also find that whether a company ends up damaged or fortified by supporting a CSC depends on the kind of the issue at the heart of the controversy as well as the political beliefs of its core consumer base. They argue that the impact of consumer activism is mostly driven by the level of polarization of society and the political makeup of their core consumer base. In highly polarized environments, people's political sensibilities are easily offended, and elicit a consumer boycott exclusively from one side of the political spectrum. Such partisan boycotts lead people on the other side of the political spectrum to rally around the company to support it and purchase more of its products (buycott). The net outcome will depend on the position of the core consumers' base. Anyhow, despite their demographic differences by political viewpoints, age, income, education, and gender there is an overall level of agreement across consumers' that corporations should engage in addressing important social issues, which is particularly noteworthy given that the U.S. population skews conservative (Austin et al., 2019).

## **Social Marketing**

Social marketing is another line of literature related to social issues and causes that this thesis will nurture from. In Social Marketing, noneconomic objectives are the primary purpose (Drumwright & Murphy, 2001) and, has come to denote the efforts by non-profit organizations and public agencies that are designed to influence behavior (Andreasen, 1994). Even though “those concerned with social and not-for-profit marketing have cultivated conceptual boundaries, which largely exclude the for-profit marketing of consumer products from their research/practice domain” (Crane & Desmond, 2002, p. 552) I argue that social cause marketing and CSC championed by for-profit brands should not be excluded from social marketing literature. The argument is that social marketing is defined as the “design, implementation and control of programs calculated to influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving considerations of product planning, pricing, communication, distribution and marketing research” (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971, p. 5).

As said by Manrai & Gardner (1992), social ideas are comparable to products in that both implicate consumption and need satisfaction: for social ideas, consumption involves taking a position and need fulfillment involves the resolution of a social problem. When a for-profit brand embraces a social cause, it starts to deal with the essential beliefs and values that surround the chosen social issue and intermix them with the brand core values. Therefore, consumption of the product and social cause support happen simultaneously satisfying multiple needs at once, making the boundaries between business marketing and social marketing blurry. Also, there is no need for companies to be perceived as merely altruistic in their motivations to conduct CSM campaigns and it is acceptable to be profit-driven while undertaking a CSM effort (Szykman, 2004), as it is seen to some extent as an attempt to create a win-win situation for both, firm and social cause (Webb & Mohr, 1998).

Thus, social cause marketing in general and CSC as a subset of it should be considered both under social marketing and under corporate marketing literature. Since intending to change social perceptions and values is typically undertaken by non-for-profit organizations or governmental agencies and that’s what social marketing literature has studied, there is novelty in studying the effect of a for-profit brand attempting to change social perceptions on controversial social issues

and this thesis can contribute to expand this literature.

### **Consumer Social Responsibility, Ethical and Political Consumption**

Corporate social responsibility needs to be complemented by consumer social responsibility (CnSR) since “if corporate interests (i.e., profits) and consumer interests (i.e., self and public interests) are aligned, then increasing social benefits and public service will also increase profits, but if they are not aligned, then an appeal to social benefits/public service will be much less likely to succeed in the absence of government mandates” (Vitell, 2015, p. 767). CnSR can manifest as boycotting – punishing companies for undesirable behavior – and buycotting– rewarding companies for favorable behavior – that according to Copeland (2014) constitute two distinctive means of political consumerism.

Political consumption is defined as “a consumer’s decision either to punish (i.e. boycott) or reward (i.e. buycott) private companies by making selective choices of products or brands, based on social, political or ethical considerations” (Baek, 2010, p. 1066) and it is something marketers need to be aware of, since political and ethical consumerism involve consumption behaviors influenced by non-economic buying criteria that can be viewed as the consumers’ reactions to business practices and to CSR. As reported by the Cone Study (2017) consumers are observing a company’s values to decide what organizations they choose to support or punish. In this study, 87% of Americans said they’d purchase a product because that company advocated for an issue they cared about (buycott) and 76% would refuse to buy a product if they found out a company supports an issue contrary to their beliefs (boycott).

A socially responsible consumer bases his or her consumption behavior on the aspiration to minimize harmful consequences and maximize positive impact on society (Mohr et al., 2001) and, relatedly, ethical consumerism refers to purchase decisions motivated by ethical values applied to corporate behaviors such as fair trade, animal testing, etc. (Webb et al., 2008). Ethical consumption and purchasing (or buycotting) behavior seek to express the values of ethically inclined consumers that believe have a responsibility towards the society and/or environment (Carrington et al., 2010; De Pelsmacker et al., 2005).

This thesis draws from and contributes to the CnSR, Ethical and Political Consumption literatures. Study 2 further makes a contribution by exploring the effects of CSC campaigns on consumer behavior in social media, a context that to the best of our knowledge has also not been researched.

### **Controversial Advertising**

There is little literature on the use of CSC in brand advertising or on its impact on brands and consumers. There is, however, significant literature on controversial advertising that can be used as a starting point to help us build our hypotheses. Controversial or provocative advertising can be defined as “a deliberate appeal, within the content of an advertisement, to stimuli that are expected to shock at least a portion of the audience, both because they are associated with values, norms or taboos that are habitually not challenged or transgressed in advertising, and because of their distinctiveness and ambiguity” (Vézina & Paul, 1997, p. 4). The provocation can reside in the product or in the ad execution and since the literature makes this distinction it is important to establish if CSC advertising is controversial because of its execution or because it promotes a sensitive product.

Ads can be considered controversial when promoting products that are ‘unmentionable’, offensive or sensitive (Barnes Jr. & Doston, 1990; Fahy, Smart, Pride, & Ferrell, 1995; Katsanis, 1994; Prendergast & Hwa, 2003; Shao & Hill, 1994; Waller, 1999; Wilson & West, 1981). Literature on controversial products advertising has been conducted for products that are controversial per se, because they are offensive, embarrassing or socially unacceptable e.g. contraceptives, intimate hygiene products, sexual diseases, alcohol, cigarettes, gambling, guns, funeral services, underwear, racially extremist groups, religious denominations, amongst others (Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 2005). Certain product categories are intrinsically more prone to controversy than others, but a well-executed ad for an otherwise polemic product could limit the controversy (Jensen & Collins, 2008). On the other hand, when a brand of a product that is non-controversial chooses to associate itself to a controversial social cause, we can think of this as adding a layer of controversy to the product, since consumers buying the brand will be buying both the product and the controversial social cause, especially if any profits go towards the advocated social cause.

Most controversial advertising research has focused on the causes of shock or offense (e.g. Waller, 1999; Wilson & West, 1981) and on controversial advertisement executions (CAE), also known as shocking, provocative or offensive advertisement executions (e.g. Chan et al., 2007; Christy & Haley, 2008; Crosier et al., 1999; Dahl et al., 2003; de Rosa & Kirchler, 2001; Dens et al., 2008; Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008; Jensen & Collins, 2008; Kerr, Mortimer, Dickinson, & Waller, 2012; Manchanda et al., 2002; Miao, 2004; Parry, Jones, Stern, & Robinson, 2013; Pope et al., 2004; Saad, Ibrahim, Naja, & Hakam, 2015; Sabri, 2017; Sun, Shen, & Pan, 2008; Ting & de Rum, 2012; Tinic, 1997; Treise, Weigold, Conna, & Garrison, 1994; Vézina & Paul, 1997; Waller, 1999, 2004, 2006). CAE differs from promoting polemic products in that the product may be controversial or not, but the ad itself is, it seeks to be controversial on purpose. Techniques commonly perceived as potentially CAE include executions portraying: nudity, racism, sexism, anti-social behavior, use of indecent language or overly personal subject matter (Waller et al., 2005). The provocation appeal may have a major effect on attention and interest to an ad, that are antecedents of elaborative processing (MacInnis et al., 1991); and on message elaboration and cognitive responses (Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008). This trend was started by Benetton who achieved a very high level of awareness worldwide during the 1980s by publishing narrative-free advertisements with strong and highly controversial images (Crosier et al., 1999; Crosier & Erdogan, 2001; de Rosa & Kirchler, 2001; Tinic, 1997; Vézina & Paul, 1997). The United Colors campaigns could have worked as advocacy advertising by calling attention to social problems, but because the ads do not recommend solutions nor take a stand they fall closer to controversial advertising than to social cause marketing (Tinic, 1997) and therefore are not considered as CSC advertising.

Since a brand using a CSC ad may cause shock of offense by promoting an idea that could be morally offensive to some consumers' segments it can be considered as a controversial advertisement execution. An ad offensiveness depends largely on an individual's interpretation of a particular advertising scenario involving several concurrent factors (Christy & Haley, 2008). Offensive advertising is context sensitive since the norms and values that violate vary according to cultural factors, as demonstrated on several cross-cultural studies (e.g. Chan et al., 2007; Waller et al., 2005). Consumer response is contingent on personal factors, on the understanding of moral norms, and on cultural symbols (sacred or forbidden images, topics, words, etc.) and on the


emotions aroused by such seeming moral violation (Banyte et al., 2014). Hence, the criteria to consider a social cause controversial is that it generates strong polarizing positions amongst consumers in that specific market, with consumers' segments that are pro or against the position taken by the brand on the CSC.

CSC advertising could be considered both as the promotion of a controversial product (the controversial social issue) and as controversial advertisement execution. CSC differs from controversial advertising literature in that using a social issue related to welfare as the shocking appeal may make a difference in consumers' response to the perceived offense. There have been studies that explored the use of controversial advertising to promote social marketing issues that demonstrated the effectiveness of shocking advertisement content in the context of a public service message such as e.g. HIV/AIDS prevention, where the surprise caused by the violation of socially acceptable norms attracts attention and stimulates more elaboration, retention and influence behavior (Dahl et al., 2003; Manchanda et al., 2002). In their study to measure the reactions of individuals to a provocative appeal for a social cause, as opposed to a provocative ad for a standard consumer product, using mild erotica as the element of provocative imagery Pope et al. (2004) demonstrate that provocative ads are more favorably received than non-provocative, even though significant interactions between cause type, gender and provocation occur. The above-mentioned studies researched controversial executions of non-controversial social causes and there were no brands involved in the advocacy of the social cause, falling under the umbrella of social marketing -in which non-economic objectives are the main purpose. This thesis will extend Controversial Advertising literature by focusing on consumers' reactions to a brand choosing to advocate a CSC in its advertising and its effect on consumers' responses.

### **Linking Diverse Literature Streams**

After discussing the different streams of separated literature that CSC research can draw from, we observe that Corporate Social Marketing, Cause Related Marketing and even Consumer Corporate Responsibility (also known as ethical, moral and, politically motivated consumption) are subsets of a broader CSR literature. Social Marketing is a different literature and so is Controversial Advertising. It has been discussed how CSC fits in and extend all of them, while at the same time provides the linkage between them, as it is depicted in Figure 1.





**Figure 1.** *Corporate Sociopolitical Activism linking diverse literature streams*

### **Thesis Contribution**

As discussed above, this thesis contributes to different streams of literature. It extends the Corporate Social Responsibility-Corporate Social Marketing-Cause Related Marketing by joining the emerging literature on Corporate Sociopolitical Activism where CSC fit. Specifically, it contributes to it by comparing and contrasting Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Sociopolitical Activism, one of the areas of future research suggested by Hydock et al. (2019). This thesis also differentiates from the very recent literature on brand activism (Bhagwat et al., 2020; Hydock et al., 2020; Mukherjee & Althuizen, 2020) in a number of ways, such as wider scope of social causes, the depth of underlying process analysis, a broader range of consumers' responses, the use of only real brands, and the use of an experiment and a field study to corroborate findings.

First, I compare consumers' responses to controversial social causes versus non-controversial social causes and no-social causes. This diverse causes analysis is important since it gives a broader sense and provides a more overall understanding of the underlying processes of social causes in general and of each type of causes in particular. Plus, including the still more prevalent non-controversial social causes to the analysis resulted in important comparisons and interesting findings that also makes contributions to the CSR and cause-related marketing literature.

Second, I perform a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the underlying processes that explain consumers' responses to both types of social causes: controversial and non-controversial, for consumers in pro and against cause positions. Besides, I examine moral emotions and cause importance as a different set of mediators and moderators.

Third, I go beyond brand choice, and investigate a wider set of consumers' responses, including ad and brand attitudes, intentions such as word of mouth, social media engagement buycott/boycott, and the actual word of mouth and buycott/boycott behaviors.

Finally, to increase reliability and generalizability I only use real brands in my experiment and replicate it on a field study. This thesis also differentiates from Nalick et al. (2016) that centers on firms' motives to engage in sociopolitical involvement and from Bhagwat et al. (2020) that focus their analysis on the impact of corporate sociopolitical activism on investors (stock market reactions) as I center my studies on consumers' responses to brand activism. The field study was analyzed using manual processing and a social media listening software.

This thesis provides a bigger picture on social causes marketing and a much-needed guidance to management on what to expect as consumers' actual responses to brand activism in important marketing measures such as ad attitude, buycott/boycott intention and behavior, positive and negative social media engagement, and finally campaign's reach and impact to decide if a non-controversial or a controversial social cause suits the brand's objectives better.

### **Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development**

A consumer exposed to a social cause marketing campaign will recognize a moral dimension that is not necessarily present in non-social cause marketing campaigns. This may prompt consumers to engage in CnSR behavior and to include non-economic buying criteria that can help them act in a way that is consistent with their values through ethical consumption.

According to the Theory of Marketing Ethics or H-V Model (Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 2006), when a consumer recognizes a situation as having ethical content, the person perceives alternatives of

actions that could be taken to resolve the ethical problem, and makes ethical judgements that will be followed by coherent intentions and behavior. To arrive to an ethical judgement the consumer performs deontological and teleological evaluations of his/her set of evoked alternatives. In the process of deontological evaluation, the consumer assesses the inherent rightness or wrongness of the behaviors implied by each alternative, comparing each alternative's behaviors with a set of predetermined deontological norms that represent personal values or rules of moral behavior. The teleological evaluation process focuses on the evaluation of perceived consequences of each alternative for different stakeholder groups, where the identity and importance of the stakeholder groups will vary across individuals and situations. The H-V theory posits that "an individual's ethical judgments (e.g., the belief that a particular choice is the most ethical alternative) are a function of the individual's deontological evaluation (i.e., applying norms of behavior to each of the alternatives) and the individual's teleological evaluation (i.e., an evaluation of the sum total of goodness versus badness likely to be provided by each alternative for all relevant stakeholders)" (Hunt & Vitell, 2006, p. 146).

The H-V model is purely cognitive, it does not include emotional elements. Nevertheless, Gigerenzer (2010) argues that in economics and cognitive sciences, full (unbounded) rationality, i.e., maximizing some kind of welfare, is normally used as a methodological "gizmo" rather than as a supposition about how people actually make decisions. He explains that full rationality would require reliable knowledge of all alternative actions and their consequences, and this is quite difficult. This author suggests that much of moral behavior is based on heuristics instead, a mental process that disregards part of the available information and does not optimize (calculation of a maximum or minimum). Trusting on heuristics in place of optimizing is called satisficing, and he calls this *bounded rationality*, the study of the cognitive processes (including emotions) that people actually rely on to make decisions in the real and uncertain world.

To the contrary, the H-V model follows a rational cognitive progression: (1) beliefs determine attitudes, (2) attitudes lead to intentions and (3) intentions inform behavior and seem to ignore the role of moral emotions in ethical consumer behavior. Moral emotions are defined as "those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent" (Haidt, 2003b, p. 853). According to Haidt (2003), people dedicate

a substantial portion of their emotional life to reacting to social occurrences that do not directly affect them. As he explains, some emotions, such as fear and happiness, occur primarily when good or bad things happen to the self or someone related to the self, but other emotions, like anger or sympathy, can be triggered simply by reading about an injustice or seeing a photograph of a suffering child. The more an emotion tends to be provoked by such disinterested elicitors, the more it can be considered a prototypical moral emotion. Following Haidt's social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001, 2003a), Mukherjee & Althuisen (2020) propose that the decision of whether to punish a brand that has taken a perceived immoral stand can be thought of as a moral dilemma that is likely to elicit a deliberate moral reasoning process. I propose that the presence of moral emotions are part of the underlying process that influence consumers' responses to social causes campaigns, not only for cause opposition but also for cause support.

In addition, Xie, Bagozzi, and Grønhaug (2015) find that positive moral emotions - combinations of inherited and learned responses to occurrences that contravene ethical sensitivities and function as a way to process information of the moral significance of inducements - mediate the effect of corporate green and non-green actions on consumer responses. Consistent with this, Kim and Johnson (2013) find that moral emotions significantly influence consumers' purchase intentions towards social-cause products. In line with Xie et al. (2015) and since "In general, a given variable may be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the criterion. Mediators explain how external physical events take on internal psychological significance. Whereas moderator variables specify when certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur" (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176) I hypothesize that consumers' responses to social causes, whether non-CSC or CSC ads, are mediated by moral emotions. Those consumer responses will be addressed in following hypotheses and will be separated between desirable consumer responses such as elaborative processing, attitude towards ad, brand attitude, positive word-of-mouth, social media engagement, boycott intentions and undesirable consumer responses such as negative word-of-mouth and boycott intentions. These consumers' responses correspond to managerial questions, are used in different studies to assess the impact of CSR and CnSR and were established in the thesis introduction.

It has been established that consumers' personal affinity or importance of a cause influence their support of a company's CSR actions (Creyer & Ross Jr, 1997; Drumwright, 1996; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). Bizer & Krosnick (2001) find that the importance the attitude object has for the individual impacts accessibly and strengthens attitudes. I therefore propose that the cause importance perceived by the consumer should have a differential effect on the consumer's moral emotions and responses. "In general terms, a moderator is a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable." (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174). Thus, I hypothesize that the perception by the consumer of how important the social cause is (cause importance) will have a moderating effect on the moral emotions the consumer feel and on consumer's responses.


### **Brand Activism Moderated Mediation Model**

Considering the combined mediation effect of moral emotions and the moderation effect of cause importance, I propose a moderated mediation model as a theoretical model of the underlying process that explains the potential effect of social causes (non-CSC and CSC advertising) on consumers' responses. This is a moderated mediation model because moral emotions mediation is moderated by cause importance (see Figure 2). According to Hayes (2017) moderated mediation centers on the conditional nature of an indirect effect -how the mediation is moderated. The interpretive attention in a moderated mediation analysis is focused on estimating the indirect effect and how that effect varies as a function of a moderator. I propose a mediation model in which social cause ads ( $X$ ) leads to the feeling of moral emotions ( $M$ ) that produce consumer responses ( $Y$ ) such as elaborative processing, attitude towards brand, positive or negative word of mouth, boycott or boycott intention, and social media engagement. The higher the cause importance ( $W$ ) for the consumers, the greater the intensity of the moral emotions and the consumers' responses. To reflect this moderated mediation model, I hypothesize

*H1a: Consumers' responses to social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance*

*H1b: The higher the cause importance the grater the effect of social cause ads on moral emotions*

*H1c: The higher the cause importance the greater the effect of social cause ads on consumers' responses*



**Figure 2. Social Causes Model.** Cause Importance Moderates Moral Emotions Mediation on consumer responses to Brand Activism (Social Causes Advertising). Hayes' Conditional Process Model 8.

**Impact of Brand Activism on Moral Emotions**

Since a social cause ad is bringing consumers' attention to a social issue the consumers should recognize the situation as having ethical content and experience moral emotions. Therefore, I hypothesize that

*H2a: Moral emotions are higher for social cause ads than for non-cause ads*

*H2b: Moral emotions are higher for non-controversial social cause ads than for non-cause ads*

*H2c: Moral emotions are higher for controversial social cause ads than for non-cause ads*

Although not studying a controversial social per se, where some people are pro and other people are against the same social issue, Xie et al., (2015) lends support to the idea that positive moral emotions are elicited by social causes such as green marketing while negative moral emotions are triggered by corporate engagement in non-green transgressions (such as oil spill at sea). Since non-CSC should elicit different levels of support but are not expected to elicit opposition, I expect consumers exposed to a non-controversial social cause ad (non-CSC) to experience only positive moral emotions such as empathy, sympathy, compassion and hope, and not experience negative moral motions such as feeling offended, or feel contempt, disgust or anger.

*H2d: Non-controversial social cause ads will only elicit positive moral emotions*

Whereas non-CSC ads cause consumers to feel positive moral emotions, CSC campaigns can prompt a variety of moral emotions for different consumers depending on his/her position towards the social cause. Specifically, in (Xie et al., 2015) study, non-green actions cause negative moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust); and corporate green actions cause positive moral emotions such as empathy. Similarly, a pro-cause position on a CSC would produce positive moral emotions such as empathy, sympathy, compassion, hope, while an against-cause position would elicit negative moral emotions such as contempt, disgust, offense and/or even anger. Thus,

*H2e: Controversial social cause ads will elicit positive moral emotions for those who hold a pro-cause position and negative moral emotions for those who hold an against-cause position*

Since moral emotions act as a filter to process information which has moral significance (Xie et al., 2015), I expect that when exposed to a CSC the consumer may need to arrive to an ethical judgment and take a pro or against position, the emotional investment should be greater than when the ad is non-controversial. Therefore, I hypothesize

*H2f: Controversial social cause ads will elicit stronger moral emotions than non-controversial social cause ads*

### **Moderated Mediation of Consumer Response to Position on Controversial Social Cause**


The presence of moral emotions when exposed to a social cause marketing ad may explain previously discussed Consumer Social Responsibility (CnSR) behavior and Corporate Social

Responsibility (CSR) results in terms of consumer behavior responses. In the literature, the assumption is that social cause marketing is non-controversial. Prior studies on social cause marketing effects fall under this non-controversy condition, where consumers are either pro-cause (supporters) or neutral and most experience positive moral emotions such as empathy, sympathy, compassion, desire to help and inspiration. While a non-CSC may obtain varying levels of support, is not generally seen as divisive. In contrast a CSC produces an asymmetrical response inviting both opposition and support.

According to the H-V model, a consumer's pro-cause or against-cause position is the result of his/her deontological and teleological evaluation and ethical judgement. This deontological assessment is associated to the perceived moral legitimacy of the social cause. Moral legitimacy is related to an evaluation of whether societal wellbeing is being promoted as defined by the audience's socially constructed value system (Hond & Bakker, 2007). A social cause that complies with a consumer's socially constructed value system will be perceived as morally legitimate and produce support or a pro-cause position. Those social causes that do not comply with a consumer's socially constructed value system will be perceived as morally illegitimate and produce opposition or an against-cause position. CSC such as e.g. Adidas Valentine's pro-gay ad or Equinox pro-public breastfeeding ad are polarizing as a reflection of the strength of diverging positions amongst consumers, where some take a pro-cause and some an against-cause position reflecting their personal ethical judgments. Therefore, CSC produce a nested situation with pro-against cause conditions (support-opposition) that is reflected in a second theoretical model, where the consumer response to the consumer's position on the controversial social cause is mediated by moral emotions and also moderated by the cause importance for the consumer (see figure 3). Paralleling the previous model and to reflect this moderated mediation model I hypothesize

***H3: Consumers' responses to the position on controversial social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance***





**Figure 3. Controversial Social Cause Model.** Cause Importance Moderates Moral Emotions Mediation on consumer responses to the consumer’s position on a Controversial Social Cause. Hayes’ Model 8 Conditional Process Model.

**Is all Brand Activism good for brands? Social Cause vs No-Cause Advertising Hypotheses**

Brand Activism or Social Cause Marketing may result in a variety of different consumer responses. The pro-cause or against-cause position taken by a consumer in response to the ethical problem posed by a social cause ad will elicit moral emotions regarding the social cause which in turn should translate into outcomes that are coherent with his/her position. So, for example, a pro-cause position might elicit positive moral emotions that might encourage positive WOM and boycott behavior amongst supporters and an against-cause position might stimulate negative WOM and boycott behavior amongst opposers. According to the Cone study (2017) of non-CSC, consumers support environmental or social issues by taking online actions such as “liking” companies or

nonprofits pages (65%), sharing social or environmental content with their social networks (60%) and sharing their positive opinions about companies doing good (77%). See figure 3 for the relationship between CSC, position towards CSC, moral emotions, and consumer responses.

Consumers' responses to an ad can be desirable for a brand or undesirable. As stated earlier desirable consumers' responses are elaborative processing, favorable attitude towards ad, favorable brand attitude, positive word-of-mouth, social media engagement, and boycott intentions amongst others. Independently of the particular brand strategy where a brand may want to, for example, prioritize social media engagement over attitude towards ad, we could say that the higher these responses on any of these desirable responses, the better for the brand. On the other hand, brands are better off avoiding or minimizing undesirable consumers' responses such as negative word-of-mouth and boycott intentions, especially amongst consumers in its target market. Following, I hypothesize consumers' responses for each of those dependent variables for each condition: non-controversial social cause ad (non-CSC), controversial social cause ad (CSC) and no social cause branding ad (no-cause). It can be expected that in general non-CSC will elicit desirable consumers' responses and to perform better than no-cause ads. In the case of CSC consumers' responses would be conditioned by his/her position on the cause. I expect a pro CSC position (support) to elicit desirable consumers' responses and to perform better than no-cause ads and an against CSC position (opposition) to elicit undesirable consumers' responses and performing worse than non-CSC and no-cause ads on desirable consumers' responses.

### **Elaborative Processing**

Increasing attention and interest are desirable effects for advertising since they are antecedents of elaborative processing (MacInnis et al., 1991) and social ideas may increase attention and are likely to affect consumers' cognitive processing of social cause advertising. Processing effects are important since they are linked directly to consumer responses, and according to MacInnis and Jaworski (1989) these responses can be cognitive (e.g. thoughts about the ad, brand, or the context), or affective (e.g. emotional response to the ad, attitude toward the ad, and brand attitudes) and can define purchase intentions. Since social causes also engage moral emotions, I expect higher elaborative processing for social causes ads (non-controversial and controversial) than for no-cause ads. Therefore,

***H4a:** Elaborative processing is higher for social causes ads than for non-cause ads*

*H4b: Elaborative processing is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H4c: Elaborative processing is higher for controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

There have been several experiments investigating the effects of controversial advertisement executions (CAE) on processing and processing outcomes (e.g. Dahl et al., 2003; Dens et al., 2008; Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008; Manchanda et al., 2002; Vézina & Paul, 1997) that suggest that CAE positively influence advertisement processing and brand information acquisition. Since CAE leads to greater message elaboration and generates more cognitive responses than a non-controversial advertisement regardless of product involvement, gender or ethnic identity (Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008) I hypothesize that a CSC ad will have a similar effect, hence:

*H4d: Elaborative processing is higher for controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads*

### **Ad and Brand Attitudes**

Previous research find that a social dimension improves a firm's reputation (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). Consumers believe that companies have a responsibility to society and that those who behave acceptably may be held in high regard (Boulstridge & Carrigan, 2000). CSR actions improve consumers' evaluations of the company and its products and generate positive brand images (Becker-Olsen & Hill, 2006; Brown & Dacin, 1997; Demetriou et al., 2010; Ellen et al., 2000; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). In addition, a cause-related message prompts more favorable consumer attitudes compared with a similar one without it (Nan & Heo, 2007). While social cause ads result in more positive attitudes than non-social cause ads, the question is what are the effects of CSC ads on consumer attitudes? If a CSC stimulates a pro-cause position which in turn elicits stronger positive moral emotions than non-social and non-CSC ads, this should result in more favorable attitudes towards the ad and the brand. This leads to the following hypotheses:

*H5a: Attitude towards an ad is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H5b: Attitude towards an ad is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

Research on controversial advertising executions (CAE) for commercial products conclude that a controversial ad may have a negative effect on the attitude towards the ad and towards the brand

(Vézina & Paul, 1997). Thus, if a CSC stimulates an against-cause position which in turn elicits strong negative moral emotions this should result in more negative attitudes towards the ad and the brand than non-social and non-CSC ads. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**H5c:** *Attitude towards an ad is higher for no-cause ads than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads*

It is reasonable to expect the same pattern of results for brand attitude than for ad attitude, therefore I hypothesize:

**H6a:** *Attitude towards a brand is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

**H6b:** *Attitude towards a brand is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

**H6c:** *Attitude towards a brand is higher for no-cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads*

Regarding the comparative performance between non-CSC and CSC, we need to separate the effect of a pro-cause position (support) and an against-cause position (opposition). It is expected to support a non-CSC because most people do, but supporting a CSC implies a choice, and may be more telling of a consumer's identity and values. And a company taking a distinct stance on a controversial issue can built its identity (Park & Jiang, 2020). This match between brand and consumer taking the same stance may increase the consumer identification with the brand. In line with Park & Jiang (2020) findings of the positive effects of corporate social advocacy activities on brand loyalty, I hypothesize:

**H5d:** *Attitude towards an ad is higher for a pro-cause position for controversial social cause than for non-controversial social cause ads*

**H6d:** *Attitude towards a brand is higher for a pro-cause position for controversial social cause than for non-controversial social cause ads*

On the other hand, similarly to the comparison vs no-cause ads, it is quite obvious to expect that non-CSC ads perform better than against-cause position on CSC ads. Consequently:

*H5e: Attitude towards an ad is higher for non-controversial social cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads*

*H6e: Attitude towards a brand is higher for non-controversial social cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads*

### **Positive and Negative Word of Mouth**

Word-of-mouth can have a major impact on consumer response to a brand and its advertising since it affects a wide range of consumer responses, from brand attitudes to information dissemination and purchase intentions (Mayzlin & Godes, 2004; Trusov et al., 2009). According to Berger & Milkman (2012) the more affect-laden a content is, it is more likely to be shared. Social cause ads would elicit more moral emotions than no-cause ads, being more affect-laden. Thus, I hypothesize:

*H7a: Positive WOM intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

Controversial advertising's positive effects on brand awareness may be attributed to the amount of non-commercial publicity generated (Vézina & Paul, 1997). Consistent with that, in political campaign contexts, Ridout & Smith (2008) find that controversial ads are amplified by news coverage rendering free advertising for the candidates. Likewise, in social media, the combination to easily shared content with hundreds or thousands of people and the desire to discuss topics of interest creates buzz around controversial advertising (Kerr et al., 2012). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that controversy will have a similar effect on the diffusion and discussion of social causes, increasing WOM and that it would add to the previous affect effect. Thus, I hypothesize:

*H7b: Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H7c: Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social cause than for non-controversial social causes ads*

Nevertheless, controversy increases interest which increases likelihood of discussion, but simultaneously it increases discomfort, which decreases likelihood of discussion (Chen & Berger, 2013) and this could enhance participation of pro-cause position over an against-cause position. Thus, in the case of an against-cause position I expect

*H7d: Positive WOM intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

*H7e: Positive WOM intention is higher for no-cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

*H7f: Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

Berger & Milkman (2012) also find that positive content is more viral than negative content, but the relationship between emotion and social transmission is more complex than valence alone. Virality is partially driven by physiological arousal and content that evokes high-arousal positive emotions (such as awe) or negative emotions (such as anger) can be highly viral. Consequently, I hypothesize:

*H8a: Negative WOM intention is lower for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H8b: Negative WOM intention is lower for a pro-cause position on controversial causes than for no-cause ads*

*H8c: Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-cause ads*

*H8d: Negative WOM intention is similar for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads*

*H8e: Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-controversial social cause ads*

*H8f: Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position than for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

## **Social Media Engagement**

Advertising is not a unilateral force exerted by brands on audiences, but a bilateral transaction in which consumers voluntarily engage or not with the messages (Crosier et al., 1999). In a world where consumers actively participate in Social Media, what happens in practice with a brand post (social media campaign) will depend upon the tendency to activism in the audience. *Engagement* in the social media space, according to Barger and Labrecque (2013) most often refers to a

consumer “taking some action beyond viewing or reading”. Tracking engagement on a per post basis enables marketers to gauge the audience’s level of interest in the content of a post. *Volume* (or “volume of mentions”) is a count of the number of mentions of a brand in social channels. Volume is one of the simplest metrics, but it can be very informative when tracked over time and correlated with campaigns as it can provide an indication of progress towards creating awareness (Barger & Labrecque, 2013) and viralization. *Sentiment* or valence, is a widespread measure to consider in evaluating the success of social media initiatives as it can capture the overriding brand sentiment expressed in the user generated content (Smith, Fischer, & Yongjian, 2012). Sentiment, opinion, and action, are three essential aspects of user attitude in social media: each opinion has a sentiment associated with it, and a user overall sentiment toward a topic can translate into actions such mention/post a tweet/retweet containing such opinions (Gao et al., 2014). In social media, the higher the volume and engagement with a positive sentiment that a post achieves, the better.

As an aggregate measure, engagement can also indicate the overall level of consumer interest in a brand’s message. Viewing/reading a post is the baseline activity. Next consumer engagement step could be to click on an emoji that represents manifest his/her *sentiment*. A higher engagement step would be to take the time to write a comment that reflects that sentiment. Emojis or comments represent the sentiment aligned with the consumer’s support or opposition to the post. The highest level of engagement would be to share a post, so it reaches friends and/or a broader audience. It is understood that the consumer agrees with what he/she is sharing unless it is accompanied with a comment that says other ways. Engaging in social media is a form of WOM sometimes called eWOM. Support for a social cause ad would be expected to generate social media engagement (clicking on emojis, commenting, sharing the post/ad) that aligns with that support. Therefore, I hypothesize:

***H9a:*** *Social media engagement intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

***H9b:*** *Social media engagement intention is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

Since there I expect stronger moral emotions for a CSC than for a non-CSC, I also expect

*H9c: Social media engagement intention for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social cause ads*

It is important to assess who tends to generate more WOM, pro-cause or against-cause consumers since that will influence the tone of the reach (how many people see the post). According to East, Hammond, and Wright (2007) even though marketers believe that negative WOM is more prevalent than positive WOM, in 15 studies positive WOM (PWOM) is more common than negative WOM (NWOM) in every case. In addition, Berger and Milkman (2012) find that emotionally evocative content in news articles is particularly viral, and that more awe-inspiring (a positive emotion) content is more viral than sadness-inducing (a negative emotion) content. Further, perceiving desirable implications of a message (e.g. beneficial public announcements) leads to a greater likelihood of taking actions to promote and amplify it (Sun et al., 2008). In addition, Kerr et al. (2012) find that audiences that have enjoyed controversial advertising may wish to talk about it and send it to like-minded people. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses

*H9d: Social media engagement intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

And what may be most relevant to a brand advocating a controversial social cause,

*H9e: Social media engagement intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

Nevertheless, since an against-cause position will elicit stronger moral emotions than a no social cause position and emotionally evocative content is particularly viral (Berger & Milkman, 2012)

*H9f: Social media engagement intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no social cause ads*

### **Boycotting and Boycotting**

Social cause marketing can improve consumers brand metrics such as brand awareness, image, credibility and engagement (Hoeffler & Keller, 2002) and socially responsible consumer behavior is positively related to these responses (Paek & Nelson, 2009). This translates to behaviors such as purchase intentions (Barone et al., 2000; Sen et al., 2016), as well as brand preference, loyalty and advocacy (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Du et al., 2007a; Sen et al., 2016). For nearly 25 years



CONE has been tracking consumers' likelihood to buy a product with a cause benefit. The number has been increasing continuously; currently 89% Americans would switch brands to one that is associated with a good cause, given similar price and quality (Cone Study, 2017). Hence,

***H10a:** Buycott intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

***H10b:** Buycott intention is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

If the strength of moral emotions and the behavioral responses are the same for a non-CSC than for a CSC, a non-CSC would always generate better consumer responses than a CSC, and brands should never advocate a CSC. It makes sense to speculate that a brand advocating a CSC expects the polarization that the controversy generates emboldens consumer's moral emotions instigating those pro-cause consumers to show an increased "buycott" behavior. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a pro-cause position would elicit buycotting behavior that is expressed as augmented purchase intention and brand choice, and that these will be greater for a CSC than for a non-CSC due to the stronger moral emotions produced by the polarization.

***H10c:** Buycott intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads*

***H10d:** Buycott intention is higher for pro-cause position than for against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

Nevertheless, for against-cause position on CSC

***H10e:** Buycott intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads*

***H10f:** Buycott intention is higher for no-cause ads than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads*

Xie et al., (2015) results indicate that negative moral emotions such as contempt, anger, and disgust lead to diverse consumer negative reactions, such as negative WOM, complaining, and boycotting the company. This is consistent with the 76% Americans that claim they would refuse to purchase a company's products or services upon learning that it supported an issue contrary to their beliefs (Cone Study, 2017). Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that

***H11a:** Boycott intention is similar for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

***H11b:** Boycott intention is similar for a pro-cause position on controversial causes than for ads*

***H11c:** Boycott intention similar for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads*

When exposed to a CSC ad, consumers that have an against-cause position would experience strong negative moral emotions leading them to engage in boycott behavior that translates into diminished purchase intentions and into brand avoidance when there is a brand choice.

***H11d:** Boycott intention higher for an against position on controversial social causes than for no-causes ads*

***H11e:** Boycott intention higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-controversial social causes ads*

***H11f:** Boycott intention higher for an against-cause position than for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

Consumer may face options where they can express their support to a cause by choosing the brand advocating it at no cost (parity) than similar brands, or they may need to sacrifice some value (money or convenience) by choosing the brand that advocates the cause they support. This would also be a form of buycott, and the ensuing hypotheses follow the same logic that the hypotheses on buycott above.

***H12a:** Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for non-controversial social causes than when there is no cause*

***H12b:** Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than when there is no cause*

***H12c:** Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than when there is no cause*

***H12d:** Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes*

***H12e:** Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes*

***H12f:** Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes*

Consumers who have a pro-cause position associated with a higher level of personal importance will experience stronger positive moral emotions that will increase their boycott behavior, even when there is a cost, such a higher price, to engaging in boycotting. Hence,

***H13a:** Consumers that hold a pro-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance*

Similarly, a consumer who has an against-cause position which is of high of personal importance will experience stronger negative moral emotions that would increase their boycott behavior, even when there is a cost, such a higher price, to engaging in boycotting. Consequently,

***H13b:** Consumers who hold an against-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance*

Additionally, it is important to understand whether there are differences in consumers' willingness to engage in boycott and boycott behavior for those holding against or pro-positions, respectively, especially when there is a cost to do so. Shafir (1993) establishes that to make choices, options' positive features are weighted more heavily in choosing than in rejecting. Further, negative features or disadvantages weigh more in rejecting than in choosing. Additionally, keeping overall values roughly equal, options with more positive reasons for them are chosen as winners, and options with more reasons against them are rejected. However, (Lutz, 1975) finds that individuals shift their attitudes towards a product more in the negative direction when information is negative more than they shift in the positive direction when information is positive. Supporting this Kanouse (1984) shows that people tend to weigh negative information more heavily than positive information. Therefore, I expect that negative moral emotions will have a stronger influence than positive moral emotions. Furthermore, Baek (2010) finds that in the US about 49 *per cent* of people

are political consumers, of whom 46 *per cent* dualcott (engage both in boycott and buycott), 24 *per cent* buycott, and 30 *per cent* boycott, hence I hypothesize:

*H13c: Consumers will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior when holding an against-cause position than to engage in buycott when holding a pro-cause position*


## **Study 1: Methodology**

### **Experimental Design and Sample**

To test the hypotheses, I use an experimental nested between-subject design. There are five factors: ad type (controversial social cause (CSC), non-controversial social cause (non-CSC), and non-social cause (non-SC) as a control), social cause type (2 CSC, 2 non-CSC), position nested within controversial social cause (pro-cause, against-cause; measured variable). This design entails seven conditions, each comprised of approximately 30 participants, totaling 210 subjects per brand, which replicated for two brands in two categories total 28 conditions, 840 individuals. On each condition subjects are also exposed to a choice type (no cost: same price gift cards, cost: \$5 and \$10 difference gift cards). All individuals are randomly exposed to one condition and complete an online questionnaire and choice task.

Two types of product categories, CSC, and non-CSC issues, are replicated to avoid results being attributed to a particular operationalization of those factors and to produce more generalizable results. Furthermore, similar results obtained across replicates help to rule out alternative explanations if in the experiment there are differences for example in consumers' perceptions between the product category fit in and the social causes or level of controversy among the replicates of those factors. In addition, if however, there are significant differences between the replicates as well as differences between again for example the fit between product categories and the social causes this may offer explanations for the differences among the replicates. See Figure 4 for design structure. See Table 1 for participants' distribution by condition.

Product Category 1



Product Category 2




Figure 4: Experimental Design Structure

Table 1: Participants' Distribution by Condition

			Ad Type				Control Condition	
			CSC Ad		Non-CSC Ad		No Social Cause Ad	
A-B Brands	Category 1	Choice Type	CSC Type 1		CSC Type 2		non-CSC Type 1	non-CSC Type 2
			Pro	Against	Pro	Against		
		No cost: Both \$50 Gift Cards	30	30	30	30	30	30
		Cost: \$50-\$40 "Cause Cost" Gift Cards	30	30	30	30	30	30
C-D Brands	Category 2	Choice Type	CSC Type 1		CSC Type 2		non-CSC Type 1	non-CSC Type 2
			Pro	Against	Pro	Against		
		No cost: Both \$50 Gift Cards	30	30	30	30	30	30
		Cost: \$50-\$40 "Cause Cost" Gift Cards	30	30	30	30	30	30
<b>Study Participants</b>			120	120	120	120	120	120

Further, Baghi and Gabrielli (2013) find that brand awareness does not influence consumers' response regarding the attractiveness of the cause-related product, consumers' intention to buy it, the perceived levels of trust in the cause-related initiative, and the usefulness and importance of the social cause linked to the product. They conducted a 2 (profit sponsoring brand awareness: high; low) × 2 (non-profit social cause brand awareness: high; low) between-subject experiment

to find that neither brand awareness of sponsoring brand nor social cause have a significant effect. Brand awareness does not induce a differential effect on the affective dimension of consumers' attitude towards the cause-related product, neither affects an individual's belief about the relevance of the social cause, nor is able to increase the appeal of the product. Since Study 1 experiment entails choosing a brand's gift card and it is conducted online where participants could google fictitious brands and not find them, I used real brands to avoid this problem. I perform extensive pretesting to choose equally likable brands and comparable social causes (similarly controversial or non-controversial and comparably important/likable).


### **Data Collection**

Data collection was conducted using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), a crowdsourcing platform that connects "requesters" with online "workers" that perform small tasks called Human Information Tasks or HITS. This platform provides access to thousands of potential research study participants from different countries and backgrounds, and data can be collected quickly and relatively inexpensively. Studies using data collected via AMT for academic purposes have been published in academic journals in disciplines such as marketing, communications, and psychology (Sheehan & Pittman, 2016). AMT participants were all 18 years old or older and US residents. They were paid US\$0.20 per minute of estimated time to complete the questionnaire. I collected AMT data for selecting the brands and social causes to be used, to pretest the stimulus material and to conduct the experiment.

### **Selection of Brands**

To select comparable brands, I tested four categories of wide use: soft drinks, sports clothing, credit cards and drugstores, with two well-known brands of similar market share for each category. Respectively Coca-Cola and Pepsi, Nike and Adidas, Visa and Mastercard, CVS and Walgreens. I collected data using Amazon Mechanical Turk N=121, n=30/31 randomly assigning individuals to one category. Questions encompassed category use, brands familiarity, brands usage, brands' overall opinion, willingness to recommend brand, brand preference. Brands in the category were randomly presented. See [Appendix 1](#) for brands pretesting questionnaire. Results show that all the categories are relevant and both brands for each category are equally likable. The main difference is that for sporting goods and soft drinks there are strong brand preferences while for credit cards

and drugstores people are predominantly neutral. Therefore, I chose Visa-Mastercard and CVS-Walgreens to conduct the experiment.



### Selection of Social Issues

To select comparable social causes, I performed a Google search to find relevant non-controversial and controversial social causes and proposed the following social issues to the thesis advisors. Non-controversial social issues: healthy eating, cleaning plastic from oceans, anti-bullying at school and workplaces, skin cancer screening, get a cancer-mammography, ending child abuse, pet adoption, housing solution for homeless veterans. Controversial social issues: same-sex marriage, homo-parental adoption, universal background check to buy weapons, ban on assault weapons for civilians, right to breast feed in public, sex education in schools, Dream Act (illegal immigrants brought to the US as children to receive a green card or legal residency in the US). We decided to pretest eating healthy, skin cancer screening, pet adoption, ending child abuse and housing solutions for veterans as non-controversial issues. As controversial social issues we decided to test same-sex marriage, breast feeding in public, homo-parental adoption, banning assault weapons and dreamers receiving a green card. I collected data using Amazon Mechanical Turk N=315, n=31/32 randomly assigning individuals to one social issue. Questions encompassed





issue importance, position on issue, feelings about a brand supporting the issue, feelings about a brand donating money to the issue. See [Appendix 2](#) for social issues pretesting questionnaire.

Non-CSC are all perceived positively and are equally likeable. In discussion with the advisors, we chose the ones that are slightly better liked and more important.

**Non-Controversial Social causes Summary Table**



	Do you think housing solutions for homeless veterans is an important social issue?	Are you pro, against or neutral about pursuing housing solutions for homeless veterans?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign in support of housing solutions for homeless veterans?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign to donate money to support housing solutions for homeless veterans?	Do you think child abuse is an important social issue?	Are you pro, against or neutral about ending child abuse?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign in support of ending child abuse?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign to support ending child abuse?
<b>n</b>	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
<b>Average</b>	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.0	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.2
<b>Mode</b>	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
<b>Stdev</b>	0.93	1.12	1.37	1.57	0.93	1.36	1.52	1.49



The controversial vs non-controversial effect is obtained, with only neutral to pro positions on non-controversial social issues and individuals reasonably split between both pro and against positions for controversial social issues. In discussion with the advisors, we discarded breast feeding in public as the less controversial. Then we selected banning assault weapons and same-sex marriage since those were slightly more controversial.

**Controversial Social causes Summary Table**

	Do you think same-sex marriage is an important social issue?	Are you pro, against or neutral about same-sex marriage?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign in support of same-sex marriage?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign to donate money to support same-sex marriage?	Do you think banning semiautomatic weapons for civilians is an important social issue?	Are you pro, against or neutral about banning semiautomatic weapons for civilians?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign in support of banning semiautomatic weapons for civilians?	How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign to donate money to support banning semiautomatic weapons for civilians?
n	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Average	4.8	5.1	4.6	4.5	5.7	5.1	5.0	5.0
Mode	7	7	4	7	7	7	7	7
Stdev	2.14	2.51	2.06	2.21	1.73	2.37	2.17	2.18



### Stimulus Material Development and Pretesting

An advertising agency was requested to professionally develop all the ads needed to conduct the experiment. They developed ads for the two non-CSC: ending child abuse and housing solution for homeless veterans, for the two CSC: same-sex marriage and banning assault weapons and replicated them for the four brands in the two categories Visa-MasterCard, CVS-Walgreens. They also developed no social cause or regular branding ads to use as control, one ad for credit cards and one ad for drugstores that were replicated for both brands in each category. They were instructed to develop the ads as similar as possible in terms of graphics, fonts, amount of information, etc. Following are the ads developed by the agency (one example per condition since the only change is the brand logo).

### Non-Controversial Social Cause Ads



We all have the power to stop child abuse.



Let's find housing solutions for homeless veterans.



## Controversial Social Cause Ads



VISA



Ban Assault Weapons NOW.



## No Social Cause Branding Control Ads



More benefits.  
More health.  
More life.



I developed the ads pretesting questionnaire based on scales found at Dr. Gordon C. Bruner II website [www.marketingscales.com](http://www.marketingscales.com). Questions encompassed brand familiarity, ad aesthetics, ad comprehension, aesthetic evaluation, attitude towards the ad, brand-cause fit, final thoughts. See [Appendix 3](#) for ads pretesting questionnaire.

There is evidence in the literature that the perceived congruence or “fit” between the brand and the social cause plays a role on consumer response (Becker-Olsen & Hill, 2006; Bigne-Alcaniz et al., 2012; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Gupta & Pirsch, 2006; Hoeffler & Keller, 2002; Nan & Heo, 2007; Pracejus & Olsen, 2004; Samu & Wymer, 2014b; Simmons & Becker-Olsen, 2006; T de Jong & Mark van der Meer, 2017). It has been established that the fit between the firm and the cause improves the attitude towards the association and towards the sponsoring brand, increasing purchase intent (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Bigne-Alcaniz et al., 2012; Gupta & Pirsch, 2006).

Furthermore, Aqueveque et al. (2018) find that the perceived fit of corporate social responsibility actions designed to reduce the inherent harm of a controversial industry sector can increase corporate reputation. Since I am using real brands, it is important that both, CSC and non-CSC in stimuli ads, present an adequate or at least equivalent product category-cause fit.

I presented the questionnaire to 6 subjects and interviewed them regarding the questionnaire clarity and length. After confirming the questionnaire was clear for all subjects, I proceeded with the pretest on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N 605/n 29/31). Subjects were randomly assigned to any of the 20 conditions (4 brands, 5 ad types). There are no difference between brands (CVS/Walgreens/Visa/Mastercard), Ad organization (poorly/well), Ad order (chaotic/ordered), Ad understanding (easy/difficult), Ad straightforward (straightforward/confusing), Ad meaning (certain/ambiguous), Ad reaction (unfavorably/favorably). Nevertheless, there are some significant differences between ads in Ad offensive/enjoyable, Ad looking poor/nice, Ad pleasing/displeasing, Ad attractive/unattractive, Ad appearance bad/good, Ad likeness dislike/like, Ad valence negative/positive, Brand-Cause-Match poor/good, Brand-Cause-Fit poor/good, Brand-Cause-Alignment poor/good. Surprisingly, those differences do not follow a patten between type of social cause, non-controversial (no-CSC) vs controversial (CSC), nor differences to the control ads. The ads responsible for most differences are banning assault weapons (CSC) and ending child abuse (non-CSC). Observing the ads, I realized that those two ads could be qualified as “negative images” while all the rest of the ads were more “positive images” (see ANOVA test results at [Appendix 4](#)). Looking into the literature I find that charities frequently include in their fundraising materials images and messages emotionally upsetting that might cause substantial psychological distress to some members of the public and result on a negative attitude towards the stress-inducing advertisement (Bennett, 2015).

Hence, I asked the advertising agency to produce new ads for banning assault weapons, ending child abuse, and I also asked to produce an ad in support of the Dreamers Act to conduct a new pretest. Following a one brand sample of the new ads that were produced for all the four brands.



**We all have the power to stop child abuse:  
See something. Say something!**



**Ban Assault  
Weapons NOW.**



**DREAM Act: Give young undocumented immigrants that arrived to this country as children a chance to become lawful permanent residents and eventually apply for citizenship.**



The new ads were tested with the same questionnaires amongst 217 subjects (3 conditions, 4 brands). Individuals were randomly assigned to a condition. ANOVA analysis were conducted again and for the six conditions: Banning Assault Weapons, Dream Act and Same-Sex Marriage as controversial causes, End Child Abuse and Housing for Homeless Veterans as non-controversial causes and branding ad as control. All the ads, except for Banning Assault Weapons, are equivalent (I did not reject  $H_0$ ) on brand familiarity, ad aesthetics, ad comprehension, aesthetic evaluation, attitude towards the ad, and brand-cause fit. There are some significant differences between some ads that after discussion with thesis advisors we found not relevant, such as: between offensiveness between Ending Child Abuse and Control that can be expected; brand familiarity between CVS and Visa (CVS vs Walgreens and VISA vs Mastercard comply with  $H_0$ ); brand knowledge between CVS and Visa (CVS vs Walgreens and VISA vs Mastercard comply with  $H_0$ ); brand advertising between CVS and Visa, and between Walgreens and Visa (CVS/Walgreens and VISA/Mastercard pairs comply with  $H_0$ ). See ANOVA test results at [Appendix 5](#). Therefore, we selected the following ads for the experiment: Housing for Veterans and positive (second ad tested) End Child Abuse ads for non-controversial social causes, Same-sex Marriage and Dream Act for controversial social causes, and the no-cause control ads (branding) for drugstores and credit cards.

### **Study I Experiment Questionnaire Pretest**

The experiment questionnaire comprehends the following aspects: usage frequency and overall impression about brand, elaborative processing, affective response to ad, attitudes towards the ad, feeling of moral emotions, ad moral assessment, position on social cause, cause importance, attitudes towards brand after ad, purchase intention, WOM intention, boycott and boycott intention, social media engagement intention, selection of gift card. See [Appendix 6](#) for questionnaire. The questionnaire was pretested with 10 individuals that were interviewed to ensure comprehension and measure time for completion (average time 8 minutes).

### **Study I Experiment**

The experiment followed a nested between-subject design. There are five factors: ad type (controversial social cause (CSC), non-controversial social cause (non-CSC), and non-social cause (non-SC) as a control), social cause type (2 CSC, 2 non-CSC), position nested within controversial

social cause (pro-cause, against-cause; measured variable). This design entails seven conditions, each comprised of approximately 30 participants, totaling 210 subjects per brand, which replicated for two brands in two categories total 28 conditions, 840 individuals. Since the pro-cause and against-cause position on CSC is a measured variable, I needed to complete a quota for those conditions.

Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, I collected data from 1067 individuals. Subjects were first exposed to a standard demographic questionnaire. See [Appendix 7](#) for questionnaire. In order to gain some efficiency, I asked participants if they owned a credit card to randomly assign those who didn't to any condition but for a drugstore brand. Also, I asked about position on same-sex marriage and (pro-cause, against-cause, neutral) to be able to assign individuals to one of the nested conditions that have not completed its quota. Nevertheless, if I was not able to complete the opposed to Dream Act quota of 30 subjects for each brand and stopped a little short of that due to budget constraints. After cleaning the database from suspicious or uncomplete responses I totaled 774 individuals that satisfactorily completed the experiment questionnaire.

### Cause \* Brand Crosstabulation

Count

		Brand				Total
		CVS	Walgreens	Visa	MasterCard	
Cause	Same-Sex Marriage	57	59	56	59	231
	Dream Act	45	47	54	47	193
	Child Abuse	29	30	26	30	115
	Veterans Housing	28	29	30	29	116
	Control	30	30	29	30	119
Total		189	195	195	195	774

### Cause \* Pro\_Con Crosstabulation

Count

		Pro_Con		Total
		Against	Pro	
Cause	Same-Sex Marriage	103	128	231
	Dream Act	56	137	193
	Child Abuse	0	112	112

Veterans Housing	0	100	100
Total	159	477	636

The experiment sample is evenly distributed by gender with 380 females (49.1%), 389 males (50.3%) and 5 Other/prefer not to say (0.6%). The sample is also reasonably distributed by age, income, education, political inclination, and religion importance.

### Age Group

	N	%
18 - 24	37	4.8%
25 - 34	269	34.8%
35 - 44	198	25.6%
45 - 54	133	17.2%
55 - 64	85	11.0%
65 - 74	47	6.1%
75 - 84	4	0.5%
85 or older	1	0.1%

### Income

	N	%
\$0-\$9,999	102	13.2%
\$10,000-\$24,999	134	17.3%
\$25,000-\$49,999	229	29.6%
\$50,000-\$74,999	142	18.3%
\$75,000-\$99,999	97	12.5%
\$100,000-\$124,999	31	4.0%
\$125,000-\$149,999	20	2.6%
\$150,000-\$174,999	5	0.6%
\$175,000-\$199,999	8	1.0%
\$200,00 and up	6	0.8%

### Education

	N	%
Less than highschool	5	0.6%
Highschool degree	94	12.1%
Some college	120	15.5%



Associate degree	71	9.2%
Bachelor degree	356	46.0%
Graduate degree	128	16.5%

#### Political Orientation

	N	%
Very conservative	50	6.5%
Conservative	176	22.7%
Middle of the road	181	23.4%
Liberal	253	32.7%
Very liberal	114	14.7%

#### Religion Importance

	N	%
I not religious	336	43.4%
Not important at all, although I consider myself religious	69	8.9%
Moderately important	145	18.7%
Very important	164	21.2%
Center of my life	60	7.8%

Each subject was exposed to one ad that represented one experimental condition and responded to the full questionnaire (available in [Appendix 6](#)). After responding all questions, subjects were told they will participate in a gift card raffle. They were asked to select between a gift card for the brand in the ad and one of a competitor's brand (CVS and Walgreens or Visa and Mastercard depending on the category's condition). There were three different levels of value: parity at \$25 gift cards, \$5 difference with \$25 and \$30 gift cards, and \$10 difference with \$40 and \$50 gift cards. Subjects were randomly assigned to a value level. When there was a \$5 or \$10 difference, subjects supporting the social cause portrayed in the ad were exposed to a gift card of a lower value for the brand in the ad supporting the cause and a higher value for the competitor brand (cost to support); vice versa, subjects opposing the social cause portrayed in the ad were exposed to a gift card of a higher value for the brand in the ad supporting the cause and a lower value for the competitor (cost to oppose). Subjects exposed to the no-cause control ad were randomly assigned to a lower or higher value for the advertising brand than for the competitor.

## Study I Results

### Scales Reliability

All scales were examined using IBM SPSS 27 (SPSS) Scales Reliability Analysis. A general accepted rule is that a Cronbach's Alpha  $\alpha$  0.6-0.7 indicates an acceptable level of reliability, and 0.8 or greater a very good level. All scales obtained  $\alpha$  above 0.7. The following table summarizes Cronbach's Alpha. See all results in [Appendix 8](#).


#### Scales Reliability

<b>x</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</b>	<b>N of Items</b>
Brand Perception Overall	.936	.936	2
Elaborative Process	.763	.763	3
Emotional Involvement with Ad	.969	.969	3
Attitude Towards Ad	.906	.906	4
Attitude Towards Ad Positive	.919	.919	2
Attitude Towards Brand	.838	.838	4
Attitude Towards Brand Positive	.791	.791	2
Total Moral Emotions	.755	.753	8
Positive Moral Emotions	.948	.949	4
Negative Moral Emotions	.924	.924	4
Ad Moral Assessment	.898	.902	2
Cause Importance	.755	.755	2
Positive Word of Mouth	.952	.952	2
Negative Word of Mouth	.931	.931	2
Boycott Intention	.901	.901	3
Buycott Intention	.928	.929	3
Social Media Engagement	.954	.955	6

Anyhow, in the case of Attitude Towards Ad and Attitude Towards Brand where 2 items in the scale were expressed in a positive way and 2 items in a negative way that had to be reversed, analyzing the frequencies and histograms I realized that the negative items present a much-skewed distribution than the positive items and scales reliability are also strong for a scale containing only the two positive items (see [Appendix 8](#)). Consequently, after consulting with thesis advisors I removed the negative items from Attitude Towards Ad and Attitude Towards Brand scales.




**Figure 2. Social Causes Model.** Cause Importance Moderates Moral Emotions Mediation on consumer response to Brand Activism (Social Causes Advertising). Hayes' PROCESS Conditional Model 8.



**Figure 3. Controversial Social Cause Model.** Cause Importance Moderates Moral Emotions Mediation on consumer response to the consumer’s position on a Controversial Social Cause. Hayes’ PROCESS Conditional Process Model 8.

To assess this thesis models, I used Hayes PROCESS macro for SPSS. By specifying model=8, PROCESS estimates the model depicted in figure 2 and 3, estimates the coefficients using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and will automatically probe any interaction in a model if its *p*-value is 0.10 or less (Hayes, 2017). “An indirect effect in a model such as this one is the product of the effect of *X* on *M* and the effect of *M* on *Y* controlling for *X*, and the direct effect is the effect of *X* on *Y* controlling for *M*. But in this model, both of these effects are specified as moderated and so become functions of *W*” (Hayes, 2017, pg 447).

As explained by Hayes (2017, pg 449) “With evidence of moderated mediation, one can claim that the  $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$  chain of events functions differently or to varying degrees for different people, in different contexts or conditions, or whatever the moderator variable represents.” Figure 4 shows the statistical diagram that represents Hayes’ Model 8 of mediated moderation.



**Figure 4.** Statistical diagram representing mediated moderation. Hayes’ Model 8. This visually depicts how the effects represented in conceptual diagram Figure 2 and Figure 3 would actually be estimated by a mathematical model, such a linear regression model.

According to Hayes (2017) this translates to

$$M = i_M + a_1X + a_2W + a_3XW + e_M$$

$$Y = i_Y + c'_1X + c'_2W + c'_3XW + e_Y$$

In our models  $Y$  represents multiple consumer responses,  $Y_n$ :

$Y_1 =$  Elaborative Process

$Y_2 =$  Emotional Involvement with Ad

$Y_3 =$  Attitude Towards Ad

$Y_4 =$  Attitude Towards Brand after Ad

$Y_5 =$  Positive Word of Mouth

$Y_6 =$  Buycott Intention

$Y_7 =$  Negative Word of Mouth

$Y_8 =$  Boycott Intention

$Y_9 =$  Social Media Engagement

$Y_{10} =$  Supported Position with Gift Card

According to Hayes (2017) historically the question as to whether an indirect effect is moderated-“moderated mediation”-has been answered using a logic similar to the causal steps approach. By this logic, if one of the paths is dependent on a moderator, then so is the indirect effect, since it is a product of two paths at least one of which is moderated. But more recent thinking does not focus on the individual paths, but rather on the model as a whole by examining whether the weight of the moderator in the function defining the size of the indirect effect is different from zero. Hayes calls this weight *index of moderated mediation*. PROCESS automatically constructs the index of moderated mediation as a product of two regressions coefficients and provides a bootstrap confidence interval. If zero is not within the interval the mediation is moderated. “When using this approach to testing whether an indirect effect is moderated, it doesn’t matter whether an interaction involving one of the paths defining the indirect effect is statistically significant by a formal test” (Hayes, 2017, pg. 425)

### **Social Causes Model Results**









To assess social causes moderated mediation model **H1a**: *Consumers’ responses to social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance*, **H1b**: *The higher the cause importance the grater the effect of social cause ads on moral emotions*, and, **H1c**: *The higher the cause importance the grater the effect of social cause ads on consumers’ responses*, I run SPSS 27 with Hayes’ PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.2 for each dependent variable  $Y_n$  that represent consumers’ response to stimulus ads. Here I will summarize results. Please find all PROCESS outputs at [Appendix 9](#).


Using Hayes process mediation analysis conducted using ordinary least squares path analysis supported the proposed Social Causes Model of cause importance moderating moral emotions mediation for all consumers' responses as can be seen in Table 1. Bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap sample are entirely positive for the Moderated Mediation Index of elaborative processing (.077), emotional involvement (.092), attitude towards ad (.059), attitude towards brand (.040), positive word of mouth (.037), boycott intentions (.069), negative word of mouth (.095), boycott intentions (.104), social media engagement (.130) and gift card selection (.029). There is no evidence that independent of its effect on moral emotions brand activism ads portraying a social cause influence consumers' responses such as elaborative processing ( $c'1 = -.080, p > .1$ ), emotional involvement ( $c'1 = .183, p > .1$ ), attitudes towards ad ( $c'1 = .061, p > .1$ ), attitudes towards brand ( $c'1 = .149, p > .1$ ), positive word of mouth ( $c'1 = .108, p > .1$ ), boycott intentions ( $c'1 = .090, p > .1$ ), social media engagement ( $c'1 = -.086, p > .1$ ) and gift card choice ( $c'1 = -.092, p > .1$ ) indicating the full mediation of moral emotions. All consumers' responses to social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance; therefore, I accept *H1a*. This can be seen in the *Figure 5*.

**Table 1. Social Causes Model (Hayes' Model 8)**

Antecedent	M (Moral Emotions)				Y (Elaborative Process)				Y (Attitude Towards Ad)				Y (Attitude Towards Brand)					
	Coeff.	SE	p		Coeff.	SE	p		Coeff.	SE	p		Coeff.	SE	p			
X (Social Cause Type)	$a_1$	.289	.093	.002	$c_1$	-.080	.095	.399	.267	.132	.044	.310	.044	.115	.008			
M (Moral Emotions)				$b$	-.516	.040	.000	.009	.055	.0876	.048	-.135	.048	.005	.000			
W (Cause Importance)	$a_2$	.077	.080	.334	$c_2$	.214	.081	.009	.713	.113	.000	.541	.000	.098	.000			
X x W	$a_3$	.150	.063	.017	$c_3$	.116	.064	.072	-.091	.089	.306	-.077	.077	.319	.000			
Constant	$im$	2.819	.129	.000	$iv$	3.207	.174	.000	4.242	.240	.000	4.976	.208	.000	.000			
				$R^2 = .194$	$R^2 = .505$	$R^2 = .337$	$R^2 = .253$					$R^2 = .253$						
				F (3,651) = 52.119	F (4,650) = 166.013	F (4,650) = 82.439	F (4,650) = 55.105					F (4,650) = 55.105						
				$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$					$, p < .001$						
<b>Index of Moderated Mediation</b>																		
				Index	.077	Index	.001	Index	-.020	Index	-.020							
				Boot SE	.055	Boot SE	.009	Boot SE	.011	Boot SE	.044							
				BootLLCI	.010	BootLLCI	-.015	BootLLCI	-.044	BootLLCI	-.044							
				BootULCI	.147	BootULCI	.022	BootULCI	-.002	BootULCI	-.002							
<b>Consequent</b>																		
				Y (Buyout Intention)					Y (Negative WOM)					Y (Boycott Intention)				
				Coeff.	.090	Coeff.	-.403	Coeff.	-.477	Coeff.	-.477							
				SE	.124	SE	.135	SE	.130	SE	.130							
				p	.424	p	.000	p	.003	p	.000							
X (Social Cause Type)	$a_1$	.289	.093	.002	$c_1$	-.108	.136	.424	.470	.470	.000	-.403	.135	.003	.000			
M (Moral Emotions)				$b$	-.249	.057	.000	.634	.052	.000	.634	.057	.000	.696	.055			
W (Cause Importance)	$a_2$	.077	.080	.334	$c_2$	.378	.116	.001	.106	.106	.000	-.209	.115	.069	.209			
X x W	$a_3$	.150	.063	.017	$c_3$	-.007	.091	.942	-.055	.084	.515	-.141	.091	.120	.102			
Constant	$im$	2.819	.129	.000	$iv$	3.821	.247	.000	2.415	.226	.000	.750	.245	.002	.236			
				$R^2 = .210$	$R^2 = .351$	$R^2 = .211$	$R^2 = .226$					$R^2 = .226$						
				F (3,651) = 52.119	F (4,650) = 45.450	F (4,650) = 87.951	F (4,650) = 43.474					F (4,650) = 47.447						
				$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$					$, p < .001$						
<b>Index of Moderated Mediation</b>																		
				Index	.037	Index	.069	Index	.095	Index	.104							
				Boot SE	.019	Boot SE	.031	Boot SE	.042	Boot SE	.046							
				BootLLCI	.005	BootLLCI	-.009	BootLLCI	.012	BootLLCI	.015							
				BootULCI	.077	BootULCI	.131	BootULCI	.177	BootULCI	.195							
<b>Consequent</b>																		
				Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)					Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)									
				Coeff.	-.092	Coeff.	-.092	Coeff.	-.092	Coeff.	-.092							
				SE	.184	SE	.184	SE	.184	SE	.184							
				p	.617	p	.617	p	.617	p	.617							
X (Social Cause Type)	$a_1$	.289	.093	.002	$c_1$	-.086	.143	.458	.458	.458	.000	-.086	.143	.458	.000			
M (Moral Emotions)				$b$	.868	.060	.000	.194	.079	.014	.868	.060	.000	.194	.079			
W (Cause Importance)	$a_2$	.077	.080	.334	$c_2$	.267	.122	.029	.057	.159	.720	.267	.122	.029	.057			
X x W	$a_3$	.150	.063	.017	$c_3$	.062	.068	.517	.101	.126	.423	.062	.068	.517	.101			
Constant	$im$	2.819	.129	.000	$iv$	.840	.259	.001	-.211	.336	.531	.840	.259	.001	-.211			
				$R^2 = .415$	$R^2 = .415$	$R^2 = .415$	$R^2 = .415$					$R^2 = .415$						
				F (3,651) = 52.119	F (4,650) = 115.515	F (4,650) = 115.515	F (4,650) = 115.515					F (4,650) = 115.515						
				$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$					$, p < .001$						
<b>Index of Moderated Mediation</b>																		
				Index	.130	Index	.029	Index	.029	Index	.029							
				Boot SE	.057	Boot SE	.018	Boot SE	.018	Boot SE	.018							
				BootLLCI	.019	BootLLCI	.001	BootLLCI	.001	BootLLCI	.001							
				BootULCI	.243	BootULCI	.071	BootULCI	.071	BootULCI	.071							
<b>Consequent</b>																		
				Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)					Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)									
				Coeff.	.862	Coeff.	.862	Coeff.	.862	Coeff.	.862							
				SE	.045	SE	.045	SE	.045	SE	.045							
				p	.000	p	.000	p	.000	p	.000							
X (Social Cause Type)	$a_1$	.289	.093	.002	$c_1$	-.086	.143	.458	.458	.458	.000	-.086	.143	.458	.000			
M (Moral Emotions)				$b$	.868	.060	.000	.194	.079	.014	.868	.060	.000	.194	.079			
W (Cause Importance)	$a_2$	.077	.080	.334	$c_2$	.267	.122	.029	.057	.159	.720	.267	.122	.029	.057			
X x W	$a_3$	.150	.063	.017	$c_3$	.062	.068	.517	.101	.126	.423	.062	.068	.517	.101			
Constant	$im$	2.819	.129	.000	$iv$	.840	.259	.001	-.211	.336	.531	.840	.259	.001	-.211			
				$R^2 = .415$	$R^2 = .415$	$R^2 = .415$	$R^2 = .415$					$R^2 = .415$						
				F (3,651) = 52.119	F (4,650) = 115.515	F (4,650) = 115.515	F (4,650) = 115.515					F (4,650) = 115.515						
				$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$	$, p < .001$					$, p < .001$						
<b>Consequent</b>																		
				Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)					Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)									
				Coeff.	.862	Coeff.	.862	Coeff.	.862	Coeff.	.862							
				SE	.045	SE	.045	SE	.045	SE	.045							
				p	.000	p	.000	p	.000	p	.000							







**Figure 5.** Hayes' Model 8 Moderated Mediation on Consumers' Response to Brand Activism.

*X*=Social Cause Ad, *W*=Cause Importance, *M*=Moral Emotions

I find that even though the direct effect of brand activism ads is not conditional on attributed cause importance, the indirect effect is. Moral emotions are contingent on how important the social cause is to the consumer: the higher the cause importance to the consumer, the higher the moral emotions they feel as shown in Table 2, supporting *H1b*.

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cause Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

**Table 2.** Conditional effects of Cause Importance on Moral Emotions

As can be seen in Table 3, *H1c* is also supported, since cause importance significantly correlates with all consumer responses (for all SPSS outputs please see [Appendix 10](#)). Moral emotions, elaborative processing, emotional involvement with ad, attitude to ad, brand attitude, positive WOM, boycott intention, social media engagement and position on cause support with gift card are greater when the perceive social cause importance is higher as indicated by a positive correlation. On the other hand, the higher the perceive social cause importance the lower negative WOM and boycott intention, as indicated by their negative correlations.


**Confidence Intervals**

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2-tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance - Total Moral Emotions	.409	.000	.343	.471
Cause Importance - Elaborative Processing	.595	.000	.543	.642
Cause Importance - Emotional Involvement with Ad	.563	.000	.509	.614
Cause Importance - Attitude to Ad	.573	.000	.519	.622
Cause Importance - Brand Attitude	.487	.000	.426	.543
Cause Importance - Positive Brand WOM	.439	.000	.375	.499
Cause Importance - Boycott Intention	.520	.000	.461	.573
Cause Importance - Negative Brand WOM	-.232	.000	-.304	-.159
Cause Importance - Boycott Intention	-.157	.000	-.231	-.082
Cause Importance - Social Media Engagement	.469	.000	.407	.527
Cause Importance - Position on Cause Supported with Gift Card	.188	.000	.113	.260

<sup>a</sup> Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.


**Table 3.** Cause Importance – Consumer Response Correlation

To assess *H2a*, *H2b* and *H2c* I run SPSS One Way ANOVA and find support for all three hypotheses (See SPSS outputs in [Appendix 11](#)). Since I am testing for the possibility of the relationships in one direction (1-tailed) I will reject null hypotheses when  $p > .1$  and this will apply for all such hypotheses in this study.



**Figure 6.** Means Plot Social cause vs no social cause advertising effect on moral emotions.

As depicted in Figure 6, social causes ads significantly elicit greater moral emotions than no cause ads supporting H2a ( $MSC= 3.24, MnoSC=2.51, p\leq .001$ ). Likewise, as depicted in Figure 7, moral emotions are greater for non-CSC ads than for non-cause ads supporting H2b ( $MnoCSC=3.62, MnoSC=2.51, p\leq .001$ ); and, greater for CSC ads than for non-cause ads supporting H2c ( $MCSC=3.03, MnoSC=2.51, p\leq .001$ ).



**Figure 7.** Means Plot Controversial and non-controversial social causes vs no social cause advertising effect on moral emotions.


To test **H2d**: Non-controversial social cause ads will elicit only positive moral emotions, I

constructed the new variable Moral Emotions Sign (MEMSign) to establish the type of moral emotions (ME) felt by respondents. The values assigned to MEMSign are 0= No ME (if PME < 2 & NME < 2), 1= Only Negative ME (if PME < 2 & NME >= 2), 2= Only Positive ME (if PME >=2 & NME < 2), and 3= Dual ME (if PME >=2 & NME >=2). As can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 8, H2d is not supported, since 50.6% of respondents feel only positive moral emotions and 42.9% of respondents feel both, positive and negative moral emotions.

**Moral Emotions Sign in Response to Non-Controversial Social Causes**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	No Moral Emotions	11	4.8	4.8
	Only Negative Moral Emotions	4	1.7	1.7
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	117	50.6	50.6
	Dual Moral Emotions	99	42.9	42.9
	Total	231	100.0	100.0

*Table 4. Moral emotions felt in response to non-controversial social cause ads.*



*Figure 8. Histogram Moral emotions response to non-controversial social causes ads*


As expected, One-way ANOVA results as shown in Table 5 and Figure 9 indicate support for *H2e*, with CSC ads eliciting positive moral emotions for those who hold a pro-cause position and eliciting negative moral emotions for those who hold an against-cause position (MpME= 4.82, MnME= 3.56,  $p \leq .001$ ).

<b>Descriptives</b>							
		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Positive Moral Emotions	Against	159	1.9167	1.23589	.09801	1.7231	2.1103
	Pro	265	4.8226	1.59059	.09771	4.6303	5.0150
	Total	424	3.7329	2.03308	.09874	3.5388	3.9270
Negative Moral Emotions	Against	159	3.5550	1.83489	.14552	3.2676	3.8424
	Pro	265	1.6028	1.32414	.08134	1.4427	1.7630
	Total	424	2.3349	1.80200	.08751	2.1629	2.5069

<b>ANOVA</b>							
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	
Positive Moral Emotions	Between Groups	839.191	1	839.191	389.485	.000	
	Within Groups	909.247	422	2.155			
	Total	1748.439	423				
Negative Moral Emotions	Between Groups	378.727	1	378.727	160.652	.000	
	Within Groups	994.841	422	2.357			
	Total	1373.568	423				

**Table 5.** One-way ANOVA positive and negative moral emotions elicited by position on controversial social causes.



**Figure 9.** Means Plot of positive and negative moral emotions elicited by position on controversial social causes.

The dual moral emotions effect explained by respondents mixed emotions when exposed to a distressing social cause that caused *H2d* to be not supported is also in play to not support *H2f* controversial social cause ads elicit stronger moral emotions than non-controversial social cause ads, since as can be seen on the On-Way ANOVA results in Table 6 and Figure 10, the effect is opposite to what was expected: non-CSC ads elicit significantly stronger moral emotions than CSC ads (MnoCSC= 3.62, MCSC= 3.03,  $p \leq .001$ ).

### Descriptives

#### Total Moral Emotions

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Controversial	424	3.03	1.082	.053	2.93	3.14	1	7
Non-Controversial	231	3.62	1.219	.080	3.47	3.78	1	7
Total	655	3.24	1.166	.046	3.15	3.33	1	7


### ANOVA

#### Total Moral Emotions

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	51.959	1	51.959	40.550	.000
Within Groups	836.731	653	1.281		

Total	888.690	654		
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**Table 6.** One-way ANOVA Total moral emotions by type of social cause ads.



**Figure 10.** Means Plot Total moral emotions by type of social cause ads.

### Controversial Social Cause Model Results

To assess Controversial Social Causes moderated mediation model and **H3:** *Consumers' responses to the position on controversial social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance*, I run SPSS 27 with Hayes' PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.2 for each dependent variable  $Y_n$  that represent consumers' response to stimulus ads. Here I will summarize results in Table 7. Please find all PROCESS outputs at [Appendix 11](#).





**Table 8. Controversial Social Causes Model (Hayes' Model 8)**

Antecedent	M (Moral Emotions)				Y (Elaborative Process)				Y (Attitude Towards Brand)						
	Coeff.	SE	p		Coeff.	SE	p		Coeff.	SE	p				
<i>X</i> (Controversial Cause Position)	$a_1$	-.043	.024	.076	$c_1$	.157	.022	.000	.523	.025	.000	.420	.027	.000	
<i>M</i> (Moral Emotions)		-	-	-	$b$	.516	.044	.000	.009	.051	.852	-.148	.054	.006	
<i>W</i> (Cause Importance)	$a_2$	.300	.035	.000	$c_2$	.227	.035	.000	.183	.040	.000	.176	.042	.000	
	$a_3$	.042	.012	.001	$c_3$	.050	.012	.000	.049	.013	.000	.054	.014	.000	
Constant	$\text{im}$	2.923	.058	.000	$\text{iv}$	2.038	.140	.000	4.347	.161	.000	5.034	.170	.000	
				$R^2 = .169$	$R^2 = .556$	$R^2 = .674$	$R^2 = .543$					$R^2 = .543$			
				F (3,420) = 28.546	F (4,419) = 130.918	F (4,419) = 216.516	F (4,419) = 124.449					F (4,419) = 124.449			
				$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$					$p < .001$			
<b>Index of Moderated Mediation</b>															
				Cause Importance	Index	.022			Index	.000			Index	-.006	
					Boot SE	.006		Boot SE	.003			Boot SE	.004		
					BootULCI	.010		BootULCI	-.003			BootULCI	-.014		
					BootLLCI	.034		BootLLCI	.006			BootLLCI	-.001		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Positive WOM)	Index	.022			Index	.000			Index	-.006	
					Boot SE	.006		Boot SE	.003			Boot SE	.004		
					BootULCI	.010		BootULCI	-.003			BootULCI	-.014		
					BootLLCI	.034		BootLLCI	.006			BootLLCI	-.001		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Buyout Intention)	Index	.029			Index	.029			Index	.029	
					Boot SE	.355		Boot SE	.502			Boot SE	.776		
					BootULCI	.029		BootULCI	.059			BootULCI	.068		
					BootLLCI	.081		BootLLCI	.182			BootLLCI	.049		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Negative WOM)	Index	.018			Index	.018			Index	.018	
					Boot SE	.075		Boot SE	.075			Boot SE	.071		
					BootULCI	.185		BootULCI	.2046			BootULCI	.282		
					BootLLCI	.040		BootLLCI	.442			BootLLCI	.198		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Boycott Intention)	Index	.021			Index	.021			Index	.033	
					Boot SE	.006		Boot SE	.006			Boot SE	.010		
					BootULCI	.010		BootULCI	.021			BootULCI	.014		
					BootLLCI	.035		BootLLCI	.035			BootLLCI	.014		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)	Index	.013			Index	.021			Index	.029	
					Boot SE	.005		Boot SE	.006			Boot SE	.009		
					BootULCI	.023		BootULCI	.010			BootULCI	.012		
					BootLLCI	.064		BootLLCI	.048			BootLLCI	.054		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Social Media Engagement)	Index	.013			Index	.021			Index	.033	
					Boot SE	.005		Boot SE	.006			Boot SE	.010		
					BootULCI	.023		BootULCI	.010			BootULCI	.012		
					BootLLCI	.064		BootLLCI	.048			BootLLCI	.054		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Supported Position with Gift Card)	Index	.013			Index	.021			Index	.033	
					Boot SE	.005		Boot SE	.006			Boot SE	.010		
					BootULCI	.023		BootULCI	.010			BootULCI	.012		
					BootLLCI	.064		BootLLCI	.048			BootLLCI	.054		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			
<b>Consequent</b>															
				Y (Cox & Snell)	2LL	.041			2LL	.041			2LL	.041	
					Cox & Snell	.006		Cox & Snell	.006			Cox & Snell	.004		
					BootULCI	.064		BootULCI	.048			BootULCI	.054		
					BootLLCI	.014		BootLLCI	.014			BootLLCI	.014		
					BootULCI			BootULCI				BootULCI			

The proposed Controversial Social Cause Model of cause importance moderating moral emotions mediation is supported for all consumers' responses. As can be seen on Table 8, bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap sample are entirely positive for the Moderated Mediation Index of elaborative processing (.022), emotional involvement (.029), attitude towards ad (.019), attitude towards brand (.013), positive word of mouth (.013), boycott intentions (.021), negative word of mouth (.029), boycott intentions (.033), social media engagement (.041) and gift card selection (.014). All consumers' responses to the position on controversial social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance. Consequently, *H3* is supported for all consumers' responses.

There is no evidence of a direct effect of position of CSC on social media engagement ( $c'_{1} = -.010, p > .1$ ) and gift card choice ( $c'_{1} = -.083, p > .1$ ) indicating a full mediation of moral emotions. There is a significant direct effect of position of CSC on elaborative processing ( $c'_{1} = .157, p \leq .001$ ), emotional involvement with ad ( $c'_{1} = .345, p \leq .001$ ), attitude towards ad ( $c'_{1} = .490, p \leq .001$ ), attitude towards brand ( $c'_{1} = .391, p \leq .001$ ), positive WOM ( $c'_{1} = .393, p \leq .001$ ), boycott intentions ( $c'_{1} = .355, p \leq .001$ ), negative WOM ( $c'_{1} = -.1350, p \leq .001$ ), and boycott intentions ( $c'_{1} = -.385, p \leq .001$ ), indicating a partial mediation of moral emotions. This can be seen in Figure 11.





**Figure 11.** Hayes' Model 8 Moderated Mediation on Consumers' Response to Position on Controversial Social Cause Ads. X=Position Pro-Against, W= Cause Importance, M = Moral Emotions.

Even though I learned from the previous analysis that social cause ads have a significant effect on moral emotions ( $a_1=.289, p \leq .05$ , see Table 1) this analysis (Table 7) reveals that the position on controversial social cause ads does not ( $a_1=-.043, p > .05$ ). Nevertheless, moral emotions are moderated by cause importance ( $a_2=.300, p \leq .001$ ) and by the interaction between position on CSC and cause importance ( $a_3=.042, p \leq .001$ ). I also find that except for the selection of a gift card supporting cause position on CSC ( $C_3= .025, p > .1$ ), the direct effect of the position on CSC is conditional on attributed cause importance for all consumers' responses: elaborative processing ( $C_3= .050, p \leq .001$ ), emotional involvement with ad ( $C_3= .050, p \leq .001$ ), attitude towards ad ( $C_3= .057, p \leq .001$ ), attitude towards brand ( $C_3= .062, p \leq .001$ ), positive WOM ( $C_3= .058, p \leq .001$ ), boycott intention ( $C_3= .075, p \leq .001$ ), negative WOM ( $C_3= -.062, p \leq .001$ ), boycott intention ( $C_3= -.071, p \leq .001$ ) and social media engagement ( $C_3= .067, p \leq .001$ ).

### Elaborative Processing

One-way ANOVA results (see Table 8 and Figure 12) show that as expected due to higher moral emotions, elaborative processing is greater for social causes ads than for non-cause ads supporting  $H4a$  (MSC= 3.96, MnoSC= 3.59,  $p \leq .01$ ).

#### Elaborative Processing

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
No Cause	119	3.59	1.345	.123	3.35	3.83	1	6


Cause	655	3.96	1.334	.052	3.85	4.06	1	6
Total	774	3.90	1.341	.048	3.81	3.99	1	6

### ANOVA

Elaborative Processing

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	13.543	1	13.543	7.594	.006
Within Groups	1376.866	772	1.784		
Total	1390.409	773			

**Table 8.** One-way ANOVA Elaborative processing by social causes vs no social causes ads



**Figure 12.** Means Plot Elaborative processing by social causes vs no social causes ads.

Also as expected, I find that elaborative processing is greater for non-CSC than for non-cause ads supporting *H4b* ( $M_{noCSC} = 4.36$ ,  $M_{noSC} = 3.59$ ,  $p \leq .001$ ). See Table 9 and Figure 13.

Elaborative Processing

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Non-Controversial	231	4.36	1.216	.080	4.21	4.52	1	6


No Cause	119	3.59	1.345	.123	3.35	3.83	1	6
Total	350	4.10	1.312	.070	3.96	4.24	1	6

### ANOVA

Elaborative Processing

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	47.076	1	47.076	29.603	.000
Within Groups	553.396	348	1.590		
Total	600.471	349			

**Table 9.** One-way ANOVA Elaborative processing by non-controversial social causes vs no social causes ads.



**Figure 13.** Means Plot Elaborative processing by non-controversial social causes vs no social cause ads.

Surprisingly, as can be seen in Table 10 I find no support for H4c (MCSC= 3.73, MnoSC= 3.59,  $p > .100$ ), since elaborative processing is not significantly higher for CSC than for non-cause ads. This finding goes against controversial advertising literature's suggestions that controversial

advertising executions positively influence processing and brand information acquisition (e.g. Dahl et al., 2003; Dens et al., 2008; Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008; Manchanda et al., 2002; Vézina & Paul, 1997).

Elaborative Processing

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Controversial	424	3.73	1.344	.065	3.61	3.86	1	6
No Cause	119	3.59	1.345	.123	3.35	3.83	1	6
Total	543	3.70	1.344	.058	3.59	3.82	1	6

**ANOVA**

Elaborative Processing

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.946	1	1.946	1.077	.300
Within Groups	977.712	541	1.807		
Total	979.659	542			

**Table 10.** One-way ANOVA Elaborative processing by controversial social causes vs no social causes ads.

Likewise, I didn't find support for H4d and not only elaborative processing is not greater for CSC than for non-CSC ads as it can be seen in Table 11 and Figure 14, but oppositely to what was expected, elaborative processing is significantly greater for non-CSC ads (MSCS=3.73, MnoCSC=4.36,  $p \leq .001$ ) rejecting H4d.

Elaborative Processing


	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Controversial	424	3.73	1.344	.065	3.61	3.86	1	6
NonControversial	231	4.36	1.216	.080	4.21	4.52	1	6
Total	655	3.96	1.334	.052	3.85	4.06	1	6

## ANOVA

Elaborative Processing

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	59.250	1	59.250	35.042	.000
Within Groups	1104.124	653	1.691		
Total	1163.374	654			

**Table 11.** One-way ANOVA Elaborative processing by controversial social causes vs non-controversial social causes ads.



**Figure 14.** Means Plot Elaborative processing by controversial social causes vs non-controversial social causes ads.

### Attitudes Towards Ad

One-Way ANOVA results reveal support for all the hypotheses regarding attitudes towards ad. Favorable attitudes towards ad are greater for non-CSC than for no-cause ads supporting H5a (MnoCSC= 4.80, MnoSC= 4.28,  $p \leq .05$ ); greater for a pro-cause position on CSC than for no-cause ads supporting H5b (MCSCp= 5.16, MnoSC= 4.28,  $p \leq .001$ ); greater for no-cause ads than

for an against-cause position on CSC ads supporting H5c (MnoSC= 4.28, MCSCa=2.16,  $p \leq .001$ ); greater for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads supporting H5d (MCSCp= 5.16, MnoCSC= 4.80,  $p \leq .05$ ); and greater for non-CSC than for an against-cause position on CSC ads supporting H5e (MnoCSC= 4.80, MCSCa=2.16,  $p \leq .001$ ). Please see Table 12 for complete results and Figure 15 for a visual representation.

### Descriptives

Attitude Towards Ad

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	4.2815	1.61775	.14830	3.9878	4.5752	1.00	7.00
Non-Controversial	231	4.8030	1.50981	.09934	4.6073	4.9988	1.00	7.00
Controversial - Pro	265	5.1566	1.34805	.08281	4.9936	5.3197	1.00	7.00
Controversial - Against	159	2.1572	1.42329	.11287	1.9343	2.3802	1.00	7.00
Total	774	4.3004	1.83959	.06612	4.1706	4.4302	1.00	7.00

### ANOVA

Attitude Towards Ad

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	982.983	3	327.661	154.507	.000
Within Groups	1632.927	770	2.121		
Total	2615.910	773			

### Post Hoc Tests

#### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Attitude Towards Ad

Bonferroni

(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-.52152*	.16432	.009	-.9562	-.0869
	Controversial - Pro	-.87509*	.16070	.000	-1.3001	-.4500
	Controversial - Against	2.12428*	.17652	.000	1.6574	2.5912




Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	.52152*	.16432	.009	.0869	.9562
	Controversial - Pro	-.35357*	.13108	.043	-.7003	-.0068
	Controversial - Against	2.64580*	.15006	.000	2.2489	3.0427
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.87509*	.16070	.000	.4500	1.3001
	Non-Controversial	.35357*	.13108	.043	.0068	.7003
	Controversial - Against	2.99937*	.14608	.000	2.6130	3.3858
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	-2.12428*	.17652	.000	-2.5912	-1.6574
	Non-Controversial	-2.64580*	.15006	.000	-3.0427	-2.2489
	Controversial - Pro	-2.99937*	.14608	.000	-3.3858	-2.6130

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 12.** One-way ANOVA Attitude towards ad by brand activism.

### Means Plots



**Figure 15.** Means Plot Attitude towards ad by brand activism.

### Attitudes Towards Brand

As can be seen in Table 13 and Figure 16 I find support for some of the hypotheses regarding attitudes towards the brand, but not for all. Favorable attitudes towards the brand are not significantly greater for non-CSC than for no-cause ads, not supporting *H6a* (MnoCSC= 4.81, MnoSC= 4.52,  $p > .1$ ); are greater for a pro-cause position on CSC than for no-cause ads supporting *H6b* (MCSCp= 5.04, MnoSC= 4.52,  $p \leq .005$ ); greater for no-cause ads than for an against-cause position on CSC ads supporting *H6c* (MnoSC= 4.52, MCSCa= 2.66,  $p \leq .001$ ); not significantly higher for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads not supporting *H6d* (MCSCp= 5.04, MnoCSC=4.82,  $p > .1$ ); and higher for non-CSC than for an against-cause position on CSC causes ads supporting *H6e* (MnoCSC= 5.04, MCSCa= 2.66,  $p \leq .001$ ).

### Descriptives

Attitude Towards Brand

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	4.5210	1.33149	.12206	4.2793	4.7627	1.00	7.00
Non-Controversial	231	4.8139	1.27261	.08373	4.6489	4.9788	1.00	7.00
Controversial - Pro	265	5.0396	1.31402	.08072	4.8807	5.1986	1.00	7.00
Controversial - Against	159	2.6572	1.26558	.10037	2.4590	2.8555	1.00	7.00
Total	774	4.4031	1.57734	.05670	4.2918	4.5144	1.00	7.00

### ANOVA

Attitude Towards Brand

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	632.636	3	210.879	125.815	.000
Within Groups	1290.596	770	1.676		
Total	1923.233	773			

### Post Hoc Tests

#### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Attitude Towards Brand

Bonferroni


(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval

		Mean Difference (I-J)			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-.29284	.14608	.272	-.6793	.0936
	Controversial - Pro	-.51861*	.14286	.002	-.8965	-.1407
	Controversial - Against	1.86378*	.15693	.000	1.4487	2.2789
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	.29284	.14608	.272	-.0936	.6793
	Controversial - Pro	-.22577	.11654	.318	-.5340	.0825
	Controversial - Against	2.15662*	.13341	.000	1.8037	2.5095
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.51861*	.14286	.002	.1407	.8965
	Non-Controversial	.22577	.11654	.318	-.0825	.5340
	Controversial - Against	2.38239*	.12987	.000	2.0389	2.7259
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	-1.86378*	.15693	.000	-2.2789	-1.4487
	Non-Controversial	-2.15662*	.13341	.000	-2.5095	-1.8037
	Controversial - Pro	-2.38239*	.12987	.000	-2.7259	-2.0389

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 13.** One-way ANOVA Attitude towards brand by brand activism.

### Means Plots



**Figure 15.** Means Plot Attitude towards brand by brand activism.

### Positive Word of Mouth

One-way ANOVA results (see Table 14 and Figure 17) do not find support for *H7a* that positive WOM intention is higher for non-CSC than for non-cause ads (MnoCSC= 5.16, MnoSC= 4.96,  $p > .1$ ) but it supports *H7b* with positive WOM intention being greater for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-cause ads (MCSCp= 5.38, MnoSC= 4.96,  $p \leq .1$ ). *H7c* predicting positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social cause than for non-controversial social causes ads is also not supported (MCSCp= 5.38, MnoCSC= 5.16,  $p > .1$ ). On the other hand, there is support for *H7d* and positive WOM intention is greater for non-CSC than for an against-cause position on CSC ads (MnoCSC= 5.16, MCSCa= 3.20,  $p \leq .001$ ); for *H7e*: and positive WOM intention is higher for no-cause than for an against-cause position on CSC ads (MnoSC= 4.96, MCSCa= 3.20  $p \leq .001$ ); and finally, for *H7f*, positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on CSC ads (MCSCp= 5.38, MCSCa= 3.20,  $p \leq .001$ ).

### Descriptives

#### Positive Brand WOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	4.96	1.454	.133	4.70	5.23	1	7
Non-Controversial	231	5.16	1.463	.096	4.97	5.35	1	7
Controversial - Pro	265	5.38	1.277	.078	5.22	5.53	1	7
Controversial - Against	159	3.20	1.753	.139	2.93	3.48	1	7
Total	774	4.80	1.681	.060	4.68	4.92	1	7

### ANOVA

#### Positive Brand WOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	527.473	3	175.824	81.686	.000
Within Groups	1657.386	770	2.152		
Total	2184.859	773			

### Post Hoc Tests

#### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Positive Brand WOM


Bonferroni

(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-.196	.166	1.000	-.63	.24
	Controversial - Pro	-.415	.162	.063	-.84	.01
	Controversial - Against	1.761*	.178	.000	1.29	2.23
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	.196	.166	1.000	-.24	.63
	Controversial - Pro	-.219	.132	.583	-.57	.13
	Controversial - Against	1.957*	.151	.000	1.56	2.36
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.415	.162	.063	-.01	.84
	Non-Controversial	.219	.132	.583	-.13	.57
	Controversial - Against	2.176*	.147	.000	1.79	2.57
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	-1.761*	.178	.000	-2.23	-1.29
	Non-Controversial	-1.957*	.151	.000	-2.36	-1.56
	Controversial - Pro	-2.176*	.147	.000	-2.57	-1.79

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 14.** One-way ANOVA Positive word of mouth by brand activism.

### Means Plots



**Figure 17.** Means Plot Positive word of mouth by social causes.

### Negative Word of Mouth

Looking into the One-Way ANOVA results (see Table 16 and Figure 19) for negative word of mouth I find that a supportive position on social causes does not have a protective effect on negative WOM, since even though negative WOM intention is lower for non-CSC than for non-cause ads this is not significant, thus there is no support for *H8a* (MnoCSC=1.94, MnoSC=2.09,  $p > .1$ ); and it is neither significant for “negative WOM intention is lower for a pro-cause position on CSC than for no-cause ads” not supporting *H8b* either (MCSCp= 1.8, MnoSC=2.09,  $p > .1$ ). This may also be explained by Ito et al., 1998 findings that negative information tends to influence evaluations more strongly than comparably extreme positive information. As expected, I find support for *H8c*, negative WOM intention being higher for an against-cause position on CSC than for no-cause ads (MCSCa= 3.36, MnoSC=2.09,  $p \leq .001$ ). I also find support for *H8d*, since negative WOM intention is similar for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads (MCSCp= 1.8, MnoCSC=1.94,  $p > .1$ ). Also as anticipated, there is support for *H8e*: Negative WOM intention is greater for an against-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads (MCSCa= 3.36, MnoCSC=1.94,  $p \leq .001$ ); and for *H8f*: Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position than for a pro-cause position on CSC ads (MCSCa= 3.36, MCSCp= 1.8,  $p \leq .001$ ).

### Descriptives

#### Negative Brand WOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	2.09	1.535	.141	1.81	2.37	1	7
Non-Controversial	231	1.94	1.544	.102	1.74	2.14	1	7
Controversial - Pro	265	1.80	1.466	.090	1.62	1.98	1	7
Controversial - Against	159	3.36	1.778	.141	3.08	3.64	1	7
Total	774	2.21	1.674	.060	2.09	2.33	1	7

### ANOVA

#### Negative Brand WOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	273.854	3	91.285	37.128	.000
Within Groups	1893.157	770	2.459		

Total	2167.010	773			
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## Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Negative Brand WOM


Bonferroni

(I) Social Causes	(J) Social Causes	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	.149	.177	1.000	-.32	.62
	Controversial - Pro	.294	.173	.536	-.16	.75
	Controversial - Against	-1.269*	.190	.000	-1.77	-.77
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	-.149	.177	1.000	-.62	.32
	Controversial - Pro	.146	.141	1.000	-.23	.52
	Controversial - Against	-1.418*	.162	.000	-1.85	-.99
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	-.294	.173	.536	-.75	.16
	Non-Controversial	-.146	.141	1.000	-.52	.23
	Controversial - Against	-1.564*	.157	.000	-1.98	-1.15
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	1.269*	.190	.000	.77	1.77
	Non-Controversial	1.418*	.162	.000	.99	1.85
	Controversial - Pro	1.564*	.157	.000	1.15	1.98

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 16.** One-way ANOVA Negative word of mouth by social causes.

## Means Plots



**Figure 19.** Means Plot Negative word of mouth by brand activism.

### Social Media Engagement

Analyzing One-Way ANOVA results in Table 17 and Figure 18, as expected, I find support that social media engagement intention is significantly greater for non-CSC than for non-cause ads supporting *H9a* (MnoCSC= 4.05, MnoSC= 2.95,  $p \leq .001$ ) and that social media engagement intention is significantly higher for pro-cause position on CSC than for non-cause ads supporting *H9b* (MCSCp= 3.70, MnoSC= 2.95,  $p \leq .001$ ). I do not find support for *H9c*: social media engagement intention for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads (MCSCp= 3.70, MnoCSC= 4.05,  $p > .1$ ). I do find support for social media engagement intention is greater for non-CSC than for an against-cause position on CSC ads supporting *H9d* (MnoCSC= 4.05, MCSCa= 2.58,  $p \leq .001$ ) and for social media engagement intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on CSC ads supporting *H9e* (MCSCp= 3.70, MCSCa= 2.58,  $p \leq .001$ ). Interestingly, I do not find support for *H9d*: Social media engagement intention is higher for an against-cause position on CSC than for no social causes ads (MnoSC= 2.95, MCSCa= 2.58,  $p > .1$ );

### Descriptives

#### Social Media Engagement

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	2.95	1.904	.175	2.61	3.30	1	7
Non-Controversial	231	4.05	2.086	.137	3.78	4.32	1	8
Controversial - Pro	265	3.70	2.132	.131	3.44	3.96	1	8
Controversial - Against	159	2.58	1.678	.133	2.32	2.84	1	7
Total	774	3.46	2.073	.075	3.31	3.60	1	8

### ANOVA

#### Social Media Engagement

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	248.592	3	82.864	20.760	.000
Within Groups	3073.529	770	3.992		



Total	3322.121	773			
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## Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Social Media Engagement


Bonferroni

(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-1.095*	.225	.000	-1.69	-.50
	Controversial - Pro	-.745*	.220	.005	-1.33	-.16
	Controversial - Against	.373	.242	.745	-.27	1.01
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	1.095*	.225	.000	.50	1.69
	Controversial - Pro	.350	.180	.311	-.13	.83
	Controversial - Against	1.468*	.206	.000	.92	2.01
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.745*	.220	.005	.16	1.33
	Non-Controversial	-.350	.180	.311	-.83	.13
	Controversial - Against	1.118*	.200	.000	.59	1.65
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	-.373	.242	.745	-1.01	.27
	Non-Controversial	-1.468*	.206	.000	-2.01	-.92
	Controversial - Pro	-1.118*	.200	.000	-1.65	-.59

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 17.** One-way ANOVA Social media engagement by brand activism.

## Means Plots



**Figure 18.** Means Plot Social media engagement by social cause.

### Buycott Intentions

As per analysis of One-Way ANOVA results in Table 18 and Figure 19, data do not support *H10a*: Buycott intention is higher for non-CSC than for non-cause ads (MnoCSC= 4.47, MnoSC= 4.09,  $p > .1$ ) but support *H10b*: Buycott intention is higher for pro-cause position on CSC than for non-cause ads (MCSCp= 4.61, MnoSC= 4.09,  $p \leq .05$ ). Nevertheless, *H10c*: Buycott intention is higher for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads is not supported (MCSCp= 4.61, MnoCSC= 4.47,  $p > .1$ ). I find support for *H10d*: Buycott intention is higher for pro-cause position than for against-cause position on CSC ads (MCSCp= 4.61, MCSCa= 2.36,  $p \leq .001$ ); for *H10e*: Buycott intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on CSC ads (MnoCSC= 4.47, MCSCa= 2.36,  $p \leq .001$ ); and, for *H10f*: Buycott intention is higher for no-cause ads than for an against-cause position on CSC ads (MnoSC= 4.09, MCSCa= 2.36,  $p \leq .001$ ).

### Descriptives

#### Buycott Brand

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	4.09	1.553	.142	3.80	4.37	1	7
Non-Controversial	231	4.47	1.563	.103	4.27	4.68	1	7
Controversial - Pro	265	4.61	1.472	.090	4.43	4.78	1	7
Controversial - Against	159	2.36	1.255	.100	2.17	2.56	1	7
Total	774	4.03	1.704	.061	3.91	4.15	1	7

### ANOVA

#### Buycott Brand

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	576.086	3	192.029	88.685	.000
Within Groups	1667.269	770	2.165		
Total	2243.355	773			

### Post Hoc Tests

#### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Buycott Brand


Bonferroni

(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-.388	.166	.118	-.83	.05
	Controversial - Pro	-.519*	.162	.009	-.95	-.09
	Controversial - Against	1.724*	.178	.000	1.25	2.20
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	.388	.166	.118	-.05	.83
	Controversial - Pro	-.132	.132	1.000	-.48	.22
	Controversial - Against	2.112*	.152	.000	1.71	2.51
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.519*	.162	.009	.09	.95
	Non-Controversial	.132	.132	1.000	-.22	.48
	Controversial - Against	2.244*	.148	.000	1.85	2.63
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	-1.724*	.178	.000	-2.20	-1.25
	Non-Controversial	-2.112*	.152	.000	-2.51	-1.71
	Controversial - Pro	-2.244*	.148	.000	-2.63	-1.85

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 18.** One-way ANOVA Boycott intention by brand activism.

**Means Plots**



**Figure 19.** Means Plot Boycott intention by Social Cause.

### Boycott Intentions

As predicted, as it can be seen in Table 19 and Figure 20, all boycott intention hypotheses are accepted. There are no differences in boycott intention amongst non-CSC, pro position on CSC and no-causes ads. *H11a*: Boycott intention is similar for non-CSC than for non-cause ads (MnoCSC= 2.04, MnoSC= 1.98,  $p > .1$ ); *H11b*: Boycott intention is similar for a pro-cause position on CSC than for no-cause ads (MCSCp= 1.90, MnoSC= 1.98,  $p > .1$ ); and, *H11c*: Boycott intention similar for a pro-cause position on CSC than for non-CSC ads (MCSCp= 1.90, MnoCSC= 2.04,  $p > .1$ ). On the other hand, an against cause position on CSC produce a higher boycott intention than a pro position, than non-CSC and no-cause ads. *H11d*: Boycott intention is higher for an against position on CSC than for no-causes ads (MCSCa= 3.38, MnoSC= 1.98,  $p \leq .001$ ); *H11e*: Boycott intention is higher for an against-cause position on CSC than for no-CSC ads (MCSCa= 3.38, MnoCSC= 2.04,  $p \leq .001$ ); and, *H11f*: Boycott intention is higher for an against-cause position than for a pro-cause position on CSC ads (MCSCa= 3.38, MCSCp= 1.90,  $p \leq .001$ )

### Descriptives

#### Boycott Brand

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	1.89	1.343	.123	1.64	2.13	1	7
Non-Controversial	231	2.04	1.475	.097	1.84	2.23	1	7
Controversial - Pro	265	1.90	1.457	.090	1.72	2.07	1	7
Controversial - Against	159	3.38	1.747	.139	3.10	3.65	1	7
Total	774	2.24	1.616	.058	2.13	2.35	1	7

### ANOVA

#### Boycott Brand

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	261.467	3	87.156	38.203	.000
Within Groups	1756.675	770	2.281		
Total	2018.142	773			

### Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons


Dependent Variable: Boycott Brand  
Bonferroni

(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-.148	.170	1.000	-.60	.30
	Controversial - Pro	-.008	.167	1.000	-.45	.43
	Controversial - Against	-1.489*	.183	.000	-1.97	-1.01
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	.148	.170	1.000	-.30	.60
	Controversial - Pro	.140	.136	1.000	-.22	.50
	Controversial - Against	-1.341*	.156	.000	-1.75	-.93
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.008	.167	1.000	-.43	.45
	Non-Controversial	-.140	.136	1.000	-.50	.22
	Controversial - Against	-1.482*	.152	.000	-1.88	-1.08
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	1.489*	.183	.000	1.01	1.97
	Non-Controversial	1.341*	.156	.000	.93	1.75
	Controversial - Pro	1.482*	.152	.000	1.08	1.88

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 19.** One-way ANOVA Boycott intention by brand activism.

### Means Plots



**Figure 20.** Means Plot Boycott intention by Social Causes.

### **Brand Choice Gift Card Selection**

I offered the participants in Study 1 the opportunity to execute their boycott or boycott intentions. Some participants were exposed to alternative gift cards of the same value (\$25) and were able to boycott/boycott at no cost. Other participants were exposed to the opportunity to boycott or boycott by sacrificing \$5 (\$25 and \$30 gift cards) or \$10 (\$40 and \$50 gift cards). I find support for all the hypotheses that predicted a greater willingness to sacrifice money for social causes than for no-cause ads.

Regarding consumers' willingness to sacrifice \$5 or \$10 to support their position on a social cause, versus gaining \$5 or \$10 for not supporting it, I find support for all the hypotheses that predicted a higher willingness to sacrifice for social causes than for no-cause where they were randomly assigned to sacrifice \$5 or \$10 or gain \$5 or \$10 to support the advertised brand. I created the variable "Sacrifice to Support" (Sac2Sup) with values 10, 5, 1 for people who chose the gift card supporting their position (sacrificing \$10, \$5, \$0 by doing so) and -10, -5, -1 for people who chose the gift card opposed to their position (gaining \$10, \$5, \$0 by doing so). Therefore, the higher the average, the greater the sacrifice. As can be seen in Table 20 and visualized in Figure 21, I find support for *H12a*: Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for non-CSC than when there is no-cause (MnoCSC= .10, MnoSC= -2.57,  $p \leq .05$ ); for *H12b*: Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position on CSC than when there is no-cause (MCSCp= -.84, MnoSC= -2.57,  $p \leq .1$ ); and, for *H12c*: Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for an against-cause position on CSC than when there is no cause (MCSCa= -.35, MnoSC= -2.57,  $p \leq .05$ ). On the other hand, regardless of the position on the social cause, there is no difference in the willingness to sacrifice money between social causes, finding no support for the following hypotheses. *H12d*: Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ((MCSCp= -.84, MnoCSC= .10,  $p > .1$ ) is not supported; *H12e*: Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for non-CSC than for an against-cause position on CSC (MnoCSC= .10, MCSCa= -.35,  $p > .1$ ) is not supported; and, *H12f*: Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on CSC (MCSCp= -.84, MCSCa= -.35,  $p > .1$ ) is not supported either.

## Descriptives

Sacrifice to Support

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	-2.5714	6.72785	.61674	-3.7927	-1.3501	-10.00	10.00
Non-Controversial	231	.0952	6.19183	.40739	-.7075	.8979	-10.00	10.00
Controversial - Pro	265	-.8377	6.58626	.40459	-1.6344	-.0411	-10.00	10.00
Controversial - Against	159	-.3522	6.57588	.52150	-1.3822	.6778	-10.00	10.00
Total	774	-.7261	6.53678	.23496	-1.1873	-.2649	-10.00	10.00

## ANOVA

Sacrifice to Support

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	586.586	3	195.529	4.641	.003
Within Groups	32443.347	770	42.134		
Total	33029.933	773			

## Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Sacrifice to Support

Bonferroni


(I) Brand Activism	(J) Brand Activism	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-2.66667*	.73244	.002	-4.6040	-.7293
	Controversial - Pro	-1.73369	.71629	.094	-3.6283	.1610
	Controversial - Against	-2.21923*	.78681	.030	-4.3004	-.1381
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	2.66667*	.73244	.002	.7293	4.6040
	Controversial - Pro	.93297	.58429	.664	-.6125	2.4785
	Controversial - Against	.44744	.66888	1.000	-1.3218	2.2167
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	1.73369	.71629	.094	-.1610	3.6283
	Non-Controversial	-.93297	.58429	.664	-2.4785	.6125
	Controversial - Against	-.48553	.65115	1.000	-2.2079	1.2368
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	2.21923*	.78681	.030	.1381	4.3004

Non-Controversial	-.44744	.66888	1.000	-2.2167	1.3218
Controversial - Pro	.48553	.65115	1.000	-1.2368	2.2079

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Table 20.** One-way ANOVA Willingness to sacrifice by brand activism.

### Means Plots



**Figure 21.** Means Plot Willingness to sacrifice by Social Causes.

When considering cause importance, as can be seen Table 21 there is no support for *H13a*: Consumers that hold a pro-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance (MhCI= -1.38, MICI= -.29,  $p > .1$ ).

### Descriptives

#### Sacrifice to Support

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Low Cause Importance	34	-1.3824	4.61890	.79213	-2.9940	.2293	-10.00	5.00
High Cause Importance	443	-.2889	6.56417	.31187	-.9019	.3240	-10.00	10.00
Total	477	-.3669	6.44739	.29521	-.9469	.2132	-10.00	10.00



**ANOVA**

Sacrifice to Support

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	37.751	1	37.751	.908	.341
Within Groups	19749.045	475	41.577		
Total	19786.797	476			

**Table 21.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of pro-cause position consumers to sacrifice by cause importance.

However, analyzing *H13a* separately by the cost to engage in boycott in \$0, \$5 or \$10, I find that, as seen in Table 22, *H13a* is supported when the cost to engage in boycott is \$0 (MhCI= .16, MICI= .75,  $p \leq .001$ ); as seen in Table 23 *H13a* is not supported when the cost to engage in boycott is \$5 (MhCI= .000, MICI= .39,  $p > .1$ ); and finally, as seen in Table 24 *H13a* is supported again when the cost to engage in boycott is \$10 (MhCI= -10.00, MICI= -1.59,  $p \leq .1$ ).

**Descriptives**

No Cost to Boycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Low Cause Importance	19	.1579	1.01451	.23275	-.3311	.6469	-1.00	1.00
High Cause Importance	157	.7452	.66895	.05339	.6398	.8507	-1.00	1.00
Total	176	.6818	.73361	.05530	.5727	.7910	-1.00	1.00

**ANOVA**

No Cost to Boycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	5.847	1	5.847	11.516	.001
Within Groups	88.335	174	.508		
Total	94.182	175			

**Table 22.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of pro-cause position consumers to sacrifice \$0 by cause importance.

### Descriptives

Sacrifice \$5 to Boycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Low Cause Importance	10	.0000	5.27046	1.66667	-3.7703	3.7703	-5.00	5.00
High Cause Importance	129	.0388	5.01934	.44193	-.8357	.9132	-5.00	5.00
Total	139	.0360	5.01795	.42562	-.8056	.8775	-5.00	5.00

### ANOVA

Sacrifice \$5 to Boycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.014	1	.014	.001	.981
Within Groups	3474.806	137	25.364		
Total	3474.820	138			

**Table 23.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of pro-cause position consumers to sacrifice \$5 by cause importance.

### Descriptives

Sacrifice \$10 to Boycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Low Cause Importance	5	-10.0000	.00000	.00000	-10.0000	-10.0000	-10.00	-10.00
High Cause Importance	157	-1.5924	9.90400	.79043	-3.1537	-.0310	-10.00	10.00
Total	162	-1.8519	9.85751	.77448	-3.3813	-.3224	-10.00	10.00

### ANOVA

Sacrifice \$10 to Boycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	342.534	1	342.534	3.582	.060
Within Groups	15301.911	160	95.637		
Total	15644.444	161			

**Table 24.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of pro-cause position consumers to sacrifice \$10 by cause importance.

On the other hand, as can be seen in Table 25 and Figure 22, I find full support for *H13b*: Consumers who hold an against-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance (MhCI= -1.12, MICI= .73,  $p \leq .1$ ).

### Descriptives

No Cost to Boycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Low Cause Importance	93	-1.1183	6.35687	.65918	-2.4275	.1909	-10.00	10.00
High Cause Importance	66	.7273	6.77449	.83388	-.9381	2.3927	-10.00	10.00
Total	159	-.3522	6.57588	.52150	-1.3822	.6778	-10.00	10.00


### ANOVA

No Cost to Boycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	131.487	1	131.487	3.081	.081
Within Groups	6700.790	157	42.680		
Total	6832.277	158			

**Table 25.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of against-cause position consumers to sacrifice by cause importance.

### Means Plots



**Figure 22.** Means Plot Willingness of against-cause position consumers to sacrifice by cause importance.

Comparable to hypothesis *H13a*, as can be seen in Table 26, I do not find support for *H13c*: Consumers will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior when holding an against-cause position than to engage in buycott when holding a pro-cause position ( $M_{\text{Against}} = -.35$ ,  $M_{\text{Pro}} = -.37$ ,  $p > .1$ ).

### Descriptives

Sacrifice \$5 to Boycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Against	159	-.3522	6.57588	.52150	-1.3822	.6778	-10.00	10.00
Pro	477	-.3669	6.44739	.29521	-.9469	.2132	-10.00	10.00
Total	636	-.3632	6.47455	.25673	-.8674	.1409	-10.00	10.00

### ANOVA

Sacrifice \$5 to Boycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.026	1	.026	.001	.980
Within Groups	26619.073	634	41.986		
Total	26619.099	635			

**Table 26.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of consumers to sacrifice by position on cause.

Nonetheless, when I analyze *H13c* separately by the cost to engage in such boycott/buycott in \$0, \$5 or \$10, I find that as seen in Table 27, *H13c* is not only not supported when the cost to engage in boycott is \$0 ( $M_{\text{Against}} = .27$ ,  $M_{\text{Pro}} = .68$ ,  $p \leq .001$ ) but it is significant in the opposite direction which means that consumers holding a pro-cause position are more willing to boycott than consumers holding an against-cause are willing to boycott when there is no monetary cost involved for them; as seen in Table 28, *H13c* is not supported when the cost to engage in boycott is \$5 ( $M_{\text{Against}} = .000$ ,  $M_{\text{Pro}} = .04$ ,  $p > .1$ ); and finally, as seen in Table 29, *H13c* is not supported either when the cost to engage in boycott is \$10 ( $M_{\text{Against}} = -1.27$ ,  $M_{\text{Pro}} = -1.85$ ,  $p > .1$ ).

**Descriptives**

No Cost to Boycott/Buycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Boycott	52	.2692	.97247	.13486	-.0015	.5400	-1.00	1.00
Buycott	176	.6818	.73361	.05530	.5727	.7910	-1.00	1.00
Total	228	.5877	.81085	.05370	.4819	.6935	-1.00	1.00

**ANOVA**

No Cost to Boycott/Buycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	6.833	1	6.833	10.844	.001
Within Groups	142.413	226	.630		
Total	149.246	227			

**Table 27.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of consumers to sacrifice \$0 by position on cause.

**Descriptives**

Sacrifice \$5 to Boycott/Buycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Boycott	52	.0000	5.04878	.70014	-1.4056	1.4056	-5.00	5.00
Buycott	139	.0360	5.01795	.42562	-.8056	.8775	-5.00	5.00
Total	191	.0262	5.01307	.36273	-.6893	.7417	-5.00	5.00

**ANOVA**

Sacrifice \$5 to Boycott/Buycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.049	1	.049	.002	.965
Within Groups	4774.820	189	25.264		
Total	4774.869	190			

**Table 28.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of consumers to sacrifice \$5 by position on cause.

### Descriptives

Sacrifice \$10 to Boycott/Buycott

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Boycott	55	-1.2727	10.01010	1.34976	-3.9788	1.4334	-10.00	10.00
Buycott	162	-1.8519	9.85751	.77448	-3.3813	-.3224	-10.00	10.00
Total	217	-1.7051	9.87635	.67045	-3.0265	-.3836	-10.00	10.00

### ANOVA

Sacrifice \$10 to Boycott/Buycott

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	13.771	1	13.771	.141	.708
Within Groups	21055.354	215	97.932		
Total	21069.124	216			

**Table 29.** One-way ANOVA Willingness of consumers to sacrifice \$10 by position on cause.

I find partial support to *H13a: Consumers that hold a pro-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance.* It is only supported when the cost to engage in boycott behavior is \$0 or \$10, but not when it is \$5. On the other hand, there is no such difference for boycotters. Therefore, *H13b: Consumers who hold an against-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance* is fully supported. Nevertheless, I do not find support for *H13c: Consumers will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior when holding an against-cause position than to engage in boycott when holding a pro-cause position.* Not only that, but I also find that when there is no cost, CSC supporters executed their boycott significantly more than CSC opposers executed their boycott (Table 27).

### Study 1 Post Hoc Analysis

Behaviors are more important than intentions, and in Study 1 potential boycotters and boycotters had the opportunity to act on their intentions. Is there any difference between boycott/buycott intentions and the actual behavior?

To further analyze this, I created the variable “Potential Buycotter or Boycotter” (ActivPot) where if Buycott Intention > 4, then ActivPot = 1, Potential Buycotter; if Boycott Intention > 4, then ActivPot = 2, Potential Boycotter. As it can be seen in Table 28. I observe greater buycott than boycott intentions ( $p \leq .001$ ), with 51% potential buycotters amongst non-CSC, 48% potential boycotters amongst CSC supporters. There is a 30% potential boycotters amongst CSC opposers, and that is less than the surprising 37% of potential buycotters for no social causes.

**Potential Buycotter or Boycotter \* Social Causes Position Crosstabulation**

			Social Causes Position				
			No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	Controversial - Pro	Controversial - Against	Total
Potential Buycotter or Boycotter	No Boycott nor Boycott	Count	66	88	107	101	362
		% within Social Causes Position	55.5%	38.1%	40.4%	63.5%	46.8%
	Potential Buycotter	Count	44	117	128	10	299
		% within Social Causes Position	37.0%	50.6%	48.3%	6.3%	38.6%
	Potential Boycotter	Count	9	26	30	48	113
		% within Social Causes Position	7.6%	11.3%	11.3%	30.2%	14.6%
Total	Count	119	231	265	159	774	
	% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

**Table 28. Potential Buycotters and Boycotters by Experimental Condition**

So now we know there are more potential buycotters than boycotters, but how does this translate to behavior? Do potential buycotters actually buycott more than potential boycotters boycott? To assess that I created the variable “Executed Buycott/Boycott” if “Sacrifice to Support” > 0 = 1, Executed Buycott/Boycott and if “Sacrifice to Support” < 0 = 0, Failed.

As can be seen in Table 29, when there is a cost to buycott/boycott there is no difference ( $p > .1$ ) between actual buycott (63.6%) and boycott (64.6%) execution amongst potential buycotters and boycotters. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table 30, only 29% act on it for non-social causes. This means that potential social cause buycotters and boycotters are willing to put their money where their mouth is while no cause buycotters are not.

When there is no cost to buycott/boycott there is more of both, but the difference between their execution behavior is significant ( $p \leq .05$ ) and potential buycotters act on their boycott intentions

more (92.2%) than potential boycotters act on their boycott intentions (76.9%). And, as can be seen in Table 31, there is no boycott execution for non-social causes.

**Descriptives**

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Min	Max
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Potential Boycotter	165	.6364	.48251	.03756	.5622	.7105	.00	1.00
	Potential Boycotter	65	.6462	.48188	.05977	.5267	.7656	.00	1.00
	Total	230	.6391	.48130	.03174	.5766	.7017	.00	1.00
Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Potential Boycotter	90	.9222	.26932	.02839	.8658	.9786	.00	1.00
	Potential Boycotter	39	.7692	.42683	.06835	.6309	.9076	.00	1.00
	Total	129	.8760	.33090	.02913	.8183	.9336	.00	1.00

**ANOVA**

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Between Groups	.004	1	.004	.019	.890
	Within Groups	53.043	228	.233		
	Total	53.048	229			
Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Between Groups	.637	1	.637	6.046	.015
	Within Groups	13.379	127	.105		
	Total	14.016	128			

**Table 29.** One-way ANOVA Buycott/boycott execution by potential buycotter/boycotter with cost and at no cost

**Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost \* Social Causes Position Crosstabulation**

			Social Causes Position				Total
			No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	Controversial - Pro	Controversial - Against	
Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Failed	Count	65	71	102	57	295
		% within Social Causes Position	71.4%	52.2%	57.6%	53.3%	57.7%
	Executed	Count	26	65	75	50	216
		% within Social Causes Position	28.6%	47.8%	42.4%	46.7%	42.3%
Total	Count	91	136	177	107	511	
	% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

**Table 30.** Buycott or Boycott execution at a cost



**Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost \* Social Causes Position Crosstabulation**

			Social Causes Position				Total
			No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	Controversial - Pro	Controversial - Against	
Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Failed	Count	28	19	10	19	76
		% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	20.0%	11.4%	36.5%	28.9%
	Executed	Count	0	76	78	33	187
		% within Social Causes Position	0.0%	80.0%	88.6%	63.5%	71.1%
Total		Count	28	95	88	52	263
		% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 31. Buycott or Boycott execution at a cost**

**Study 1 Discussion**

Study 1 goes beyond the existing literature by offering a theoretical framework that incorporates moral emotions and cause importance to explain the underlying process of consumer responses to social causes in general and CSC in particular. This differentiates from Hydock et al. (2020) in that these authors investigate consumer’s alignment/misalignment on a controversial issue advocated by a brand and a brand’s share as underlying processes accounting for positive or negative effects of corporate political advocacy. In addition, they consider perceived authenticity as a moderator. I propose and analyze moral emotions as a mediator of consumer responses: processing, attitudes, intentions and behavior and cause importance. Further, I examine the importance of a social cause as moderating moral emotions and consumer responses to social cause advertising.

The proposed social causes moderated mediation model is validated: moral emotions mediate consumer responses to social causes, and the higher the moral emotions, the greater the consumers’ responses. Also, cause importance moderates moral emotions and indirectly consumer responses. Specifically, the higher consumers’ perceptions of the importance of a social cause, the greater the effect of social cause advertisement on their responses.

The controversial social causes moderated mediation model is also corroborated. Moral emotions mediate consumer responses to position on CSC, and the higher the moral emotions, the greater consumers’ responses. Correspondingly, cause importance moderates moral emotions and consumer responses, the higher the perception of importance of the cause by consumers, the greater their response. This also goes beyond Mukherjee & Althuizen (2020) who following Haidt’s social

intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001, 2003a) suggest that the decision of whether to punish a brand that has taken a perceived immoral stand can be thought of as a moral dilemma that is likely to elicit a deliberate moral reasoning process. I examine the underlying process and test a model on how moral emotions influence consumers' responses, and I do so not only for cause opposition but also for cause support.

Extending previous literature, this thesis analyzes consumers' responses to CSC, non-CSC, and no-social causes advertising. This diverse causes analysis differentiates this thesis from Hydock et al. (2020), Mukherjee & Althuizen (2020) and Bhagwat et al. (2020) who only compare CSC to no social causes. This is important not only because non-CSC are still more prevalent, but by analyzing the underlying process for social causes in general I am also contributing to the CSR and cause-related marketing literature.

An important finding is that while CSC elicit divergent moral emotions, positive amongst cause supporters and negative amongst opposers, non-CSC elicit dual moral emotions, positive and negative. This unexpected duality impacts predictions of consumers' responses to non-CSC advertising.

This study also differentiates from Hydock et al. (2020) in that they analyze impact on brand choice between small and big market share brands, while I use real brands of similar characteristics for control. Plus, I analyze the impact not only on brand choice but on a wider scope of responses including attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. In general, social cause ads performed better than no-cause ads. As expected, consumers' responses to CSC were dependent on their position towards the cause. A pro-cause position on a CSC shows just a few advantages over a non-CSC, nevertheless these are pluses on important consumers' responses such as attitude towards ads, attitude towards brands and boycott behavior when there is no monetary cost. As predicted, CSC opposers' negative moral emotions show worse results than any other conditions on desirable consumers' responses. It also augmented negative WOM and boycott intentions. Social causes may be an effective way to promote positive WOM, social media engagement intentions, and boycott intentions and behavior. It is remarkable that when there is a social cause involved,

potential boycotters and boycotters put their money where their mouth is, while potential no-cause boycotters do not.

## **Processing**

I successfully established the underlying process where moral emotions moderated by social cause importance mediated most consumer responses to brand activism in general and to controversial social causes in particular. I also discover that the intensity of moral emotions felt is more important than if they are positive or negative. This could be appreciated because while the type of social cause did have a significant effect on moral emotions (see Social Causes Model) the position on a controversial cause did not (see Controversial Social Causes Model), even though moral emotions is a significant mediator in both models.

As expected, no social cause ads (control) do not trigger moral emotions while CSC ads elicit positive moral emotions amongst supporters and negative moral emotions amongst opposers. An unanticipated finding is that non-CSC ads elicit both positive and negative moral emotions at the same time. To explain this counter intuitive result, a study by Bennett (2015) establishes that a majority (63%) of individuals experience substantial mixed emotions when exposed to charity advertising that deal with emotionally upsetting issues (cruelty to animals, severe physical disfigurement, etc.). People with high empathetic disposition and high affect intensity exhibit a mix of emotions that are more negative than positive, signaling charities intending to fundraise need to be careful with their advertising. Even though Bennett (2015) does not specifically address moral emotions, some of the emotions studied in his research such as “sadness for the victim”, “anger at the situation” and “hope for the victim’s future” are similar to the moral emotions included in this thesis. Nevertheless, an additional analysis reveals a predominance of positive moral emotions over negative moral emotions in response to non-CSC ads (See [Appendix 13](#) for data support of this analysis).

Since the measure of total moral emotions is based on the average of the sum of the scores of positive and negative moral emotions, this dual moral emotion effect in response to non-CSC ads also explains why contrary to what was expected, non-CSC elicit stronger moral emotions than CSC ads that elicit only positive or negative moral emotions depending on a consumer’s position in relation to the CSC. These dual moral emotions are responsible for some enhanced consumers’

responses, e.g. elaborative processing. Contradicting controversial advertising literature which suggests that controversial advertising executions positively influence processing and brand information acquisition (e.g. Dahl et al., 2003; Dens et al., 2008; Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008; Manchanda et al., 2002; Vézina & Paul, 1997) no support for CSC ads eliciting greater elaborative processing than no-cause ads is found. In particular, opposite to what was expected, CSC ads elicit lower elaborative processing than non-CSC ads. To further investigate this result I examine the impact of different moral emotions on elaborative processing by analyzing the effect of position on social causes and find there are no significant differences in elaborative processing between supporters of CSC and non-CSC ads, but elaborative processing is greater for non-CSC than for opposers to CSC ads (See [Appendix 13](#) for ANOVA results). This leads us to conclude that only higher positive moral emotions elicit greater elaborative processing, meaning that this effect is only produced by social cause advertising that elicit positive moral emotions, i.e., non-CSC or a pro-cause position on CSC.

Study 1 processing conclusions: Moral emotions mediate consumers' responses to social causes (CSC and non-CSC). Higher the moral emotions results in a greater influence on consumer responses. Cause importance moderates moral emotions and consumer responses, and the higher the cause importance, the grater the effect. CSC elicit divergent moral emotions: positive for pro-cause and negative for against-cause, while non-CSC elicit both. Positive moral emotions have a greater impact on elaborative processing.

### **Attitudes**

All social causes have an effect on ad attitudes while only CSC ads have a significant effect on brand attitudes. All hypotheses regarding attitudes toward ads are supported, with pro-cause CSC performing best, followed by non-CSC with an against-cause position on CSC ads performing worst. This is not the case for attitudes towards brands. There are less clear significant differences between non-CSC and CSC. The higher sensitivity of attitudes towards ads to social cause advertising than towards brands may be explained because while an ad is seen for the first time and consumers are just forming their attitudes towards it, they probably have formed prior attitudes toward well-known brands resulting in more stable attitudes.

Analyzing the One-Way ANOVA results from Table 13 and Figure 15, it also seems that attitudes towards brands are more sensitive to negative information. This is consistent with findings that negative information tends to influence evaluations more strongly than comparably extreme positive information (Ito et al., 1998). However, the fact that this negative bias exists along with a more positive attitudes towards brands for pro-cause position on CSC than for no-cause ads could be explained by the preferential weighting of negative and of extreme cues (Fiske, 1980).

## **Intentions**

As with attitudes towards ads, the highest positive WOM intentions are prompted by a pro-cause position on CSC ads, followed by non-CSC ads. Opposition to CSC elicits the lowest positive WOM intentions. While I correctly predict the directions of these relationships significant differences between all conditions is not found, e.g., positive WOM for non-CSC is no different than for no-social cause ads. This may be explained by negative moral emotions present in non-CSC having the effect of preventing people from taking an action to help on causes they care for (Bennett, 2015), somehow cancelling positive moral emotions.

On the other hand, negative WOM intentions are significantly higher amongst opposers to CSC ads than for any other condition. Surprisingly, the results reveal that support for a CSC or non-CSC ad does not provide a protective effect against negative WOM intentions. This may also be explained by Ito et al., 1998 findings that negative information tends to influence evaluations more strongly than comparably extreme positive information.

Social cause ads elicit greater social media engagement intentions than no-social cause ads, and importantly, both non-CSC ads and CSC supporters show greater social media engagement intentions than CSC opposers. This is extremely relevant since it would mean that CSC opposers display lower intentions to spread negative WOM in social media and thus, may not present as great a danger to brands as expected. What may explain this result is that commitment to brands moderate negative information effects on attitude change (Ahluwalia et al., 2000). In addition, even though it is true that in general that the higher the moral emotions the greater the social media engagement, positive moral emotions play a stronger role in social media engagement intentions. Post hoc analysis lends support to this explanation (see [Appendix 13](#)).

Supporters to CSC ads show the highest boycott intentions, followed by non-CSC ads, and CSC opposers who show the lowest boycott intentions. We correctly predict the directions, but there are no significant differences between non-CSC and CSC supporters, and between non-CSC and no-cause ads, where the presence of negative moral emotions may prevent people from taking actions to help on causes they care about (Bennett, 2015). CSC supporters fail to elicit higher boycott intentions than non-CSC. The explanation may be once again that CSC do not elicit stronger moral emotions than non-CSC as was expected. As anticipated, boycott intentions were significantly greater amongst CSC opposers than for any other condition. A post hoc analysis reveals that about 50% of supporters of CSC ads and non-CSC ads express boycott intentions, while 30% of opposers to CSC ads express boycott intentions. Surprisingly, 37% of consumers expressed boycott intentions after seeing branding no cause, control ads. By offering a gift card with brand choice, I had the opportunity to unveil if these intentions translate into behaviors.

## **Behaviors**

When offered the opportunity to engage in boycott or boycott behavior, people are more willing to sacrifice money for social causes than for no social causes, regardless of the position on the social cause. There is no difference in the willingness to sacrifice money between CSC supporters and opposers and amongst them and non-CSC. The explanation for this is that once moral emotions are triggered, it doesn't really matter if those emotions are positive, negative, or a combination of both. To find support for this explanation, see ANOVA analysis in [Appendix 13](#).

While not significantly different, a surprisingly high 77% of CSC opposers act on their boycott intentions, and 71% of non-CSC and 60% of CSC supporters act on their boycott intentions when there is a monetary sacrifice to do so. Significantly lower than all of the aforementioned conditions, only 36% act on their boycott intentions for a brand associated with no-social cause ads.

On the other hand, when there is no monetary cost, boycott behavior is greater than boycott behavior. This may happen because commitment to brands moderate negative information effects on attitude change (Ahluwalia et al., 2000). At no monetary cost, 79% boycotters execute their

boycott intentions, while 92% of potential non-CSC buycotters and 97% of potential CSC buycotters executed their boycott intentions. There is no boycott execution for non-social causes. Importantly, contradicting negative bias (Baumeister et al., 2001), boycott behavior is never greater than buycott behavior. And when there is no cost to buycott or boycott, buycott behavior is stronger than boycott.

Study 1 provides us with the opportunity to compare buycott/boycott intentions with actual buycott/boycott behavior. However, it does not provide the opportunity to confirm if word of mouth and social media engagement intentions translate into behaviors. Hence, a second study, in particular a field study is designed and conducted to observe and compare if and how social media engagement intentions correspond with actual consumer responses, posts and actual behavior, for real brands and real social cause advertising.

*Tables 39, 40, 41 and 42* provide a summary of Study 1 findings.

Table 39. Processing Summary

<b>Processing</b>		
<i>Hypotheses</i>	<b>Brand Activism Model</b>	
<i>H1a</i>	<i>Customer responses to social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance</i>	Supported
<i>H1b</i>	<i>The higher the cause importance the greater the effect of social cause ads on moral emotions</i>	Supported
<i>H1c</i>	<i>The higher the cause importance the greater the effect of social cause ads on customer responses</i>	Supported
<b>Moral Emotions</b>		
<i>H2a</i>	<i>Moral emotions are higher for social cause ads than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported
<i>H2b</i>	<i>Moral emotions are higher for non-controversial social cause ads than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported
<i>H2c</i>	<i>Moral emotions are higher for controversial social cause ads than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported
<i>H2d</i>	<i>Non-controversial social cause ads will only elicit positive moral emotions</i>	Not Supported
<i>H2e</i>	<i>Controversial social cause ads will elicit positive moral emotions for those who hold a pro-cause position and negative moral emotions for those who hold an against-cause position</i>	Supported
<i>H2f</i>	<i>Controversial social cause ads will elicit stronger moral emotions than non-controversial social cause ads</i>	Not Supported, Opposite Effect
<b>Controversial Social Causes Model</b>		
<i>H3</i>	<i>Customer responses to the position on controversial social cause ads are mediated by moral emotions which are moderated by cause importance</i>	Supported
<b>Elaborative Processing</b>		
<i>H4a</i>	<i>Elaborative processing is higher for brand activism (social causes ads) than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported
<i>H4b</i>	<i>Elaborative processing is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported
<i>H4c</i>	<i>Elaborative processing is higher for controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Not Supported
<i>H4d</i>	<i>Elaborative processing is higher for controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads</i>	Not Supported, Opposite Effect

Hayes Conditional Process Model 8 show a GOOD FIT for the Social Causes Moderated Mediation Model. Moral emotions mediate all consumers' responses. Cause importance moderates moral emotions.

Both social causes elicit moral emotions, Non-CSC elicit more. CSC elicit mainly positive moral emotions amongst cause supporters or negative moral emotions on cause opposers. Non-CSC elicit a DUAL response of both positive and negative moral emotions resulting in stronger total moral emotions.

There is also a GOOD FIT for the Social Causes Moderated Mediation Model (sig. Hayes Index). Moral emotions mediate all consumers' responses. Cause importance moderates moral emotions.

Non-CSC advertising and a pro-cause position on CSC elicit higher elaborative processing. Against-cause position on CSC not showing higher elaborative processing is inconsistent with controversial advertising literature.

Moral emotions mediate customer responses to brand activism (controversial and non-controversial social causes). The higher the moral emotions the higher the customer responses. Cause importance moderate moral emotions and customer responses, and the higher the importance, the greater the effect. Controversial social elicit divergent moral emotions: positive for pro-cause and negative for against-cause, while non-controversial social causes elicit both.



Table 40. Attitudes Summary

Attitudes			
Attitudes Towards Ad			
H5a	Attitude towards an ad is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported	Positivity towards ads is higher for supporters of CSC, followed by non-CSC, no-cause ads and opposers to CSC.
H5b	Attitude towards an ad is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported	
H5c	Attitude towards an ad is higher for no-cause ads than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads	Supported	
H5d	Attitude towards an ad is higher for a pro-cause position for controversial social cause than for non-controversial social cause ads	Supported	
H5e	Attitude towards an ad is higher for non-controversial social cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads	Supported	
Attitudes Towards Brand			
H6a	Attitude towards a brand is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Not Supported	Attitudes toward brand follows a similar pattern than attitudes towards ad, but each condition is not significantly different from every other condition. Surprisingly, non-CSC did not elicit more positive attitudes towards the brand than no-cause.
H6b	Attitude towards a brand is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported	
H6c	Attitude towards a brand is higher for no-cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads	Supported	
H6d	Attitude towards a brand is higher for a pro-cause position for controversial social cause than for non-controversial social cause ads	Not Supported	
H6e	Attitude towards a brand is higher for non-controversial social cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads	Supported	

Table 41. Intentions Summary

Intentions		
Positive Word of Mouth		
H7a	Positive WOM intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Not Supported
H7b	Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported
H7c	Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social cause than for non-controversial social causes ads	Not Supported
H7d	Positive WOM intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
H7e	Positive WOM intention is higher for no-cause than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
H7f	Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
Negative Word of Mouth		
H8a	Negative WOM intention is lower for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Not Supported
H8b	Negative WOM intention is lower for a pro-cause position on controversial causes than for no-cause ads	Not Supported
H8c	Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-cause ads	Supported
H8d	Negative WOM intention is similar for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads	Supported
H8e	Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social cause ads	Supported
H8f	Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position than for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
Social Media Engagement		
H9a	Social media engagement intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported
H9b	Social media engagement intention is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported
H9c	Social media engagement intention for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social cause ads	Not Supported
H9d	Social media engagement intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
H9e	Social media engagement intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
H9f	Social media engagement intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no social cause ads	Not Supported
Boycott		
H10a	Boycott intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Not Supported
H10b	Boycott intention is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported
H10c	Boycott intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads	Not Supported
H10d	Boycott intention is higher for pro-cause position than for against-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported
H10e	Boycott intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads	Supported
H10f	Boycott intention is higher for no-cause ads than for an against-cause position on controversial social cause ads	Supported
Boycott		
H11a	Boycott intention is similar for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads	Supported
H11b	Boycott intention is similar for a pro-cause position on controversial causes than for ads	Supported
H11c	Boycott intention similar for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes ads	Supported
H11d	Boycott intention higher for an against position on controversial social causes than for no-causes ads	Supported
H11e	Boycott intention higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-controversial social causes ads	Supported
H11f	Boycott intention higher for an against-cause position than for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes ads	Supported

Support of CSC, non-CSC and no-cause elicit greater Positive WOM intentions than opposition to CSC  
Non-CSC did not elicit more Positive WOM than no-cause while support to CSC did.

Negative WOM pattern is the mirror image of Positive WOM. Opposition to CSC's higher than any other condition, but other conditions are not significantly different from each other.  
Support to CSC and non-CSC ads fail to provide greater protection against negative WOM intentions versus no-cause ads.

Non-CSC and support to CSC ads elicit greater social media engagement intentions.  
Support to CSC elicit greater social media engagement intentions than opposition to CSC ads.

Supporters of CSC and non-CSC exhibit greater boycott intention than opposers to CSC but only supporters on CSC boycott intentions are greater than no-cause. There is no difference between buyvott intentins amongst non-CSC and CSC supporterres.

Boycott and boycott intentions display mirrored images patterns.  
Boycott intentions of CSC opposers are greater than for any other condition  
Boycott intentions amongst supporters are higher than boycott intentions amongst opposers.

Pro-position on social causes (natural on non-CSC or as a stand on CSC) show an advantage for positive WOM and Social Media Engagement. An against cause position can cause negative WOM but it does not seem too dangerous since it does not elicit higher Social Media Engagement.

Table 42. Behaviors Summary

Brand Choice - Gift Card - Execution of Boycott/Boycott Intention		Behavior
H12a	Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for non-controversial social causes than when there is no cause	Supported
H12b	Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than when there is no cause	Supported
H12c	Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than when there is no cause	Supported
H12d	Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social causes	Not Supported
H12e	Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for non-controversial social causes than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes	Not Supported
H12f	Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes	Not Supported
H13a	Consumers that hold a pro-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance	Partial support: supported for \$0 and \$10 but not supported for \$5
H13b	Consumers who hold an against-cause position for a cause of high personal importance will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior compared to consumers where the cause is of low personal importance	Supported
H13c	Consumers will be more willing to absorb a cost to engage in boycott behavior when holding an against-cause position than to engage in boycott when holding a pro-cause position	Not Supported. Also opposite at \$0 cost

Social causes may be an effective way to promote boycott, and under some circumstances boycott behavior is stronger than boycott behavior. At no cost, boycott is higher than boycott!

Boycott is NEVER higher than boycott. Cause importance drives boycott. Boycotters not always need the cause to be important to them to show support.

Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money (either boycott or boycott) for social causes than for no-social causes. When there is a cost, there is no difference between boycott and boycott. CSC and Non-CSC Boycott behavior are no different, at a cost or at no cost.

Social causes significantly affect boycott and boycott behavior (brand choice) at cost or no cost. Cause importance drives boycott but only partially affects boycott (depending on its cost). Boycotters are more willing to sacrifice money for causes of higher personal importance.

## **Study 2: Social Media Field Study**

This field study complements and reinforces the findings of the previous experiment examining a subset of hypotheses under another methodology. Mixed methods research improves validity and reliability of the resulting data and strengthens causal inferences by providing the opportunity to observe data convergence or divergence in hypothesis testing (Abowitz & Toole, 2010). Still, there are other good reasons to conduct field research. Study 1 experiment was conducted in isolation, and according to Gigerenzer (2010) ethical behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs, since, as an analogy, by looking at only one blade, one will not understand how scissors cut. According to this author, people make decisions with social heuristics rather than exclusively moral rules. Additionally, moral behavior is not the consequence of mental states or processes alone, such as character, moral reasoning, or intuition, but results from the match (or mismatch) of the mental processes with the structure of the social environment. Most people seem to rely on some common heuristics: (1) if there is a default, do nothing about it, (2) imitate peers to foster social coherence (3) use some kind of tit-for-tat on interactions. Since moral emotions mediate consumers' responses such as social media engagement to social causes ads, it is important to examine this behavior in a natural setting. Social media mimic or echo social systems, which are networks of actors connected through relational patterns (Peters et al., 2013).

Also, the Internet is not just another medium to convey information and advertising, its interactive nature enables consumers to respond and react, creating an ecosystem that changes the conventional parameters of mass communication that have been considered in most of the controversial advertising studies. Internet-based social media has made it possible for people to communicate with thousands of other people about products giving consumers the opportunity to find information and express opinions that can reach other consumers and brands (Mangold & Faulds, 2009). The impact of this connected, informed and active consumer that seeks to exercise her/his influence shifts the orientation of marketing from a 'market to' philosophy where consumers are targeted and subjects of promotion, to a '*market with*' philosophy (Badot & Cova, 2008). The study of consumers' social media behavior is important as social engagement interaction affects consumers' responses to ads (Calder et al., 2009), especially today given the prevalence of social media. In addition, it allows an assessment of the effect of brand activism

advertising on word of mouth (WOM), an important measure of impact and influence of ad campaigns (e.g. Berger & Milkman, 2012; Berger & Schwartz, 2011; East, Hammond, & Wright, 2007).

Brands are increasingly implementing their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) undertakings using digital and social media platforms since this enables them to include their consumer co-creation initiatives; and consumers are utilizing social media networking platforms to create, modify, share, and discuss Internet content, which can significantly impact a firm's reputation (Kietzmann et al., 2011). Kull and Heath (2014) find that in the case of cause-related marketing with choice of cause to support, social media can improve consumer-brand relationships and enhance critical marketing outcomes such as brand attachment, brand attitude, and purchase intention; effects that are mediated by an empowerment-to-engagement pathway. A word of caution of these same authors is that when brands have a negative image, CM campaigns co-creation with consumers can backfire. It is therefore relevant to analyze the impact on social media of consumers' holding against cause positions and I do so.

Controversial advertisement that touches a sensitive subject is not only noticed but also acts as a stimulus for involvement and discussion amongst consumers (Banyte et al., 2014; de Rosa & Kirchler, 2001), and because this discussion is triggered by strong emotions that deems the ad good or condemns it, it can give rise to a lively social debate (de Rosa & Kirchler, 2001). According to (Peters et al., 2013) for traditional media, organizations thrive on convergence and the higher "brand sympathy" across the audience the better, but in social media divergence is not always bad and certain brands may flourish on hardship as discrepancy increases and reinforces the affinity of its core users. Social media can be a place where consumers support and promote a successful brand social cause campaign or become the battlefield of passionate and polarized arguments in favor or against a controversial social cause.

Study 1 experiment used real brands that exposed consumers to ending child abuse and finding solutions for homeless veterans as two non-controversial social causes, to same-sex marriage and DREAM Act as two controversial social causes and a branding ad as non-social cause or control. In Study 2 I observe consumers' behavior in Facebook as a natural social media environment and

measured their responses to controversial social causes and non-controversial social causes campaigns for real brands, comparing them with regular branding campaigns.

Study 2 will also allow to test a subset of my hypotheses in line with the metrics that can be measured and that I examine under the metrics section. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no research to assess if brands promoting controversial social causes are winners or losers in these social media battles. In addition, the results of this study will provide managers with a better understanding of the dynamics of consumers' discussion on social media of brand activism and its effects on brands.

## **Study 2 Methodology**

### **Selection of Social Media Campaigns**


In line with Whelan, Moon, and Grant (2013), I use the term 'social media' to refer to social networking sites such as Facebook (~2.7 billion active users), microblogs such as Instagram (~1.2 billion active users) and content sharing sites such as YouTube (~2.3 billion active users)<sup>10</sup>. I pre-selected Facebook to conduct our field study since it is the social media with most users. I conducted a search for brands that posted controversial and non-controversial social causes campaigns and selected posts from Budweiser (immigrant, pride, earth day, folds of honor), Gillette (boys will be boys, the best men can be, covid-19, earth day), Starbucks (pride, black lives matter, good merch, feeding America), Walmart (pride, black lives matter, feeding America, children's miracle network hospital). Please see selected post in [Appendix 13](#).

The pre-selected Facebook posts were presented in random order to a panel of 10 marketing experts who also responded two questions (see [Appendix 14](#)). Pride and Black Live Matters were the controversial social causes post best rated by the expert, while Feeding America was the best rated non-controversial social cause. All the selected social causes were also posted by both Walmart and Starbucks, whose Facebook pages have a similar number of followers (approximately

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<sup>10</sup> Retrieved from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/> on May 3rd, 2021

34 millions have liked Walmart’s Facebook page and 36.5 millions have liked Starbucks’)<sup>11</sup>, creating a natural replication structure, depicted in Figure 26.



**Figure 26.** Social Media Field Study Design

To complete the posts selection with branding posts for Starbucks and Walmart, for each brand I selected the 10 branding’ posts with most engagement (likes, comments, shares), 5 posts in the two weeks previous to the social causes’ posts and 5 posts after it and calculated a branding post average. Please find a list of selected post in [Appendix 16](#).

### Study 2 Metrics

Social media metrics are often made observable in the interfaces themselves, and as they stem from active audience choices such as clicking, following, liking, sharing, commenting and so on, they inform about audience size and their reaction to a brand posting or campaign. Social media metrics consider both quantitative and qualitative aspects. The quantitative aspects are related to

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<sup>11</sup> Retrieved on June 2, 2021 from <https://www.facebook.com/walmart> and from <https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks>

the number of comments, friends, likes, followers and others; and the qualitative aspects are related to the ‘sentiments’ provoked by the users’ actions and the effect of users’ actions (Drula, 2012). I followed a twofold procedure by manually counting and classifying emojis, comments and shares to produce a frequencies table (Study 2 Part 1) and using Brandwatch, a social media listening and analysis software (Study 2 Part 2).

### **Study 2 Part 1 Metrics**

Facebook main measures of engagement are reactions (emojis), comments and shares. Emojis are smileys and ideograms widely used in messaging and on websites. People click on Facebook emojis to express their reaction to posts and comments. We used Facebook public count of emojis for every post and classified them as positive (like, love and care emojis), negative (angry and sad emojis) and ambiguous/neutral (WOW and laugh emojis).

To count and classify consumers’ comments for each post, I used a systematic random approach and read one of every third consumers’ comments. I classified the comments in a frequency table according to the following categories: neutral, positive, or negative comment. The negative comments were also classified into negative on-topic and negative off-topic. There were two distinctive kinds of negative on-topic comments with different implications: not in agreement, when people expressed disagreement or criticized the post; and too late or not enough, when consumers supported the post topic but considered the brand was late or not doing enough about it. Negative off-topic comments were negative on other product/service when consumers criticized or complained about other products or services of the brand, and finally negative on other social issues when consumers expressed concern or disagreement regarding other issues, e.g. the brand investment in China, perceived mistreatment of police, wearing mask for covid or other social issues not related to the post as some of other social issues with read about on consumers’ comments.

To count shares, I reviewed visible shares and classified them as negative (shared with negative wording), neutral (ambiguous or neutral wording) and positive (positive wording or no wording). No wording was considered positive according the marketing and social media experts I discussed the subject with. The consensus is that if you agree with the post and think others should see it,



clicking the share button shows your support. If you don't agree with the post and want to share your indignation, you probably make sure to express it, so your friends don't think you are showing support.

According to Social Media Week, one of the world's premier conferences and industry news platforms for professionals in media, marketing and technology, property of Adweek, it is much easier to click an emoji than to comment. This explains why the vast majority of post receive more emojis than comments. Social media algorithms understand this and give greater weight to comments. Yet more important than comments are shares. Sharing denotes those users found the post interesting and important enough to make it their own.<sup>12</sup> To reflect these differences in consumers' actions, I estimated total social media engagement as emojis + 2\*comments + 3\*shares. Consulted marketing and social media experts agreed with this procedure. Anyways, I tested the data by also simply adding the three items and there is no difference on results or conclusions. Engagement rate is calculated as the number of interactions divided by actual reach (number of viewers who have seen a post) and multiplied by 100<sup>13</sup>. However, I do not have reach data to estimate engagement rate, so I just express it as a frequency and fortunately both Starbucks and Walmart audiences are similar in size. I also estimated positive social media engagement as positive emojis + 2\*positive comments+3\*positives shares and negative social media engagement as negative emojis + 2\*negative comments+3\*negatives shares.

By using positive social media engagement as a proxy for positive word of mouth I assessed the following hypotheses evaluated in study 1, focusing on the conversion of intention on behavior.

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<sup>12</sup> Retrieved from <https://socialmediaweek.org/blog/2017/10/social-media-metrics-compared-valuable/#:~:text=Comments%20vs%20Shares,to%20make%20it%20their%20own> on June 1, 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2020/05/14/are-you-using-the-right-formula-to-calculate-your-social-media-engagement-rate/?sh=7d6aaf8b50b8> on June 1, 2021.

*H7a: Positive WOM intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H7b: Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H7c: Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social cause than for non-controversial social causes ads*

Finally, by using negative social media engagement as a proxy for negative word of mouth I evaluated the following hypotheses assessed in study 1, focusing on the conversion of intention on behavior.

*H8a: Negative WOM intention is lower for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H8c: Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-cause ads*

*H8e: Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-controversial social cause ads*

Social media engagement metrics also allow us to evaluate the following hypotheses assessed in study 1, focusing on the conversion of intention on behavior:

*H9a: Social media engagement intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H9b: Social media engagement intention is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads*

*H9c: Social media engagement intention for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social cause ads*

*H9e: Social media engagement intention is higher for a pro-cause position than for an against-cause position on controversial social causes ads*

*H9f: Social media engagement intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no social cause ads*

## **Study 2 Part 2 Metrics**

Social media listening and analysis software (such as Radian6, Brandwatch, Sysomos, SocialMention and others) allow one to examine the interactions between consumers, from consumers to brand and from brand to consumers (e.g. Altschwager, Drennan, Winklhofer, & Jarvis, 2016; Leskovec, 2011; Murdough, 2009). Social media monitoring software provide functionality for listening, tracking, and gathering relevant content across wide ranges of social media, organizing consumer information, listening for specific mentions, detecting phrases and trending topics, pointing out consumer's sentiments and identifying thought leaders and influencers, and allows to distinguish changes in words/perceptions and shifts in sentiments (Altschwager et al., 2016).

To conduct the analysis, I had access to use Brandwatch, ranked as the category leader in the Forrester Wave Social Listening Platforms Report Q4 2020<sup>14</sup>. Brandwatch main metrics<sup>15</sup> are the following:

- **Mention Volume:** The overall volume of mentions (comments) for the selected date range.
- **Reach:** The potential amount of people that may have seen a given post. The calculation takes into account metrics such as followers, engagement, page ranks and estimated views.
- **Sentiment:** Charts your data by the three sentiment values (positive, neutral, and negative).
- **Net Sentiment:** Net sentiment is calculated by subtracting the number of negative mentions from positive mentions and dividing by the sum of negative and positive mentions (normalized to a -5/5 scale).
- **Emotion:** Breaks down data by emotion (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise).
- **Impact Score:** Impact score measures the degree of overall engagement with a mention. The impact of a mention is measured relative to the population of mentions from the same content source. This is equivalent to an engagement measure.

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<sup>14</sup> Accessed at <https://reprints2.forrester.com/#/assets/2/37/RES157487/report>

<sup>15</sup> From <https://consumer-research-help.brandwatch.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013645317-Chart-Metrics-and-Dimensions> accessed June 1, 2021

## **Study 2 Results**

### **Study 2 Part 1 Manual Processing Results**

I summarized campaign metrics in Table 43. The table is organized as follows: First there is the total frequency count for each campaign. I built an index to facilitate column analysis and better envision the differences between each type of campaign and the branding posts average used as control. I assign 100 to branding post (no social cause) average and it can be easily seen that for example a post with an index of 268 in emojis almost tripled the branding average posts emojis performance and a post with index 45 barely reached half of the branding average post performance. I then separated each metric in positive, negative, and neutral providing their respectively indexes. Here I also stipulate what percentage of the total metric is positive, neutral to facilitate a row analysis.

Engagement (Emoji +2*Comment+3*Share)												
Post	Type	Total	Index	Positive	%	Index	Negative	%	Index	Neutral	%	Index
<b>Starbucks</b>												
Pride	CSC	4,192	24	3,252	78%	21	802	19%	79	137	3%	15
Black Lives Matter	CSC	107,738	612	57,709	54%	368	38,524	36%	3,782	11,505	11%	1,254
Average Controversial	CSC	55,965	318	31,514	56%	201	18,654	33%	1,831	5,797	10%	632
Feeding America	Non-CSC	6,485	37	5,331	82%	34	1,139	18%	112	15	0%	2
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	17,601	100	15,665	89%	100	1,019	6%	100	917	5%	100
<b>Walmart</b>												
Pride	CSC	16,108	262	10,871	67%	214	3,932	24%	550	1,305	8%	365
Black Lives Matter	CSC	41,673	677	17,993	43%	354	20,984	50%	2,935	2,696	6%	753
Average Controversial	CSC	28,891	470	14,429	50%	284	12,457	43%	1,742	2,004	7%	560
Feeding America	Non-CSC	2,591	42	2,199	85%	43	382	15%	53	9	0%	3
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	6,153	100	5,080	83%	100	715	12%	100	358	6%	100

Emojis												
Post	Type	Total	Index	Positive	%	Index	Negative	%	Index	Neutral	%	Index
<b>Starbucks</b>												
Pride	CSC	2,252	25	2,202	98%	25	25	1%	163	25	1%	18
Black Lives Matter	CSC	23,881	268	18,572	78%	268	1,230	5%	8,039	4,079	17%	2,871
Average Controversial	CSC	13,067	146	10,387	79%	146	628	5%	4,101	2,052	16%	1,444
Feeding America	Non-CSC	3,976	45	3,945	99%	45	16	0%	105	15	0%	11
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	8,920	100	8,763	98%	100	15	0%	100	142	2%	100
<b>Walmart</b>												
Pride	CSC	7,872	196	6,789	86%	196	339	4%	3,000	744	9%	388
Black Lives Matter	CSC	9,473	236	6,815	72%	236	675	7%	5,973	1,983	21%	1,035
Average Controversial	CSC	8,673	216	6,802	78%	216	507	6%	4,487	1,364	16%	712
Feeding America	Non-CSC	1,268	32	1,259	99%	32	4	0%	35	5	0%	3
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	4,009	100	3,806	95%	100	11	0%	100	192	5%	100

Shares												
Post	Type	Total	Index	Positive	%	Index	Negative	%	Index	Neutral	%	Index
<b>Starbucks</b>												
Pride	CSC	148	14	140	94%	13	4	3%	81	4	3%	30
Black Lives Matter	CSC	10,619	992	8,093	76%	770	832	8%	15,953	1,693	16%	12,171
Average Controversial	CSC	5,384	503	4,187	78%	398	399	7%	7,644	798	15%	5,733
Feeding America	Non-CSC	377	35	377	100%	36	-	0%	-	-	0%	-
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	1,071	100	1,052	98%	100	5	0%	100	14	1%	100
<b>Walmart</b>												
Pride	CSC	612	215	570	93%	205	23	4%	626	19	3%	626
Black Lives Matter	CSC	1,400	493	1,204	86%	434	43	3%	1,162	154	11%	4,996
Average Controversial	CSC	1,006	354	885	88%	319	33	3%	891	88	9%	2,851
Feeding America	Non-CSC	269	95	269	100%	97	-	0%	-	-	0%	-
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	284	100	277	98%	100	4	1%	100	3	1%	100

Comments												
Post	Type	Total	Index	Positive	%	Index	Negative	%	Index	Neutral	%	Index
<b>Starbucks</b>												
Pride	CSC	748	27	316	42%	17	382	51%	77	50	7%	14
Black Lives Matter	CSC	26,000	951	7,429	29%	397	17,398	67%	3,523	1,173	5%	320
Average Controversial	CSC	13,374	489	4,283	32%	229	8,415	63%	1,704	676	5%	184
Feeding America	Non-CSC	689	25	128	19%	7	561	81%	114	-	0%	-
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	2,734	100	1,873	69%	100	494	18%	100	367	13%	100
<b>Walmart</b>												
Pride	CSC	3,200	495	1,187	37%	537	1,762	55%	509	252	8%	321
Black Lives Matter	CSC	14,000	2,167	3,784	27%	1711	10,090	72%	2,913	126	1%	161
Average Controversial	CSC	8,600	1,331	2,485	29%	1124	5,926	69%	1,711	189	2%	241
Feeding America	Non-CSC	258	40	67	26%	30	189	73%	55	2	1%	3
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	646	100	221	34%	100	346	54%	100	79	12%	100

Table 42, Emojis, comments, shares and Engagement Frequencies

Since branding post average is a small sample (n=10) that represent all branding post, to establish significant differences between post types ( $\mu_i \neq \mu_0$ ) I performed *t* test analysis.

Post	Type	Total Engagement			Positive Engagement			Negative Engagement			Neutral Engagement		
		Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
<b>Starbucks</b>													
Pride	Controversial	4,192	2.539	<i>p</i> < .05	3,252	2.599	<i>p</i> < .05	802	0.873	<i>p</i> > .05	137	2.382	<i>p</i> < .05
Black Lives Matter	Controversial	107,738	-17.065	<i>p</i> < .001	57,709	-8.776	<i>p</i> < .001	38,524	-156.613	<i>p</i> < .001	11,505	-33.461	<i>p</i> < .001
Controversial Starbucks	Controversial	55,965	-7.263	<i>p</i> < .001	31,514	-3.304	<i>p</i> < .01	18,654	-73.657	<i>p</i> < .001	5,797	-15.464	<i>p</i> < .001
Feeding America	Non-Controversial	6,485	2.104	<i>p</i> > .05	5,331	2.165	<i>p</i> > .05	1,139	-0.532	<i>p</i> > .05	15	2.768	<i>p</i> < .05
Branding Sample	No-Social Cause	17,601	SD: 16,703		15,696	SD: 15,139		1,011	SD: 757		893	SD: 1,003	
<b>Walmart</b>													
Pride	Controversial	16,108	-5.040	<i>p</i> < .001	10,871	-3.087	<i>p</i> < .05	3,932	-13.780	<i>p</i> < .001	1,305	-9.710	<i>p</i> < .001
Black Lives Matter	Controversial	41,673	-17.983	<i>p</i> < .001	17,993	-6.886	<i>p</i> < .001	20,984	-86.798	<i>p</i> < .001	2,696	-23.915	<i>p</i> < .001
Controversial Walmart	Controversial	28,891	-11.512	<i>p</i> < .001	14,429	-4.984	<i>p</i> < .001	12,457	-50.288	<i>p</i> < .001	2,004	-16.850	<i>p</i> < .001
Feeding America	Non-Controversial	2,591	1.803	<i>p</i> > .05	2,199	1.539	<i>p</i> > .05	382	1.420	<i>p</i> > .05	9	3.522	<i>p</i> < .01
Branding Sample	No-Social Cause	6,153	SD: 6,246		5,084	SD: 5,928		714	SD: 738		354	SD: 310	

**Table 43.** Engagement *t*-Test Results

### Total Engagement

As can be seen in Table 43, *t*-test results show that there is no difference in total social media engagement between branding posts ( $M_s=17,601$ ,  $SD= 16,703$ ;  $M_w= 6,153$ ,  $SD= 6,246$ ) and Feeding America (non-controversial) neither for Starbucks ( $M_s=6,485$ ,  $p > .05$ ) nor Walmart ( $M_w= 2,591$ ,  $p > .05$ ), not supporting *H9a* (see Table 42). On the other hand, Pride and Black Lives Matter (BLM) controversial post engagement are significantly different than branding. BLM engagement is higher for both Starbucks ( $M_s=107,738$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and Walmart ( $M_w=41,673$ ,  $p < .001$ ). By transitivity logical relation, I can also establish that if BLM is higher than Branding and Feeding America is not different than branding, then BLM (controversial) is higher than Feeding America (non-controversial). However, Pride is only higher for Walmart ( $M_w=16,108$ ,  $p < .001$ ) while for Starbucks it is lower than branding ( $M_s=4,192$ ,  $p < .05$ ). This may be explained while Walmart is considered more conservative, Starbucks is considered more liberal. Starbucks has a long story of supporting equality and inclusion, with its first Starbucks LGBTQ partner group formed in 1996<sup>16</sup> which may result in Pride not being a controversial issue for Starbucks and its consumers. In fact, for all social media engagement metrics, Starbucks' Pride performance is similar

<sup>16</sup> <https://stories.starbucks.com/press/2019/starbucks-equity-and-inclusion-timeline/> retrieved on June 2, 2021

to non-CSC Feeding America. CSC engagement average is greater than no-cause posts ( $M_s=55,965$ ,  $p < .001$ ;  $M_w=28,891$   $p < .001$ ) and by transitivity also significantly greater than non-CSC posts.

	<b>Social Media Engagement</b>	<b>Study 1 Intentions</b>	<b>Study 2 Behaviors</b>
<i>H9a</i>	<i>Social media engagement intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported	Not Supported
<i>H9b</i>	<i>Social media engagement intention is higher for pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported	Supported
<i>H9c</i>	<i>Social media engagement intention for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-controversial social cause ads</i>	Not Supported	Supported

**Table 44.** Social Media Engagement Hypotheses Study 1/Study 2 Comparison

### Positive Engagement

When looking into positive engagement, we can observe similar results. As can be seen in Table 43, *t*-test results show that there is no difference in total engagement between branding posts ( $M_s=15,692$ ,  $SD= 15,139$ ;  $M_w= 5,084$ ,  $SD= 5,928$ ) and Feeding America (non-CSC) post neither for Starbucks ( $M_s=5,331$ ,  $p > .05$ ) nor Walmart ( $M_w= 2,199$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and with this I confirm Study 1 *H7a* findings that non-CSC fail to generate higher positive WOM than no-social causes. Conversely, Pride and Black Live Matter (BLM) CSC posts positive engagement is greater than no-cause (branding) posts. Pride ( $M_s=3,252$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $M_w=10,871$ ,  $p < .05$ ); BLM ( $M_s=57,709$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $M_w=17,993$ ,  $p < .001$ ) confirming study 1 *H7b* result that a CSC support produces greater positive WOM than a no-cause and *H9b* that it also generates greater social media engagement behavior. By transitivity logical relation, I can also establish that since Pride and BLM positive engagement are greater than no-cause, and Feeding America is not different than no-cause then Pride and BLM (CSC) have greater positive engagement than Feeding America (non-CSC). CSC positive engagement average is greater than no-cause ( $M_s=31,514$ ,  $p < .01$ ;  $M_w=14,429$   $p < .001$ ) and by transitivity also significantly greater than non-CSC. Opposite to Study 1 outcome, this gives support to *H7c* and to *H9c* since supporters of CSC generate greater positive WOM and social media engagement behavior than supporters of non-CSC. Therefore, as can be seen in Table 45, using positive social media engagement as a proxy I confirmed *H7a* and *H7b* intentions were reflected in behavior, and accepted *H7c* and *H9c*, building a stronger case in support of CSC advertising.

	<b>Positive Word of Mouth</b>	<b>Study 1 Intentions</b>	<b>Study 2 Behaviors</b>
H7a	<i>Positive WOM intention is higher for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Not Supported	Not Supported
H7b	<i>Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Supported	Supported
H7c	<i>Positive WOM intention is higher for a pro-cause position on controversial social cause than for non-controversial social causes ads</i>	Not Supported	Supported

**Table 45.** Positive WOM Hypotheses Study 1/Study 2 Comparison

### Neutral Engagement

All social causes neutral engagement is greater than for no-cause posts ( $M_S=893$ ,  $SD= 1,003$ ;  $M_W=354$ ,  $SD= 310$ ). Both Pride ( $M_S=137$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $M_W=1,305$ ,  $p < .001$ ); and BLM ( $M_S=11,505$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $M_W=2,696$ ,  $p < .001$ ) neutral engagement is greater than no-cause for both brands. Feeding America neutral engagement is lower than no-cause posts for Starbucks and Walmart ( $M_S=15$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $M_W=9$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

### Negative Engagement

In the case of negative engagement, no-cause posts ( $M_S=1,011$ ,  $SD= 757$ ;  $M_W= 714$ ,  $SD= 738$ ) were no different than non-CSC Feeding America posts for Starbucks and Walmart ( $M_S=1,139$ ,  $p > .05$ ,  $M_W=238$ ,  $p > .05$ ). confirming lack of support for *H8a*. And surprisingly, neither is Starbucks' Pride ( $M_S=802$ ,  $p > .05$ ) showing the same performance as no-cause, confirming Pride it is not a controversial issue for Starbucks. Contrastingly, Walmart's Pride negative engagement is higher than for no-cause posts ( $M_W=3,932$ ,  $p < .001$ ). BLM negative engagement is greater than no-cause for both brands ( $M_S=38,524$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $M_W=20,984$ ,  $p < .001$ ). This provides support for *H8c*. By transitivity logic relation, except for Starbucks' Pride, since CSC posts negative engagement is greater than for no-cause posts, and non-CSC post are no different than no-cause posts, then negative engagement for CSC posts is greater than for non-CSC post, providing support to *H8e* (Table 46).

	<b>Negative Word of Mouth</b>	<b>Study 1 Intentions</b>	<b>Study 2 Behaviors</b>
H8a	<i>Negative WOM intention is lower for non-controversial social causes than for non-cause ads</i>	Not Supported	Not Supported
H8c	<i>Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-cause ads</i>	Supported	Supported
H8e	<i>Negative WOM intention is higher for an against-cause position on controversial social causes than for no-controversial social cause ads</i>	Not Supported	Supported

**Table 46.** Negative WOM Hypotheses Study 1/Study 2 Comparison



### **Type of Engagement Proportion**

A chi-square test was performed to examine if the proportion of positive/negative/neutral engagement differ by post type. Please see [Appendix 17](#) for SPSS outputs. For Starbucks, the proportion is significantly different between no-cause and Pride posts  $X^2(2, N = 21,792) = 798.701, p < .001$ ; no-cause and BLM posts  $X^2(2, N = 125,339) = 8,008.600, p < .001$ ; no-cause and CSC post  $X^2(2, N = 73,566) = 6,418.308, p < .001$ ; and, no-cause and Feeding America posts  $X^2(2, N = 24,086) = 1,06.926, p < .001$ . For Walmart, the proportion is also significantly different between no-cause and Pride posts  $X^2(2, N = 22,261) = 521.133, p < .001$ ; no-cause and BLM posts  $X^2(2, N = 47,826) = 3,500.257, p < .001$ ; no-cause and CSC posts  $X^2(2, N = 35,043) = 2,317.696, p < .001$ ; and, no-cause and Feeding America posts  $X^2(2, N = 8,743) = 145.385, p < .001$ .

### **Emojis, Shares and Comments**

If we investigate the specific actions, such as clicking emojis, commenting and sharing, we can see in Table 43 that emojis and shares are always mostly positive, with positive emojis between 72% to 99% of total emojis and positive shares between 76% to 100% of total shares. On the other hand, it seems that negative comments predominate. Starbuck's branding (no-cause) is the only case where positive comments predominate with 69% followed by Starbucks' Pride with 42%. Excluding those, all other post range between 19% to 34% positive versus 54% to 81% of negative comments.

### **Comments Analysis**

Since all the negativity is concentrated in comments, I looked deeper into this aspect. Reading consumers comments it is distinguishable that some comments are negative regarding the post content. I call those "on-topic" negative comments. There are some are negative comments that discuss other issues not related with the post content. I call those "off-topic" negative comments. We can expect people to express opposition on CSC posts with negative comments, but it also happens on non-CSC and no-cause posts, e.g., in this Starbucks' S'mores drink post: "I went and got one for my birthday treat yesterday. It is my fav drink. This year it was TERRIBLE no taste and watery!".

Off-topic negative comments also happens in all kinds of posts. There are comments that criticize the product or service, such as "Wrong order and disgusting coffee yet again! This is last time I use Starbucks" or "Laziest bunch of employees I've ever seen. Won't shop there. Nasty meat,

horrible produce. Yuck.....”. There are also comments that introduce another social issues not related to the brand post, such as “Hey starbucks why do you use free PRISON LABOR? Most of which the majority of the inmates are Black and minorities, what is your stance on that?” or “Cheap Chinese crap made by slave labor by religious, anti communist prisoners in China that makes Walmart rich!” or “Need one supporting police. Otherwise, call a unicorn when you have a theft”.

In Table 47 there is a display of the frequencies of negative comments on-topic and off-topic and it seems there is a dissimilar distribution for the different types of posts. This is important because at least when the negative comments are on-topic the brand controls the narrative and I observe some defense from other consumers’ as well.

Negative Comments									
Post	Type	Total Negative	Index	Negative on-Topic	%	Index	Negative off-Topic	%	Index
<b>Starbucks</b>									
Pride	CSC	382	77	216	57%	84	166	43%	70
Black Lives Matter	CSC	17,398	3,523	12,511	72%	4887	4,887	28%	2,055
Average Controversial	CSC	8,415	1,704	5,785	69%	2260	2,630	31%	1,106
Feeding America	Non-CSC	561	114	102	18%	40	459	82%	193
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	494	100	256	52%	100	238	48%	100
<b>Walmart</b>									
Pride	CSC	1,762	509	791	45%	1421	971	55%	334
Black Lives Matter	CSC	10,090	2,913	8,324	83%	14950	1,766	18%	608
Average Controversial	CSC	5,926	1,711	4,558	77%	8185	1,368	23%	471
Feeding America	Non-CSC	189	55	147	78%	264	42	22%	15
Average Branding Control	No-Cause	346	100	56	16%	100	291	84%	100

**Table 47.** Negative Comments Frequency Table

**On-Topic vs. Off-Topic Comments Analysis**

To establish significant differences of negative comment types between post types ( $\mu_i \neq \mu_0$ ) I performed *t* test analysis and results are displayed in Table 48.

Post	Type	Total Negative Comments			Negative Comments On-Topic			Negative Comments on Off-		
		Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean	t	Sig. (2-tailed)
<b>Starbucks</b>										
Pride	Controversial	382	0.947	$p > .05$	216	0.383	$p > .05$	166	1.080	$p > .05$
Black Lives Matter	Controversial	17,398	-143.599	$p < .001$	12,511	-117.685	$p < .001$	4,887	-70.112	$p < .001$
Controversial Starbucks	Controversial	8,415	-67.288	$p < .001$	5,785	-53.097	$p < .001$	2,630	-36.069	$p < .001$
Feeding America	Non-Controversial	561	-0.574	$p > .05$	102	1.478	$p > .05$	459	-3.340	$p < .01$
Branding Sample	No-Social Cause	494	SD:	372	256	SD:	329	238	SD:	210
<b>Walmart</b>										
Pride	Controversial	1,762	-12.024	$p < .001$	791	-7.061	$p < .001$	971	-10.256	$p < .001$
Black Lives Matter	Controversial	10,090	-82.770	$p < .001$	8,324	-79.402	$p < .001$	1,766	-22.244	$p < .001$
Controversial Walmart	Controversial	5,926	-47.397	$p < .001$	4,558	-43.232	$p < .001$	1,368	-16.250	$p < .001$
Feeding America	Non-Controversial	111	1.996	$p > .05$	10	0.438	$p > .05$	101	2.857	$p < .05$
Branding Sample	No-Social Cause	346	SD:	364	56	SD:	79	291	SD:	356

**Table 48.** Negative Comments *t*-Test Results

As can be seen in Table 48, except for Starbucks' Pride that performs no different than no-cause and non-CSC posts, unsurprisingly, all other CSC posts have higher negative comments than no-cause post, both on-topic and off-topic. What is noteworthy is that Feeding America's off-topic negative comments ( $M_S=459$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $M_W=42$ ,  $p < .05$ ). are also higher than no-cause posts ( $M_S=238$ ,  $SD= 210$ ;  $M_W= 291$   $SD= 356$ ) while on-topic negative comments are not ( $M_S=102$ ,  $p > .05$ ,  $M_W=147$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

I performed a chi-square test to examine if the proportion on-topic/off-topic of negative comments differ by post type (please see [Appendix 18](#) for SPSS outputs). For Starbucks, the proportion did not differ between Pride and no-cause posts  $X^2(1, N = 876) = 1.933$ ,  $p > .05$ . The proportion between on-topic/off-topic of negative comments is significantly different between no-cause and BLM posts  $X^2(1, N = 17,892) = 94.843$ ,  $p < .001$ ; no-cause and CSC posts average  $X^2(1, N = 8,909) = 61.228$ ,  $p < .001$ ; and, no-cause and Feeding America posts  $X^2(1, N = 1,055) = 132.599$ ,  $p < .001$ . For Walmart, the proportion between on-topic/off-topic of negative comments is significantly different between no-cause and Pride posts  $X^2(1, N = 2,109) = 99.738$ ,  $p < .001$ ; no-cause and BLM posts  $X^2(1, N = 10,437) = 933.513$ ,  $p < .001$ , no-cause and CSC posts  $X^2(1, N = 6,273) = 622.473$ ,  $p < .001$ ; and no-cause and Feeding America posts  $X^2(1, N = 536) = 197.576$ ,  $p < .001$ . Importantly, this confirms the ability of CSC posts to keep negativity centered on-topic where consumers hold pro or against positions according to their moral views versus branding posts where negativity is spread on different kinds of negative topics on the brand.

But a question that arises is, why does Starbucks being more liberal get even more negative on-topic comments on BLM than Walmart? To find the explanation we must investigate the two different kinds of on-topic negative comments. There is the type of negativity that arises from not agreeing with the brand stand. E.g. at Walmart's Pride post: "Why should we have a month for freaks" or "I see you guys put the pedophiles colors too... so sad, time to cut my business from you evil company"; or at Starbucks' BLM post: "Every time you support and fund these radical organizations and fund Planned Parenthood, the closer you are pushing me to never buy another thing from Starbucks. Your values are not values that I support".

Another way to be negative on-topic is to complain that the brand is too late taking the stand or not doing enough, as in these following examples. At Starbucks' BLM post: "Too little, too late, Starbucks. Did corporate management miss the "sensitivity training" they provided their employees the last time they showed their racism? You're on the wrong side of history again"; or this example at Walmart's Pride post: "Yeah those pins aren't free when I worked for Walmart I asked for a rainbow pride pin turns out you have to pay for them". It can also happen to no-cause posts, e.g. at this Starbucks' Summer Drinks post: "They need to make caffeine free coffee drinks in these flavors"; or at this Walmart Mobile App post: "Not sure whats the point of using the mobile app to order ahead when you still have to sit through the drive thru line to pick up your order".

As can be seen in Table 49 about 73% negative comments on Walmart's Pride post and 71% on Walmart's BLM post were against the brand stand each of those CSC, while only 30% negative comments on Starbucks' BLM were against the CSC and a 70% were about Starbucks being too late to the party or not doing enough to support BLM. This is then consistent with the different expectations hold by Walmart's more conservative consumers base and by Starbucks' more liberal consumers.

Negative Comments									
Post	Type	Total Negative	% of Total Comments	Negative on Topic	% of Negative Comment	Against Cause Comment	% of Negative on topic	Not Enough Comment	% of Negative on topic
<b>Starbucks</b>									
Pride	CSC	382	51%	216	57%	183	85%	33	15%
Black Lives Matter	CSC	17398	67%	12511	72%	3714	30%	8797	70%
Average Controversial Starbucks	CSC	8415	63%	5785	69%	2254	39%	3531	61%
Feeding America	Non-CSC	561	81%	102	18%				
Average Branding Starbucks	No-Cause	494	18%	256	52%				
<b>Walmart</b>									
Pride	CSC	1762	55%	791	45%	575	73%	216	27%
Black Lives Matter	CSC	10090	72%	8324	83%	5928	71%	2396	29%
Average Controversial Walmart	CSC	5926	69%	4558	77%	3252	71%	1306	29%
Feeding America	Non-CSC	189	73%	147	78%				
Average Branding Walmart	No-Cause	346	54%	56	16%				

**Table 49.** “Against Cause” vs “Not Enough” Negative Comments.

I also observed that on-topic negative comments sometimes trigger a defense from other consumers, such as “I mean if yall dont like the pin that much no one is making you shop there. You also dont have to work there. There's lots of stores, shows, etc I dont really like. I just dont go there. Watch the show. Etc” in support of Walmart’s Pride post; or “They were n support of BLM and Pride before receiving backlash... the CEO sent out a letter in support of diversity June 1 before all the talk about not allowing their employees express themselves. They posted that they were working w ASU to make some online resources to promote education on diversity, I mean, wth??? I have a son who works at multiple locations where he’s always been encouraged to show support of any cause” on Starbuck’s BLM post. On the other hand, I did not find such defense when negative comments were off topic.

**Study 2 Part 2: Brandwatch Results**


I was able to analyze Walmart’s campaigns using Brandwatch. Sadly, it was not possible to study Facebook’s campaigns with it. I contacted Brandwatch support and was informed that unfortunately Starbucks’ Facebook page has audience restricted posts. Basically, the posts have audience restrictions embedded in them, which is why Brandwatch can’t crawl them even though we can see them by clicking the link. Satisfactorily, Brandwatch analysis for Walmart posts is convergent with manual processing, reinforcing the reliability of our manual processing.

**Reach, Impact Score and Mention Volume**

As a refresher, as defined by Brandwatch, mention volume is the number of comments while sentiment is the tone of the mention: positive, negative or neutral. Average reach is an average of the number of people estimated to have seen a given post from a source. Reach is calculated using metrics such as followers, engagement, page ranks and estimated views. Impact score shows the potential impact of an author, site or mention. It's a logarithmic scale between 0-100 normalized for the data set to help find what's most interesting. It is the equivalent to engagement in manual processing.

### Walmart's Pride Post Reach, Impact and Mentions

Brandwatch reports an average reach of 312, an impact score of 6.4 and a mention volume of 1,767 for Walmart's Pride post. As can be seen in Figure 27, we observe a peak of 415% in mention volume on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2020 when Walmart's Pride post was published. By clicking on the 1,449 thread, it takes us to the studied post and we confirm that is correct to attribute the volume increase to Pride Post.



**Figure 27.** Walmart's Pride Mention Volume

### Walmart's Black Lives Matter Post Reach, Impact and Mentions


Brandwatch reports an average reach of 270, an impact score of 3.9 and a mention volume of 5,702 for Walmart's BLM post. As can be seen in Figure 28, we observe a peak of 469% in mention volume on June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2020 when Walmart's BLM post was published. By clicking on the 2,739 mentions thread, it takes us to the studied post and we confirm that the volume increase is driven by BLM Post.



**Figure 28.** Walmart’s BLM Mention Volume

**Walmart’s Feeding America Post Reach, Impact, and Mentions**

On the other hand, Brandwatch reports an average reach of 441, an impact score of 8.2 and a mention volume of only 117 for Walmart’s Feeding America Feeding America post published on August 8th, 2020. But, and by clicking in peak B we learned that the 205% increase in mentions volume is attributed not to Feeding America but to Walmart Storytime with D.J.<sup>17</sup> and the peak on August 20<sup>th</sup> to a post about Agnes’ 90<sup>th</sup> Birthday (a Walmart’s associate for 32 years)<sup>18</sup>. Therefore, volume mention is not driven by Feeding America.



<sup>17</sup>[https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=3166198583468623&ref=watch\\_permalink#channels\\_comment\\_588813745126680](https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=3166198583468623&ref=watch_permalink#channels_comment_588813745126680)

<sup>18</sup><https://www.facebook.com/walmart/posts/10158907895219236>

**Figure 29. Walmart’s Feeding America Mention Volume**

We summarize Brandwatch’s reach, impact score, mention volume and peak over Walmart average mention volume over Walmart’s average in Table 47. As it can be seen, Brandwatch’s mention volume and impact scores are convergent with those calculated by manual processing.

<b>Walmart Social Causes Post</b>	<b>Reach</b>	<b>Impact Score</b>	<b>Mention Volume</b>	<b>Peak</b>
Pride	381,160	89,7	1,767	415%
Black Lives Matter	1,282,740	96,8	5,702	469%
Feeding America	42,060	67,8	117	No Peak

**Table 47. Brandwatch Reach, Impact Score and Mention Volume for Walmart Brand Social Causes Posts**

**Sentiment**

Also consistent with manual processing findings, looking into the sentiments in the mentions for each campaign, as seen Table 48 and in Figures 30, 31 and 31, all campaigns exhibit similar percentage of positive sentiment (between 24% - 28%) and all present a higher proportion of negative than positive sentiments. In the case of Feeding America though, neutral sentiment equals the negative sentiment.

Brandwatch associates a sentiment to each mention, The Sentiment of a Mention can be Positive, Negative or Neutral. Sentiment is assigned automatically by the system but can be selected manually if required. Comparing to manually processed data, we find that Brandwatch presents a higher level of neutral comments than I did in the manual processing. As it is discussed in their learning center, their approach achieves very high precision for positive and negative mentions. This means that almost all mentions classified as positive or negative are, in fact, positive or negative. However, this approach also has relatively low recall for positive and negative mentions, meaning that many mentions that were actually positive or negative were



incorrectly classified as neutral. This is being improved with artificial intelligence<sup>19</sup>. Brandwatch allows comments sentiments to be manually reclassified. Nevertheless, I did not re-classify any of the posts assigned by Brandwatch considering that any bias would affect all posts in a similar manner.

### Walmart's Pride Post Sentiments





Figure 30. Walmart's Pride Mention's Sentiment


### Walmart's Black Lives Matter Post Sentiments



<sup>19</sup> Retrieved from <https://consumer-research-help.brandwatch.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013739958-Sentiment-Analysis> on June 4th, 2021

**Figure 31. Walmart’s BLM Mention’s Sentiment**

**Walmart’s Feeding America Post Sentiment**



**Figure 31. Walmart’s Feeding America Mention’s Sentiment**

Walmart Social Causes Post Mentions	Mention Volume	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Pride	1,767	24%	28%	48%
Black Lives Matter	5,702	28%	20%	52%
Feeding America	117	28%	36%	36%

**Table 48. Brandwatch Mention’s Sentiment for Walmart Brand Social Causes Posts**

**Emotions**

By examining the mention’s emotions, as can be seen in figures 33, 34 and 35 and summarized in Table 49 it is surprising to discover that as per Brandwatch’s emotions allotment, Feeding America has the highest level of anger while for BLM the predominant sentiment is sadness. Even though this is surprising, and I did not manually measure the same emotions, joy percentage is similar to my manual count of positive comments and the sum of anger, disgust, fear and sadness is similar to my percentage of negative comments. Emotion is assigned to Mentions automatically by the system, using a custom statistical classifier which was created in-house by Brandwatch’s team of data scientists. The brand or researcher can manually re-classify each mention and the system will

learn from it.<sup>20</sup> I looked into a sample of mentions and would have changed some assignments, but I did not since I considered that any bias would be applied equally to all posts.

### Walmart's Pride Post Emotions




Figure 33. Walmart's Pride Mention's Emotions

### Walmart Black Lives Matter Post Emotions





Figure 34. Walmart's BLM Mention's Emotions

<sup>20</sup> Retrieved from <https://consumer-research-help.brandwatch.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013739658-Emotions> on June 4th, 2021

## Walmart's Feeding America Post Emotions



**Figure 35.** Walmart's Feeding America Mention's Emotions

Walmart Social Causes Post Mentions	Mention Volume	Anger	Disgust	Fear	Joy	Sadness	Surprise
Pride	1,767	38%	23%	2%	20%	16%	1%
Black Lives Matter	5,702	24%	19%	2%	24%	31%	0%
Feeding America	117	50%	13%	2%	31%	4%	0%

**Table 49.** Brandwatch Mention's Emotions for Walmart Brand Social Causes Posts

### Topics Analysis

As can be seen in Figures 36, 37 and 38 in the case of Pride, Figures 39, 40 and 41 for BLM and in Figures 42, 43 and 44 for Feeding America, and consistent with what I find in the manual processing, comments stayed mostly on topic for CSC posts. I also look into Father's Day Post as an example of a no-cause post later in the same month of Pride and BLM post, and as seen in Figures 45, 46 and 47, mentions started to deviate from topic on the negative comments such as mask and employees, also consistent with what I find in Study 2 Part 1 about no-CSC and no-cause posts eliciting more off-topic comments.







### Walmart's Feeding America Post Topic Analysis



Figure 42. Walmart's Feeding America Mention's Topic Wheel



Figure 43. Walmart's Feeding America Mention's Word Cloud






Figure 44. Walmart's Feeding America Mention's Topic Cluster



Figure 45. Walmart's Father's Day Mention's Topic Wheel



10 posts for Walmart and Starbucks. In total those 16 posts produced 199,746 emojis, 100,699 comments and 33,364 shares that I classified. I also examined Walmart posts using Brandwatch social media listening software.

Study 2 offered the opportunity to go beyond the literature and observe, analyze, and compare consumers' responses on social media to CSC versus a non-CSC and both social causes posting strategies against the brand baseline built with no social cause (regular branding) posts, a dimension not yet investigated. Importantly, manual process measures and Brandwatch data were convergent validating the methodology and adding robustness to Study 2 findings.

Study 2 also allowed me to compare study 1 social media engagement intentions with study 2 behaviors. I find that some observed behaviors are consistent with the intentions expressed in the experiment while some are not. Looking into the literature for reasons for those differences, the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991) agree that if a researcher wants to know how people will behave the best way to find out is to ask people how they intend to behave, although there is a gap between intention and behavior (Sheeran, 2002). There is in particular an existent ethical consumer intention-behavior Gap (Carrington et al., 2010; Hassan et al., 2016). “The attitude–behavior or words–deed gap ... has been widely documented within both the social psychology field and the ethical consumption sub-field” (Carrington et al., 2010, p. 141). This gap has been investigated in the ethical consumption literature exploring two perspectives: empirical issues associated with apprehending this gap and studying a range of cognitive factors (Carrington et al., 2010, 2014; Shaw & McMaster, 2015; Sheeran, 2002). Carrington et al., 2014 find that amongst other factors, the translation of intentions into behavior is contingent upon the prioritization of ethical concerns, and that not all concerns are of equal salience. In the gap I find, while intentions favor non-CSC, social media engagement behaviors favor CSC. A possible explanation is that ethical concerns are more salient for CSC than for non-CSC. Another plausible explanation for this intention-behavior gap may be a social desirability bias that is inherent to self-reported research methods, and is noticeable in studies with ethical considerations (Carrigan & Attalla, 2001) where social media engagement for non-CSC ads are perceived as more socially desirable than for CSC ads, exaggerating intentions for non-CSC.

Both manual processing and Brandwatch show greater total engagement for CSC than for no-social cause advertising, confirming study 1 findings, but also greater than non-CSC contradicting Study 1. Contrary to Study 1 findings, in Study 2 non-CSC engagement is no different than for no social causes. Also Study 2 supported *H9c* that predicted a higher social media engagement for a pro-position on a controversial social cause for a non-CSC that is not supported by study 1. The exception to this is Starbuck's pride post engagement not being significantly different than Starbuck's no-cause and I conjecture that due to the long tradition of Starbucks supporting LGBTQ community and to its more liberal consumers base, Pride is not a controversial issue but a non-CSC post for Starbucks' customers. Hydock et al., 2020 find that CSC authenticity and values alignment with brand and consumers play a big role on CSC results for a brand, but Starbucks' Pride findings may suggest that too much authenticity and too good of an alignment may result in a diminished controversy capacity. This is excellent news for a brand supporting a cause dear to its values since it will mainly elicit positive results. Not very good news if the brand is after social media engagement and impact.

As enticing as it may be to obtain greater social media engagement, it is important to differentiate engagement sentiment, positive and negative since they have distinctively different managerial implications, so I analyzed them separately. Positive engagement is predominant and follows the same pattern than total engagement, with CSC posts showing greater positive engagement than no social causes and non-CSC, while there is no difference between the two last ones confirming study 1 findings. Nevertheless, Study 2 showed support for *H7b* that a pro-cause position on CSC generates greater positive WOM than non-CSC while Study 1 did not.

Negative social media engagement behaviors on the other hand are more consistent with intentions. Non-CSC and no-social cause post present the same levels of negative engagement while CSC negative engagement is higher than for any other type of post. Study 2 findings are aligned with Study 1 findings. The only exception is Starbuck's Pride post, that again behaved like a no-CSC post as previously discussed, generating similar negative engagement than no-cause and non-CSC.

Engagement sentiment is different by type of consumer reaction. While emojis and shares are predominantly positive for all types of post, only Starbucks managed to have a higher proportion of positive than negative comments in its no-cause posts average. For all other posts, negative comments are predominant. This means that in general the higher the comments number, the higher the negative comments, and negative comments can skyrocket. However, the fact that shares are largely positive it is also important since it sets the tone of the campaign reach and I observed that post shares spread positivity, not negativity. Negative comments are mostly contained in the original post.

Because negative comments are so prevalent, I investigated them in more depth. I find a very interesting and distinctive behavior regarding negative comments: on-topic negative comments are predominant in controversial causes posts, whereas off-topic negative comments are prevalent in non-controversial and no-cause posts. Also, I observed other consumers defending the brand when negative comments were on topic but not when they were off topic. CSC may in this sense offer a little bit more control of the conversation.

Moreover, not all on-topic negative comments are created equal, they will depend on how the CSC aligns with consumers values and brand positioning. There are on-topic comments related to a “I do not agree with the position of the post” indicating a cause opposition as it predominantly happens for Walmart’s CSC or an “I expect even more from you” indicating a cause support as it predominantly happens to Starbucks’ CSC. Here is where (Hydock et al.), 2020 cause-brand-consumer alignment comes into full play, since as these authors find, a CSC may repel misaligned consumers to a greater degree than it attracts aligned consumers, and therefore the type of negative response the brand gets may matter in terms of boycott and boycott intentions and behavior.

Using Brandwatch I can also report greater reach and impact of CSC than of non-CSC posts, as new measures that go beyond Study 1. In the case of Walmart, BLM has an impressive reach of 1,282,740 and an impact score of 96.8. Pride has a reach of 381,160 and its impact score is 89.7. Both controversial causes show greater social media engagement behavior than no-cause campaign Father’s Day (selected by the marketing experts panel) that achieves a reach of 165,420 and an

impact score of 79.1. Non-CSC post Feeding America shows the worst social media engagement performance with a reach of 42,060 and an impact score of 67.8.

In summary, I show that Brandwatch and manual processing results converge, validating the methodology and increasing reliability. I find that intentions do not always translate into behaviors, and while social media engagement intentions favor non-CSC, behaviors favor CSC. As a result, CSC posts have at least 10 times the reach and a higher impact (engagement) than non-CSC and no-cause posts. All post types seem to elicit predominantly negative comments, nevertheless, CSC posts also elicit a much greater number. However, there are some differences with regard to the types of negative comments. First there are off-topic negative comments that are prevalent in non-CSC and no-cause posts, and on-topic comments that are predominant in CSC posts. Second, these on-topic negative comments also have two distinctive types: those “against the brand position on the post” and those reproaching the brand for “not doing enough”. The type of negative on-topic comment depends on the brand positioning and consumers' core values.

## **Thesis General Discussion**

### *Theoretical Contributions*

An important theoretical contribution of this thesis is the development of a theoretical framework that identifies and tests an underlying process that explains consumer responses to both social causes (CSC and non-CSC) in general as well as a model that explains consumer responses to CSC advertising in particular. This adds conceptually to marketing social cause theory as well as to controversial social cause theory. Moral emotions mediate consumers' responses and the perception of cause importance moderates those moral emotions and consumers' responses. The stronger the moral emotions and the higher the perceived cause importance, the stronger are consumers' responses.

This thesis not only demonstrates the importance of moral emotions to explaining consumer responses to social cause advertising, but it also reveals the existence of divergent moral emotions for CSC that are positive amongst cause supporters and negative amongst cause opposers. Additionally, it uncovers a duality of moral emotions, both positive and negative, for non-CSC ads. This is noteworthy because it establishes a difference between CSC and non-CSC advertising

and because the presence of negative moral emotions in non-CSC advertising has important implications with regard to consumer responses.

This thesis extends the previous literature by providing a broader picture and a more complete understanding of consumers' reactions. This is accomplished in two different ways. It investigates a wider set of consumer responses, in particular, processing, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors and it compares CSC with non-CSC advertising in addition to no-social causes as is the standard in previous studies. This is important not only because non-CSC are more prevalent than CSC ads, but by analyzing the underlying process for social causes in general we are also contributing to the CSR and cause-related marketing literatures.

Similar to prior research (Sheeran, 2002) the results show that consumer intentions and behaviors diverge, under a number of circumstances both in Study 1 (experiment) and between the experiment and the field study. This supports the need for more field studies and suggest perhaps more coupling of experiments with field research.

Contrary to the controversial advertising literature which shows that controversial ads increase elaborative processing (Huhmann & Mott-Stenerson, 2008), I find this is not the case with CSC ads. I discover that higher elaborative processing is produced by stronger positive moral emotions, therefore this effect is only produced by social causes perceived as positive: by a non-CSC ad or by a pro-cause position on CSC advertising. In fact, an against cause position diminishes elaborative processing.

Contrary to a negativity bias (Baumeister et al., 2001), under some circumstances boycott behavior is higher than boycott behavior. Also contradicting a negativity bias, in social media positive reactions (emojis) and shares predominate over negative ones. This has important theoretical implications since it presents some limitations to a negativity bias, and it also has managerial implications as well.

### *Managerial Implications*

The adage says, “silence is golden”. Is it always? It seems that when it comes to brands taking a stand on social issues, sometimes silence can be deafening, and consumers want to see brands show their true colors. The results suggest that managers can use social cause advertising (CSC and non-CSC) to increase attitudes towards ad, positive WOM and boycott intentions and behaviors. Since non-CSC does not seem to influence attitudes towards brands, utilizing a riskier strategy, managers can use CSC advertising that improves attitudes towards brands amongst cause supporters, but it also diminishes it amongst cause opposers.

How does all that translate into behaviors toward brands, in particular to boycott or boycott behavior? Consumers are more willing to sacrifice money for social causes than for no social causes, regardless of the position on the social cause. There is no difference in the willingness to sacrifice money between boycotters and boycotters based on social cause ads. Many times, there is no monetary cost to select one brand versus another in order to boycott or boycott. Under this scenario boycott behavior is stronger than boycott behavior. What is important here is that boycott behavior is never stronger than boycott behavior, and at no cost, boycott is stronger. What this means is that if the consumers base is evenly split between CSC supporters and opposers, and there is no monetary cost, the brand would benefit as consumers would be more likely to boycott than boycott. And if there are more supporters than opposers for a cause, the boycott effect may be even stronger.

Social media is an increasingly important promotion channel. In Study 2 I demonstrate that manual processing methods can produce as valuable and reliable information as social media software listening tools at a low cost. This is particularly useful for small companies with limited budgets to assess social media campaigns results.

If increasing social media engagement is the managerial objective, CSC can accomplish that by increasing social media reach by at least 10 times. CSC can generate about three times the positive engagement than no social cause (branding) posts while a non-CSC post shows a pattern similar to a no social cause posts. So, if a brand is looking to increase social media engagement, taking a



stand on a controversial social cause may certainly accomplish this, however this is not without risks... since a CSC ad can multiply negative comments by tenfold.

Interestingly, a high level of negative comments is not exclusive to CSC posts, since non-CSC and no social cause posts also present an abundance of negative comments. Nevertheless, the volume of negative comments on CSC is outstandingly high. Digging deeper to understand the drivers of such negativity in comments, I find that negative comments on non-CSC and no social cause posts are mainly off-topic, covering all kinds of other matters from other social causes to deficient products or bad service. On the other hand, CSC posts concentrate negative comments on-topic, which at least gives the brand more control of the conversation. There are two distinct types of negative on-topic comments: "I'm against this cause" and "You are not doing enough". Understanding the differences in negative comments is very informative to management. What is the prevalent type of on-topic negative comments? It depends on the alignment of the CSC with the brand positioning and consumers' values. Taking a stand on a CSC that is aligned with the brand's consumer base may be a smart move (Hydock et al., 2020). However, as the Starbucks' Pride campaign demonstrates, if the cause is too well aligned or has been run for a long time, it may lose the effects of controversial advertising as it is no longer perceived as controversial.

Is engaging in CSC advertising worth it for a brand? It is if the goal is to increase ad attitude, social media reach and engagement -which is mostly positive- and if the brand is not afraid to deal with an increase in the amount of negative comments on-topic. Even though the number of negative comments on CSC posts is substantial, they stay mostly confined within the post. And since reactions (emojis) and shares are predominantly positive, what is being spread about the brand is mostly positive. If a brand's objective is to generate more sales, boycott behavior is stronger than boycott behavior if there is no associated cost. Of course, it would be wise to select a controversial social cause in tune with the brand's values that also reflect the values of the majority of its customers, and to only promote what the brand actually does. If it is only talk and no actions, similarly to how some brands are accused of greenwashing or pinkwashing, it could be accused

of causewashing<sup>21</sup>. And if some preliminary research indicates more cause supporters than cause opposers in the brand's consumer base, it seems to be a sure bet. Take a stand on a CSC to stand out!

### **Limitations and Future Research**

As always, the results as well as any theoretical and managerial implications need to be taken with a grain of salt because like in all studies this research also has limitations, that also provide future research opportunities.

To begin with, the analysis of consumer comments based upon a manual processing method would benefit from the inclusion of two independent coders, followed by a calculation of inter-coder reliability. It is important however, to note that the convergence/consistency of results between the manual processing of comments and the Brandwatch analyses provides some confidence in the reliability of the coding and results of consumer comments between the two different methodologies. With that said, two independent coders will re-code the consumer comments and I will calculate an inter-coder reliability score.

To control for a number of external factors such as the levels of controversy, cause importance, brand familiarity and likeability, similar levels of each of these factors were established and then chosen as stimuli through pretesting. Future research could manipulate these factors to assess their differential effects on consumers' responses.

In conjunction with measuring consumer responses to a single ad or post this research could benefit from also measuring the commitment of a brand to a social cause. One should consider that regularly engaging with controversial issues in an ideologically consistent way may strengthen the distinctiveness and coherence of a brand's identity, which can enhance consumer-brand identification (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). Thus, it is possible that brand social cause activism positively influences consumers' attitudes, intentions, and behaviors in the long term. This is

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<sup>21</sup> I define Causewashing as controversial or non-controversial social cause's advertising that is not aligned with the brand/company actions and could be perceived as opportunistic instead of value-driven.

particularly important since in Study 2 Walmart's Pride campaign performs as a CSC while Starbucks' Pride does not. Is Starbucks long support of LGBTQ the reason why Pride is not perceived as or responded to as a CSC for the brand? Also, does Starbucks long support of LGBTQ make Pride too well aligned to Starbucks positioning? A good brand-CSC alignment is advocated by Hydock et al., (2020). Is there a point where good alignment obliterates controversiality for a brand? Future research should address the differences between short-term vs long term controversial cause support and investigate whether brand-cause alignment follows a U shape curve where too little or too much is detrimental.

A further potential limitation is related to this issue of brand-cause fit or alignment. I pre-tested for brand-cause fit to ensure all were equally perceived for control reasons. In the experiment this variable was not measured again so any potential effects it may have on consumers' responses could not be assessed. In pre-testing I observe that customers holding a pro-cause position usually consider there was a good cause-brand fit while against-cause position holders feel the opposite thus it does not behave as a control variable. Future research could test, possibly including it as a covariate, the differential effects of the cause-brand relationship for supporters versus opposers of a social cause depicted in an ad to determine its influence.

There are a number of other future research ideas that arise from the study design and data analyses. For example, as all of this research was conducted in the US, it would be interesting to see if cultural differences impact consumer responses to social cause advertising. Additionally, analysis of whether the discussion generated in social media is centered more on the brand or on the controversial social cause. Moreover, CSC advertising can act as a hot button topic sparking troll posts that prompt ordinary users to engage in trolling behavior. Trolling behavior can also be centered on the brand, on the CSC or on other customers. Future research could establish if discussions and trolling behavior related to CSC advertising are brand centered, social cause centered or customer centered, and if discussions and trolling behavior differ from that associated with non-CSC and no social cause posts. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of each of the distinctive negative positions that consumers may take on a brand stand on social causes -against cause and not doing enough- on consumers' attitudes towards brand and

other responses. Future research could also establish how positive and negative on-topic versus off-topic comments on social media affect brands.

In addition, it would be thought-provoking to incorporate cognitive components to the social cause model to build and test a more integrated conceptual model. To develop a scale to measure different behaviors and levels of response to social cause activism would be useful as well.

Finally, it would be interesting to investigate how corporate CSC activities affect brands in multi-brand firms and how a specific brand's CSC activities affect other brands in the firm and the corporation. Further, to extend research to other corporate social responsibility activities to examine if this process model fits brand activism in general. I examine brand activism from the consumers' viewpoint; however, studying this phenomenon from a managerial perspective to obtain a better understanding of why brands decide to take a stand on CSC despite the risks associated with it would provide useful insights to both academics and managers alike.

I hope that this thesis and any future publications will stimulate further research on the phenomenon of social cause brand activism.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Brands Pretesting Questionnaire

- How often have you worn/drunk/used/shopped at... sport clothing/sodas/credit cards/drugstore in the last three months? 7-point semantic differential Extremely familiar/Extremely unfamiliar
- How familiar are you with Adidas-Nike/CocaCola-Pepsi/Visa-MasterCard/CVS-Walgreens? 7-point semantic differential Extremely negative/Extremely positive
- How often have you worn/drunk/used/shopped... sport clothing/sodas/credit cards/drugstore in the last three months? Once a week or more, a few times a month, once a month, at least once in the last three months, never
- What is your overall opinion of Adidas-Nike/CocaCola-Pepsi/Visa-MasterCard/CVS-Walgreens? 7-point semantic differential Extremely low/Extremely high



- How often have you worn/drunk/used/shopped... Adidas-Nike/CocaCola-Pepsi/Visa-MasterCard/CVS-Walgreens? Once a week or more, a few times a month, once a month, at least once in the last three months, never
- How do you feel about Adidas-Nike/CocaCola-Pepsi/Visa-MasterCard/CVS-Walgreens? 7-point semantic differential Extremely unfavorable/Extremely favorable
- How likely is that you would recommend Adidas-Nike/CocaCola-Pepsi/Visa-MasterCard/CVS-Walgreens to a friend or colleague? 7-point semantic differential Extremely unlikely/Extremely likely
- Do you have a preference between Adidas-Nike/CocaCola-Pepsi/Visa-MasterCard/CVS-Walgreens? 7-point semantic differential Brand 1-Indifferent-Brand 2 (random order)

## **Appendix 2 Social Issues Pretesting Questionnaires**

*Social issue: Same-Sex Marriage, Dream Act, Ending Child Abuse, Housing Solutions for Veterans*

- Do you think *social issue* is an important social issue? 7-point semantic differential Extremely unimportant/Extremely important
- Are you pro, against or neutral about *social issue*? 7-point semantic differential Strongly Against/Neutral/Strongly Pro
- How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign in support of *social issue*? 7-point semantic differential Extremely negative/Extremely positive
- How would you feel about a brand or company running an advertising campaign to donate money in support of *social issue*? 7-point semantic differential Extremely negative/Extremely positive

Where *social issue* is eating healthy, skin cancer screening, pet adoption, ending child abuse, housing solutions for veterans, same-sex marriage, breast feeding in public, homo-parental adoption, banning assault weapons and dreamers receiving a green card.

## **Appendix 3 Ads Pretesting Questionnaire**

### **Brand Familiarity, Random Order**

- About Visa/MasterCard/Walgreens/CVS you would say that... 7-point semantic differential This brand is very unfamiliar to me / This brand is very familiar to me.

- About Visa/MasterCard/Walgreens/CVS you would say that... 7-point semantic differential I'm not at all knowledgeable about this brand / I'm very knowledgeable about this brand.

- About Visa/MasterCard/Walgreens/CVS you would say that... 7-point semantic differential I have never seen advertisements about this brand in the mass media / I have seen many advertisements about this brand in the mass media.

#### **Aesthetic Formality (Presenting Ad), Random Order**

- Would you say this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Poorly organized / Well organized

- Would you say this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Chaotic / Ordered

- Would you say this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Illegible / Legible

#### **Ad comprehension (Presenting Ad), Random Order**

- Would you say this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Easy to understand / Difficult to understand

- Would you say this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Straightforward / Confusing

- Would you say this ad is... 7-point semantic differential The meaning is certain / The meaning is ambiguous

#### **Aesthetic Evaluation (Presenting Ad), Random Order**

- I think this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Offensive / Enjoyable

- I think this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Poor-looking / Nice-looking

- I think this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Displeasing / Pleasing

- I think this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Unattractive / Attractive

- I think this ad has... 7-point semantic differential bad appearance / good appearance

- I think this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Ugly / Beautiful

#### **Attitude Towards the Ad (Presenting Ad), Random Order**

- Regarding this ad... 7-point semantic differential I dislike the ad / I like the ad

- Regarding this ad... 7-point semantic differential I react unfavorably to the ad / I react favorably to the ad

- Regarding this ad... 7-point semantic differential I feel negative toward the ad / I feel positive toward the ad.

## Brand Fit

Directions: When you think about how (brand) and (social cause) match up with one another, would you say that the sponsorship is a:

- 7-point semantic differential A poor match / A good match
- 7-point semantic differential Poor fit / Good fit
- 7-point semantic differential Poor alignment / Good alignment

## Final Thoughts (Presenting Ad)

Are there other things that come to mind when you see this ad? Open question

## Appendix 4 Ads Pretesting Results

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Cause_Type * Brand	605	100.0%	0	0.0%	605	100.0%
Cause_Ad * Brand	605	100.0%	0	0.0%	605	100.0%

### Cause\_Type \* Brand Crosstabulation

		Brand				Total
		CVS	Mastercard	Visa	Walgreens	
Cause_Type	Control	29	30	30	27	116
	Controversial	62	62	63	61	248
	Non-Controversial	62	56	62	61	241
Total		153	148	155	149	605

### Cause\_Ad \* Brand Crosstabulation

		Brand				Total
		CVS	Mastercard	Visa	Walgreens	
Cause_Ad	Assault Weapons	32	31	32	30	125
	Branding	29	30	30	27	116

Child Abuse	30	28	30	31	119
Same-Sex Marriage	30	31	31	31	123
Veterans Housing	32	28	32	30	122
<b>Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>605</b>

### Oneway

### ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Ad_Organized	Between Groups	13.777	4	3.444	2.017	.091
	Within Groups	1024.778	600	1.708		
	Total	1038.555	604			
Ad_Ordered	Between Groups	14.633	4	3.658	1.910	.107
	Within Groups	1149.152	600	1.915		
	Total	1163.785	604			
Ad_legible	Between Groups	30.267	4	7.567	4.721	.001
	Within Groups	961.743	600	1.603		
	Total	992.010	604			
Ad_Understandability	Between Groups	22.965	4	5.741	1.151	.332
	Within Groups	2992.943	600	4.988		
	Total	3015.907	604			
Ad_Straightforward	Between Groups	23.669	4	5.917	1.313	.264
	Within Groups	2703.197	600	4.505		
	Total	2726.866	604			
Ad_Meaning	Between Groups	58.610	4	14.653	3.046	.017
	Within Groups	2886.530	600	4.811		
	Total	2945.140	604			
Ad_Offensivness	Between Groups	139.224	4	34.806	15.708	.000
	Within Groups	1329.514	600	2.216		
	Total	1468.737	604			
Ad_Look	Between Groups	70.331	4	17.583	7.517	.000
	Within Groups	1403.388	600	2.339		
	Total	1473.719	604			
Ad_Pleasingness	Between Groups	99.372	4	24.843	9.473	.000
	Within Groups	1573.504	600	2.623		
	Total	1672.876	604			
Ad_Attractiveness	Between Groups	75.640	4	18.910	7.149	.000

	Within Groups	1587.061	600	2.645		
	Total	1662.701	604			
Ad_Appereance	Between Groups	61.301	4	15.325	6.386	.000
	Within Groups	1439.800	600	2.400		
	Total	1501.101	604			
Ad_Beautiness	Between Groups	104.122	4	26.030	9.996	.000
	Within Groups	1562.500	600	2.604		
	Total	1666.621	604			
Ad_Likeness	Between Groups	44.395	4	11.099	3.927	.004
	Within Groups	1695.582	600	2.826		
	Total	1739.977	604			
Ad_Reaction	Between Groups	45.361	4	11.340	4.184	.002
	Within Groups	1626.424	600	2.711		
	Total	1671.785	604			
Ad_Valence	Between Groups	66.200	4	16.550	6.178	.000
	Within Groups	1607.321	600	2.679		
	Total	1673.521	604			
Brand_Familiarity	Between Groups	2.186	4	.546	.328	.859
	Within Groups	999.854	600	1.666		
	Total	1002.040	604			
Brand_Knowledge	Between Groups	8.714	4	2.178	1.239	.293
	Within Groups	1055.114	600	1.759		
	Total	1063.828	604			
Brand_Advertising	Between Groups	13.510	4	3.377	1.602	.172
	Within Groups	1265.290	600	2.109		
	Total	1278.800	604			

## Multiple Comparisons

Bonferroni

Dependent Variable	(I) Cause_Ad_Code	(J) Cause_Ad_Code	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ad_legible	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.489*	.163	.028	-.95	-.03
		Child Abuse	-.640*	.162	.001	-1.10	-.18
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.196	.161	1.000	-.65	.26
		Veterans Housing	-.300	.161	.632	-.75	.15
	Branding	Assault Weapons	.489*	.163	.028	.03	.95
		Child Abuse	-.151	.165	1.000	-.62	.31
		Same-Sex Marriage	.294	.164	.736	-.17	.76
		Veterans Housing	.189	.164	1.000	-.27	.65
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	.640*	.162	.001	.18	1.10
		Branding	.151	.165	1.000	-.31	.62
		Same-Sex Marriage	.444	.163	.065	-.01	.90
		Veterans Housing	.340	.163	.374	-.12	.80
	Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.196	.161	1.000	-.26	.65
		Branding	-.294	.164	.736	-.76	.17
		Child Abuse	-.444	.163	.065	-.90	.01
		Veterans Housing	-.104	.162	1.000	-.56	.35
	Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.300	.161	.632	-.15	.75
		Branding	-.189	.164	1.000	-.65	.27
		Child Abuse	-.340	.163	.374	-.80	.12
		Same-Sex Marriage	.104	.162	1.000	-.35	.56
Ad_Meaning	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.589	.283	.376	-1.39	.21
		Child Abuse	.359	.281	1.000	-.43	1.15
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.280	.279	1.000	-1.06	.51
		Veterans Housing	-.034	.279	1.000	-.82	.75

Branding	Assault Weapons	.589	.283	.376	-.21	1.39
	Child Abuse	.949*	.286	.010	.14	1.75
	Same-Sex Marriage	.309	.284	1.000	-.49	1.11
	Veterans Housing	.555	.284	.513	-.25	1.36
Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.359	.281	1.000	-1.15	.43
	Branding	-.949*	.286	.010	-1.75	-.14
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.639	.282	.238	-1.43	.16
	Veterans Housing	-.393	.283	1.000	-1.19	.40
Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.280	.279	1.000	-.51	1.06
	Branding	-.309	.284	1.000	-1.11	.49
	Child Abuse	.639	.282	.238	-.16	1.43
	Veterans Housing	.246	.280	1.000	-.54	1.04
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.034	.279	1.000	-.75	.82
	Branding	-.555	.284	.513	-1.36	.25
	Child Abuse	.393	.283	1.000	-.40	1.19
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.246	.280	1.000	-1.04	.54
Ad_Offensiveness	Assault Weapons					
	Branding	-1.036*	.192	.000	-1.58	-.50
	Child Abuse	.203	.191	1.000	-.33	.74
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.663*	.189	.005	-1.20	-.13
Branding	Assault Weapons					
	Child Abuse					
	Same-Sex Marriage					
	Veterans Housing					
Child Abuse	Assault Weapons					
	Branding					
	Same-Sex Marriage					
	Veterans Housing					
Branding	Assault Weapons	1.036*	.192	.000	.50	1.58
	Child Abuse	1.240*	.194	.000	.69	1.79
	Same-Sex Marriage	.373	.193	.535	-.17	.92
	Veterans Housing	.205	.193	1.000	-.34	.75
Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.203	.191	1.000	-.74	.33
	Branding	-1.240*	.194	.000	-1.79	-.69
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.867*	.191	.000	-1.41	-.33
	Veterans Housing					

		Veterans Housing	-1.035*	.192	.000	-1.57	-.49
Same-Sex Marriage		Assault Weapons	.663*	.189	.005	.13	1.20
		Branding	-.373	.193	.535	-.92	.17
		Child Abuse	.867*	.191	.000	.33	1.41
		Veterans Housing	-.168	.190	1.000	-.70	.37
Veterans Housing		Assault Weapons	.831*	.189	.000	.30	1.36
		Branding	-.205	.193	1.000	-.75	.34
		Child Abuse	1.035*	.192	.000	.49	1.57
		Same-Sex Marriage	.168	.190	1.000	-.37	.70
Ad_Look	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.679*	.197	.006	-1.23	-.12
		Child Abuse	.197	.196	1.000	-.35	.75
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.595*	.194	.023	-1.14	-.05
		Veterans Housing	-.437	.195	.253	-.98	.11
	Branding	Assault Weapons	.679*	.197	.006	.12	1.23
		Child Abuse	.876*	.200	.000	.31	1.44
		Same-Sex Marriage	.084	.198	1.000	-.47	.64
		Veterans Housing	.243	.198	1.000	-.32	.80
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.197	.196	1.000	-.75	.35
		Branding	-.876*	.200	.000	-1.44	-.31
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.792*	.197	.001	-1.35	-.24
		Veterans Housing	-.634*	.197	.014	-1.19	-.08
Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.595*	.194	.023	.05	1.14	
	Branding	-.084	.198	1.000	-.64	.47	
	Child Abuse	.792*	.197	.001	.24	1.35	
	Veterans Housing	.158	.195	1.000	-.39	.71	
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.437	.195	.253	-.11	.98	
	Branding	-.243	.198	1.000	-.80	.32	
	Child Abuse	.634*	.197	.014	.08	1.19	



		Same-Sex Marriage	-.158	.195	1.000	-.71	.39
Ad_Pleasin gness	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.795*	.209	.002	-1.38	-.21
		Child Abuse	.315	.207	1.000	-.27	.90
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.543	.206	.085	-1.12	.04
		Veterans Housing	-.547	.206	.082	-1.13	.03
	Branding	Assault Weapons	.795*	.209	.002	.21	1.38
		Child Abuse	1.110*	.211	.000	.51	1.71
		Same-Sex Marriage	.252	.210	1.000	-.34	.84
		Veterans Housing	.248	.210	1.000	-.34	.84
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.315	.207	1.000	-.90	.27
		Branding	-1.110*	.211	.000	-1.71	-.51
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.859*	.208	.000	-1.45	-.27
		Veterans Housing	-.862*	.209	.000	-1.45	-.27
	Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.543	.206	.085	-.04	1.12
		Branding	-.252	.210	1.000	-.84	.34
		Child Abuse	.859*	.208	.000	.27	1.45
		Veterans Housing	-.004	.207	1.000	-.59	.58
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.547	.206	.082	-.03	1.13	
	Branding	-.248	.210	1.000	-.84	.34	
	Child Abuse	.862*	.209	.000	.27	1.45	
	Same-Sex Marriage	.004	.207	1.000	-.58	.59	
Ad_Attract iveness	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.690*	.210	.011	-1.28	-.10
		Child Abuse	.201	.208	1.000	-.39	.79
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.407	.207	.495	-.99	.18
		Veterans Housing	-.656*	.207	.016	-1.24	-.07
	Branding	Assault Weapons	.690*	.210	.011	.10	1.28
		Child Abuse	.892*	.212	.000	.29	1.49

	Same-Sex Marriage	.284	.210	1.000	-.31	.88
	Veterans Housing	.034	.211	1.000	-.56	.63
Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.201	.208	1.000	-.79	.39
	Branding	-.892*	.212	.000	-1.49	-.29
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.608*	.209	.038	-1.20	-.02
	Veterans Housing	-.857*	.210	.000	-1.45	-.27
Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.407	.207	.495	-.18	.99
	Branding	-.284	.210	1.000	-.88	.31
	Child Abuse	.608*	.209	.038	.02	1.20
	Veterans Housing	-.249	.208	1.000	-.83	.34
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.656*	.207	.016	.07	1.24
	Branding	-.034	.211	1.000	-.63	.56
	Child Abuse	.857*	.210	.000	.27	1.45
	Same-Sex Marriage	.249	.208	1.000	-.34	.83
Ad Apperance	Assault Weapons					
	Branding	-.726*	.200	.003	-1.29	-.16
	Child Abuse	.198	.198	1.000	-.36	.76
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.305	.197	1.000	-.86	.25
Branding	Veterans Housing	-.408	.197	.391	-.96	.15
	Assault Weapons	.726*	.200	.003	.16	1.29
	Child Abuse	.924*	.202	.000	.35	1.49
	Same-Sex Marriage	.421	.200	.362	-.14	.99
Child Abuse	Veterans Housing	.318	.201	1.000	-.25	.88
	Assault Weapons	-.198	.198	1.000	-.76	.36
	Branding	-.924*	.202	.000	-1.49	-.35
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.503	.199	.119	-1.06	.06
	Veterans Housing	-.606*	.200	.025	-1.17	-.04

Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.305	.197	1.000	-.25	.86	
	Branding	-.421	.200	.362	-.99	.14	
	Child Abuse	.503	.199	.119	-.06	1.06	
	Veterans Housing	-.103	.198	1.000	-.66	.45	
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.408	.197	.391	-.15	.96	
	Branding	-.318	.201	1.000	-.88	.25	
	Child Abuse	.606*	.200	.025	.04	1.17	
	Same-Sex Marriage	.103	.198	1.000	-.45	.66	
Ad_Beauti ness	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.816*	.208	.001	-1.40	-.23
	Child Abuse	.159	.207	1.000	-.42	.74	
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.786*	.205	.001	-1.36	-.21	
	Veterans Housing	-.668*	.205	.012	-1.25	-.09	
Branding	Assault Weapons	.816*	.208	.001	.23	1.40	
	Child Abuse	.975*	.211	.000	.38	1.57	
	Same-Sex Marriage	.030	.209	1.000	-.56	.62	
	Veterans Housing	.147	.209	1.000	-.44	.74	
Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.159	.207	1.000	-.74	.42	
	Branding	-.975*	.211	.000	-1.57	-.38	
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.945*	.207	.000	-1.53	-.36	
	Veterans Housing	-.827*	.208	.001	-1.41	-.24	
Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.786*	.205	.001	.21	1.36	
	Branding	-.030	.209	1.000	-.62	.56	
	Child Abuse	.945*	.207	.000	.36	1.53	
	Veterans Housing	.118	.206	1.000	-.46	.70	
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.668*	.205	.012	.09	1.25	
	Branding	-.147	.209	1.000	-.74	.44	
	Child Abuse	.827*	.208	.001	.24	1.41	
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.118	.206	1.000	-.70	.46	

Ad_Likeness	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.736*	.217	.007	-1.35	-.13
		Child Abuse	-.179	.215	1.000	-.79	.43
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.383	.214	.734	-.98	.22
		Veterans Housing	-.616*	.214	.041	-1.22	-.01
	Branding	Assault Weapons	.736*	.217	.007	.13	1.35
		Child Abuse	.558	.219	.113	-.06	1.18
		Same-Sex Marriage	.354	.218	1.000	-.26	.97
		Veterans Housing	.121	.218	1.000	-.49	.73
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	.179	.215	1.000	-.43	.79
		Branding	-.558	.219	.113	-1.18	.06
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.204	.216	1.000	-.81	.41
		Veterans Housing	-.437	.217	.441	-1.05	.17
	Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.383	.214	.734	-.22	.98
		Branding	-.354	.218	1.000	-.97	.26
		Child Abuse	.204	.216	1.000	-.41	.81
		Veterans Housing	-.233	.215	1.000	-.84	.37
	Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.616*	.214	.041	.01	1.22
		Branding	-.121	.218	1.000	-.73	.49
		Child Abuse	.437	.217	.441	-.17	1.05
		Same-Sex Marriage	.233	.215	1.000	-.37	.84
Ad_Reaction	Assault Weapons	Branding	-.579	.212	.066	-1.18	.02
		Child Abuse	.061	.211	1.000	-.53	.65
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.295	.209	1.000	-.88	.29
		Veterans Housing	-.585	.210	.054	-1.18	.01
	Branding	Assault Weapons	.579	.212	.066	-.02	1.18
		Child Abuse	.640*	.215	.030	.03	1.24
		Same-Sex Marriage	.284	.213	1.000	-.32	.88
		Veterans Housing					



	Child Abuse	.419	.210	.468	-.17	1.01
	Veterans Housing	-.209	.209	1.000	-.80	.38
Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.770*	.208	.002	.18	1.36
	Branding	-.047	.212	1.000	-.64	.55
	Child Abuse	.628*	.211	.030	.03	1.22
	Same-Sex Marriage	.209	.209	1.000	-.38	.80

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

### Multiple Comparisons

Bonferroni

Dependent Variable	(I) Cause_Ad_Code	(J) Cause_Ad_Code	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Brand_Cause_Match	Assault Weapons	Child Abuse	.024	.225	1.000	-.57	.62
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.168	.223	1.000	-.76	.42
		Veterans Housing	-.636*	.224	.028	-1.23	-.04
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	-.024	.225	1.000	-.62	.57
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.193	.226	1.000	-.79	.41
		Veterans Housing	-.660*	.226	.022	-1.26	-.06
	Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.168	.223	1.000	-.42	.76
		Child Abuse	.193	.226	1.000	-.41	.79
		Veterans Housing	-.467	.224	.227	-1.06	.13
	Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.636*	.224	.028	.04	1.23
		Child Abuse	.660*	.226	.022	.06	1.26
		Same-Sex Marriage	.467	.224	.227	-.13	1.06
Brand_Cause_Fit	Assault Weapons	Child Abuse	-.252	.228	1.000	-.86	.35
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.377	.226	.579	-.98	.22

		Veterans Housing	-.828*	.227	.002	-1.43	-.23
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	.252	.228	1.000	-.35	.86
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.125	.229	1.000	-.73	.48
		Veterans Housing	-.576	.229	.074	-1.18	.03
	Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.377	.226	.579	-.22	.98
		Child Abuse	.125	.229	1.000	-.48	.73
		Veterans Housing	-.451	.228	.288	-1.05	.15
	Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.828*	.227	.002	.23	1.43
		Child Abuse	.576	.229	.074	-.03	1.18
		Same-Sex Marriage	.451	.228	.288	-.15	1.05
Brand_Cause_Alignment	Assault Weapons	Child Abuse	-.099	.229	1.000	-.71	.51
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.346	.228	.773	-.95	.26
		Veterans Housing	-.757*	.228	.006	-1.36	-.15
	Child Abuse	Assault Weapons	.099	.229	1.000	-.51	.71
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.247	.230	1.000	-.86	.36
		Veterans Housing	-.658*	.231	.027	-1.27	-.05
	Same-Sex Marriage	Assault Weapons	.346	.228	.773	-.26	.95
		Child Abuse	.247	.230	1.000	-.36	.86
		Veterans Housing	-.411	.229	.440	-1.02	.20
	Veterans Housing	Assault Weapons	.757*	.228	.006	.15	1.36
		Child Abuse	.658*	.231	.027	.05	1.27
		Same-Sex Marriage	.411	.229	.440	-.20	1.02

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## Appendix 5 Second Ads Pretesting

### Case Processing Summary

Cases

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Cause_Type * Brand	580	100.0%	0	0.0%	580	100.0%
Ad_Type_code * Brand	580	100.0%	0	0.0%	580	100.0%

### Cause\_Type \* Brand Crosstabulation

		Brand				Total
		CVS	Mastercard	Visa	Walgreens	
Cause_Type	Control	29	30	30	27	116
	Controversial	66	69	69	65	269
	NonControversial	49	48	49	49	195
Total		144	147	148	141	580

### Ad\_Type\_code \* Brand Crosstabulation

Count

		Brand				Total
		CVS	Mastercard	Visa	Walgreens	
Ad_Type_code	End Child Abuse	17	19	17	19	72
	Housing for Veterans	32	29	32	30	123
	Same-Sex Marriage	30	31	32	31	124
	Ban Assault Weapons	19	19	18	16	72
	Dream Act	17	19	19	18	73
	No-Cause Control	29	30	30	27	116
Total		144	147	148	141	580

### Oneway

#### ANOVA

Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
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Brand_Familiarity	Between Groups	8.253	5	1.651	.920	.468
	Within Groups	1026.614	572	1.795		
	Total	1034.867	577			
Brand_Knowledge	Between Groups	8.525	5	1.705	.906	.477
	Within Groups	1076.930	572	1.883		
	Total	1085.455	577			
Brand_Advertising	Between Groups	5.539	5	1.108	.471	.798
	Within Groups	1344.082	572	2.350		
	Total	1349.621	577			
Ad_Organized	Between Groups	43.510	5	8.702	4.519	.000
	Within Groups	1105.283	574	1.926		
	Total	1148.793	579			
Ad_Ordered	Between Groups	72.606	5	14.521	6.921	.000
	Within Groups	1204.392	574	2.098		
	Total	1276.998	579			
Ad_legible	Between Groups	10.719	5	2.144	1.369	.234
	Within Groups	899.116	574	1.566		
	Total	909.834	579			
Ad_Understandability	Between Groups	15.545	5	3.109	.641	.669
	Within Groups	2785.853	574	4.853		
	Total	2801.398	579			
Ad_Straightforward	Between Groups	21.278	5	4.256	.948	.449
	Within Groups	2575.913	574	4.488		
	Total	2597.191	579			
Ad_Meaning	Between Groups	46.714	5	9.343	1.966	.082
	Within Groups	2728.052	574	4.753		
	Total	2774.766	579			
Ad_Offensivness	Between Groups	82.241	5	16.448	8.030	.000
	Within Groups	1175.718	574	2.048		
	Total	1257.959	579			
Ad_Look	Between Groups	92.215	5	18.443	7.634	.000
	Within Groups	1386.674	574	2.416		
	Total	1478.890	579			
Ad_Pleasingness	Between Groups	64.879	5	12.976	5.178	.000
	Within Groups	1438.528	574	2.506		
	Total	1503.407	579			
Ad_Attractiveness	Between Groups	65.993	5	13.199	5.382	.000
	Within Groups	1407.669	574	2.452		

	Total	1473.662	579			
Ad_Appearence	Between Groups	77.562	5	15.512	6.605	.000
	Within Groups	1347.988	574	2.348		
	Total	1425.550	579			
Ad_Beautiness	Between Groups	77.490	5	15.498	6.095	.000
	Within Groups	1459.538	574	2.543		
	Total	1537.028	579			
Ad_Likeness	Between Groups	46.357	5	9.271	3.504	.004
	Within Groups	1518.643	574	2.646		
	Total	1565.000	579			
Ad_Reaction	Between Groups	54.797	5	10.959	4.320	.001
	Within Groups	1456.140	574	2.537		
	Total	1510.938	579			
Ad_Valence	Between Groups	48.004	5	9.601	4.026	.001
	Within Groups	1368.884	574	2.385		
	Total	1416.888	579			

## Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons

Bonferroni Dependent Variable	(I) Ad_Type_code	(J) Ad_Type_code	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
						Ad_Organized	End Child Abuse
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.215	.206	1.000	-.82	.39
		Ban Assault Weapons	.653	.231	.074	-.03	1.33
		Dream Act	.035	.230	1.000	-.64	.71

	No-Cause Control	-.244	.208	1.000	-.86	.37
Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.051	.206	1.000	-.56	.66
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.164	.177	1.000	-.68	.36
	Ban Assault Weapons	.704*	.206	.010	.10	1.31
	Dream Act	.086	.205	1.000	-.52	.69
	No-Cause Control	-.193	.180	1.000	-.72	.34
Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.215	.206	1.000	-.39	.82
	Housing for Veterans	.164	.177	1.000	-.36	.68
	Ban Assault Weapons	.868*	.206	.000	.26	1.47
	Dream Act	.250	.205	1.000	-.35	.85
	No-Cause Control	-.029	.179	1.000	-.56	.50
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.653	.231	.074	-1.33	.03
	Housing for Veterans	-.704*	.206	.010	-1.31	-.10
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.868*	.206	.000	-1.47	-.26
	Dream Act	-.617	.230	.114	-1.30	.06
	No-Cause Control	-.897*	.208	.000	-1.51	-.28
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.035	.230	1.000	-.71	.64
	Housing for Veterans	-.086	.205	1.000	-.69	.52
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.250	.205	1.000	-.85	.35
	Ban Assault Weapons	.617	.230	.114	-.06	1.30
	No-Cause Control	-.280	.207	1.000	-.89	.33

	No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.244	.208	1.000	-.37	.86
		Housing for Veterans	.193	.180	1.000	-.34	.72
		Same-Sex Marriage	.029	.179	1.000	-.50	.56
		Ban Assault Weapons	.897*	.208	.000	.28	1.51
		Dream Act	.280	.207	1.000	-.33	.89
Ad_Ordered	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	.274	.215	1.000	-.36	.91
		Same-Sex Marriage	.237	.215	1.000	-.40	.87
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.097*	.241	.000	.39	1.81
		Dream Act	.435	.241	1.000	-.27	1.14
		No-Cause Control	-.102	.217	1.000	-.74	.54
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	-.274	.215	1.000	-.91	.36
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.036	.184	1.000	-.58	.51
		Ban Assault Weapons	.824*	.215	.002	.19	1.46
		Dream Act	.162	.214	1.000	-.47	.79
		No-Cause Control	-.375	.187	.687	-.93	.18
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.237	.215	1.000	-.87	.40
		Housing for Veterans	.036	.184	1.000	-.51	.58
		Ban Assault Weapons	.860*	.215	.001	.23	1.49
		Dream Act	.198	.214	1.000	-.43	.83
		No-Cause Control	-.339	.187	1.000	-.89	.21
	Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-1.097*	.241	.000	-1.81	-.39

		Housing for Veterans	-.824*	.215	.002	-1.46	-.19
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.860*	.215	.001	-1.49	-.23
		Dream Act	-.662	.241	.092	-1.37	.05
		No-Cause Control	-1.199*	.217	.000	-1.84	-.56
	Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.435	.241	1.000	-1.14	.27
		Housing for Veterans	-.162	.214	1.000	-.79	.47
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.198	.214	1.000	-.83	.43
		Ban Assault Weapons	.662	.241	.092	-.05	1.37
		No-Cause Control	-.537	.216	.201	-1.17	.10
	No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.102	.217	1.000	-.54	.74
		Housing for Veterans	.375	.187	.687	-.18	.93
		Same-Sex Marriage	.339	.187	1.000	-.21	.89
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.199*	.217	.000	.56	1.84
		Dream Act	.537	.216	.201	-.10	1.17
Ad_Offensivness	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.618	.212	.056	-1.24	.01
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.460	.212	.459	-1.08	.17
		Ban Assault Weapons	.347	.239	1.000	-.36	1.05
		Dream Act	-.589	.238	.203	-1.29	.11
		No-Cause Control	-.836*	.215	.002	-1.47	-.20
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.618	.212	.056	-.01	1.24
		Same-Sex Marriage	.158	.182	1.000	-.38	.70

	Ban Assault Weapons	.965*	.212	.000	.34	1.59
	Dream Act	.029	.211	1.000	-.59	.65
	No-Cause Control	-.218	.185	1.000	-.76	.33
Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.460	.212	.459	-.17	1.08
	Housing for Veterans	-.158	.182	1.000	-.70	.38
	Ban Assault Weapons	.807*	.212	.002	.18	1.43
	Dream Act	-.129	.211	1.000	-.75	.49
	No-Cause Control	-.377	.185	.632	-.92	.17
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.347	.239	1.000	-1.05	.36
	Housing for Veterans	-.965*	.212	.000	-1.59	-.34
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.807*	.212	.002	-1.43	-.18
	Dream Act	-.936*	.238	.001	-1.64	-.24
	No-Cause Control	-1.183*	.215	.000	-1.82	-.55
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	.589	.238	.203	-.11	1.29
	Housing for Veterans	-.029	.211	1.000	-.65	.59
	Same-Sex Marriage	.129	.211	1.000	-.49	.75
	Ban Assault Weapons	.936*	.238	.001	.24	1.64
	No-Cause Control	-.247	.214	1.000	-.88	.38
No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.836*	.215	.002	.20	1.47
	Housing for Veterans	.218	.185	1.000	-.33	.76
	Same-Sex Marriage	.377	.185	.632	-.17	.92

		Ban Assault Weapons	1.183*	.215	.000	.55	1.82
		Dream Act	.247	.214	1.000	-.38	.88
Ad_Look	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.179	.231	1.000	-.86	.50
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.352	.230	1.000	-1.03	.33
		Ban Assault Weapons	.833*	.259	.021	.07	1.60
		Dream Act	-.447	.258	1.000	-1.21	.31
		No-Cause Control	-.434	.233	.949	-1.12	.25
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.179	.231	1.000	-.50	.86
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.173	.198	1.000	-.76	.41
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.012*	.231	.000	.33	1.69
		Dream Act	-.269	.230	1.000	-.95	.41
		No-Cause Control	-.255	.201	1.000	-.85	.34
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.352	.230	1.000	-.33	1.03
		Housing for Veterans	.173	.198	1.000	-.41	.76
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.185*	.230	.000	.51	1.86
		Dream Act	-.095	.229	1.000	-.77	.58
		No-Cause Control	-.082	.201	1.000	-.67	.51
	Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.833*	.259	.021	-1.60	-.07
		Housing for Veterans	-1.012*	.231	.000	-1.69	-.33
		Same-Sex Marriage	-1.185*	.230	.000	-1.86	-.51
		Dream Act	-1.281*	.258	.000	-2.04	-.52
		No-Cause Control	-1.267*	.233	.000	-1.95	-.58

	Dream Act	End Child Abuse	.447	.258	1.000	-.31	1.21
		Housing for Veterans	.269	.230	1.000	-.41	.95
		Same-Sex Marriage	.095	.229	1.000	-.58	.77
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.281*	.258	.000	.52	2.04
		No-Cause Control	.014	.232	1.000	-.67	.70
	No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.434	.233	.949	-.25	1.12
		Housing for Veterans	.255	.201	1.000	-.34	.85
		Same-Sex Marriage	.082	.201	1.000	-.51	.67
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.267*	.233	.000	.58	1.95
		Dream Act	-.014	.232	1.000	-.70	.67
Ad_Pleasingness	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.167	.235	1.000	-.86	.53
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.196	.235	1.000	-.89	.50
		Ban Assault Weapons	.722	.264	.096	-.06	1.50
		Dream Act	-.147	.263	1.000	-.92	.63
		No-Cause Control	-.443	.238	.940	-1.14	.26
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.167	.235	1.000	-.53	.86
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.029	.201	1.000	-.62	.57
		Ban Assault Weapons	.889*	.235	.003	.20	1.58
		Dream Act	.020	.234	1.000	-.67	.71
		No-Cause Control	-.276	.205	1.000	-.88	.33
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.196	.235	1.000	-.50	.89



	Housing for Veterans	.029	.201	1.000	-.57	.62
	Ban Assault Weapons	.918*	.235	.002	.23	1.61
	Dream Act	.049	.234	1.000	-.64	.74
	No-Cause Control	-.247	.204	1.000	-.85	.36
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.722	.264	.096	-1.50	.06
	Housing for Veterans	-.889*	.235	.003	-1.58	-.20
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.918*	.235	.002	-1.61	-.23
	Dream Act	-.869*	.263	.015	-1.64	-.09
	No-Cause Control	-1.165*	.238	.000	-1.87	-.47
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	.147	.263	1.000	-.63	.92
	Housing for Veterans	-.020	.234	1.000	-.71	.67
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.049	.234	1.000	-.74	.64
	Ban Assault Weapons	.869*	.263	.015	.09	1.64
	No-Cause Control	-.296	.237	1.000	-.99	.40
No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.443	.238	.940	-.26	1.14
	Housing for Veterans	.276	.205	1.000	-.33	.88
	Same-Sex Marriage	.247	.204	1.000	-.36	.85
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.165*	.238	.000	.47	1.87
	Dream Act	.296	.237	1.000	-.40	.99
Ad_Attractiveness	End Child Abuse					
	Housing for Veterans	-.323	.232	1.000	-1.01	.36
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.092	.232	1.000	-.78	.59

	Ban Assault Weapons	.722	.261	.088	-.05	1.49
	Dream Act	-.242	.260	1.000	-1.01	.52
	No-Cause Control	-.379	.235	1.000	-1.07	.31
Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.323	.232	1.000	-.36	1.01
	Same-Sex Marriage	.231	.199	1.000	-.36	.82
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.045*	.232	.000	.36	1.73
	Dream Act	.081	.231	1.000	-.60	.76
	No-Cause Control	-.056	.203	1.000	-.65	.54
Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.092	.232	1.000	-.59	.78
	Housing for Veterans	-.231	.199	1.000	-.82	.36
	Ban Assault Weapons	.814*	.232	.007	.13	1.50
	Dream Act	-.150	.231	1.000	-.83	.53
	No-Cause Control	-.287	.202	1.000	-.88	.31
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.722	.261	.088	-1.49	.05
	Housing for Veterans	-1.045*	.232	.000	-1.73	-.36
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.814*	.232	.007	-1.50	-.13
	Dream Act	-.964*	.260	.003	-1.73	-.20
	No-Cause Control	-1.101*	.235	.000	-1.79	-.41
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	.242	.260	1.000	-.52	1.01
	Housing for Veterans	-.081	.231	1.000	-.76	.60
	Same-Sex Marriage	.150	.231	1.000	-.53	.83

		Ban Assault Weapons	.964*	.260	.003	.20	1.73
		No-Cause Control	-.137	.234	1.000	-.83	.55
	No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.379	.235	1.000	-.31	1.07
		Housing for Veterans	.056	.203	1.000	-.54	.65
		Same-Sex Marriage	.287	.202	1.000	-.31	.88
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.101*	.235	.000	.41	1.79
		Dream Act	.137	.234	1.000	-.55	.83
Ad_Appereance	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.259	.227	1.000	-.93	.41
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.165	.227	1.000	-.83	.50
		Ban Assault Weapons	.667	.255	.139	-.09	1.42
		Dream Act	-.392	.255	1.000	-1.14	.36
		No-Cause Control	-.591	.230	.157	-1.27	.09
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.259	.227	1.000	-.41	.93
		Same-Sex Marriage	.094	.195	1.000	-.48	.67
		Ban Assault Weapons	.926*	.227	.001	.26	1.60
		Dream Act	-.133	.226	1.000	-.80	.53
		No-Cause Control	-.331	.198	1.000	-.92	.25
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.165	.227	1.000	-.50	.83
		Housing for Veterans	-.094	.195	1.000	-.67	.48
		Ban Assault Weapons	.832*	.227	.004	.16	1.50
		Dream Act	-.227	.226	1.000	-.89	.44

		No-Cause Control	-.425	.198	.482	-1.01	.16
Ban Assault Weapons		End Child Abuse	-.667	.255	.139	-1.42	.09
		Housing for Veterans	-.926*	.227	.001	-1.60	-.26
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.832*	.227	.004	-1.50	-.16
		Dream Act	-1.059*	.255	.001	-1.81	-.31
		No-Cause Control	-1.257*	.230	.000	-1.93	-.58
Dream Act		End Child Abuse	.392	.255	1.000	-.36	1.14
		Housing for Veterans	.133	.226	1.000	-.53	.80
		Same-Sex Marriage	.227	.226	1.000	-.44	.89
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.059*	.255	.001	.31	1.81
		No-Cause Control	-.198	.229	1.000	-.87	.48
No-Cause Control		End Child Abuse	.591	.230	.157	-.09	1.27
		Housing for Veterans	.331	.198	1.000	-.25	.92
		Same-Sex Marriage	.425	.198	.482	-.16	1.01
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.257*	.230	.000	.58	1.93
		Dream Act	.198	.229	1.000	-.48	.87
Ad_Beautiness	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.171	.237	1.000	-.87	.53
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.304	.236	1.000	-1.00	.39
		Ban Assault Weapons	.847*	.266	.023	.06	1.63
		Dream Act	-.174	.265	1.000	-.95	.61
		No-Cause Control	-.330	.239	1.000	-1.04	.37

Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.171	.237	1.000	-.53	.87
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.133	.203	1.000	-.73	.47
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.018*	.237	.000	.32	1.72
	Dream Act	-.003	.236	1.000	-.70	.69
	No-Cause Control	-.160	.206	1.000	-.77	.45
Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	.304	.236	1.000	-.39	1.00
	Housing for Veterans	.133	.203	1.000	-.47	.73
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.151*	.236	.000	.45	1.85
	Dream Act	.130	.235	1.000	-.56	.82
	No-Cause Control	-.027	.206	1.000	-.63	.58
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.847*	.266	.023	-1.63	-.06
	Housing for Veterans	-1.018*	.237	.000	-1.72	-.32
	Same-Sex Marriage	-1.151*	.236	.000	-1.85	-.45
	Dream Act	-1.021*	.265	.002	-1.80	-.24
	No-Cause Control	-1.178*	.239	.000	-1.88	-.47
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	.174	.265	1.000	-.61	.95
	Housing for Veterans	.003	.236	1.000	-.69	.70
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.130	.235	1.000	-.82	.56
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.021*	.265	.002	.24	1.80
	No-Cause Control	-.157	.238	1.000	-.86	.55
No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.330	.239	1.000	-.37	1.04

		Housing for Veterans	.160	.206	1.000	-.45	.77
		Same-Sex Marriage	.027	.206	1.000	-.58	.63
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.178*	.239	.000	.47	1.88
		Dream Act	.157	.238	1.000	-.55	.86
Ad_Likeness	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.023	.241	1.000	-.73	.69
		Same-Sex Marriage	.176	.241	1.000	-.53	.89
		Ban Assault Weapons	.792	.271	.055	-.01	1.59
		Dream Act	.118	.270	1.000	-.68	.91
		No-Cause Control	-.173	.244	1.000	-.89	.55
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.023	.241	1.000	-.69	.73
		Same-Sex Marriage	.199	.207	1.000	-.41	.81
		Ban Assault Weapons	.815*	.241	.012	.10	1.53
		Dream Act	.141	.240	1.000	-.57	.85
		No-Cause Control	-.150	.211	1.000	-.77	.47
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.176	.241	1.000	-.89	.53
		Housing for Veterans	-.199	.207	1.000	-.81	.41
		Ban Assault Weapons	.616	.241	.163	-.09	1.33
		Dream Act	-.058	.240	1.000	-.76	.65
		No-Cause Control	-.349	.210	1.000	-.97	.27
	Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.792	.271	.055	-1.59	.01
		Housing for Veterans	-.815*	.241	.012	-1.53	-.10

		Same-Sex Marriage	-.616	.241	.163	-1.33	.09
		Dream Act	-.674	.270	.194	-1.47	.12
		No-Cause Control	-.965*	.244	.001	-1.68	-.25
	Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.118	.270	1.000	-.91	.68
		Housing for Veterans	-.141	.240	1.000	-.85	.57
		Same-Sex Marriage	.058	.240	1.000	-.65	.76
		Ban Assault Weapons	.674	.270	.194	-.12	1.47
		No-Cause Control	-.291	.243	1.000	-1.01	.42
	No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.173	.244	1.000	-.55	.89
		Housing for Veterans	.150	.211	1.000	-.47	.77
		Same-Sex Marriage	.349	.210	1.000	-.27	.97
		Ban Assault Weapons	.965*	.244	.001	.25	1.68
		Dream Act	.291	.243	1.000	-.42	1.01
Ad_Reaction	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.013	.236	1.000	-.71	.68
		Same-Sex Marriage	.275	.236	1.000	-.42	.97
		Ban Assault Weapons	.944*	.265	.006	.16	1.73
		Dream Act	.105	.265	1.000	-.67	.89
		No-Cause Control	-.012	.239	1.000	-.72	.69
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.013	.236	1.000	-.68	.71
		Same-Sex Marriage	.288	.203	1.000	-.31	.89
		Ban Assault Weapons	.957*	.236	.001	.26	1.65

	Dream Act	.118	.235	1.000	-.58	.81
	No-Cause Control	.000	.206	1.000	-.61	.61
Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.275	.236	1.000	-.97	.42
	Housing for Veterans	-.288	.203	1.000	-.89	.31
	Ban Assault Weapons	.669	.236	.071	-.03	1.36
	Dream Act	-.170	.235	1.000	-.86	.52
	No-Cause Control	-.288	.206	1.000	-.89	.32
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.944*	.265	.006	-1.73	-.16
	Housing for Veterans	-.957*	.236	.001	-1.65	-.26
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.669	.236	.071	-1.36	.03
	Dream Act	-.839*	.265	.024	-1.62	-.06
	No-Cause Control	-.957*	.239	.001	-1.66	-.25
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.105	.265	1.000	-.89	.67
	Housing for Veterans	-.118	.235	1.000	-.81	.58
	Same-Sex Marriage	.170	.235	1.000	-.52	.86
	Ban Assault Weapons	.839*	.265	.024	.06	1.62
	No-Cause Control	-.118	.238	1.000	-.82	.58
No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.012	.239	1.000	-.69	.72
	Housing for Veterans	.000	.206	1.000	-.61	.61
	Same-Sex Marriage	.288	.206	1.000	-.32	.89
	Ban Assault Weapons	.957*	.239	.001	.25	1.66



		Dream Act	.118	.238	1.000	-.58	.82
Ad_Valence	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.071	.229	1.000	-.75	.60
		Same-Sex Marriage	.121	.229	1.000	-.55	.79
		Ban Assault Weapons	.819*	.257	.023	.06	1.58
		Dream Act	.050	.256	1.000	-.71	.81
		No-Cause Control	-.132	.232	1.000	-.81	.55
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.071	.229	1.000	-.60	.75
		Same-Sex Marriage	.191	.197	1.000	-.39	.77
		Ban Assault Weapons	.890*	.229	.002	.21	1.57
		Dream Act	.121	.228	1.000	-.55	.79
		No-Cause Control	-.061	.200	1.000	-.65	.53
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.121	.229	1.000	-.79	.55
		Housing for Veterans	-.191	.197	1.000	-.77	.39
		Ban Assault Weapons	.699*	.229	.035	.02	1.37
		Dream Act	-.070	.228	1.000	-.74	.60
		No-Cause Control	-.252	.199	1.000	-.84	.34
	Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.819*	.257	.023	-1.58	-.06
		Housing for Veterans	-.890*	.229	.002	-1.57	-.21
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.699*	.229	.035	-1.37	-.02
		Dream Act	-.769*	.256	.042	-1.53	-.01
		No-Cause Control	-.951*	.232	.001	-1.63	-.27
Dream Act		End Child Abuse	-.050	.256	1.000	-.81	.71

	Housing for Veterans	-.121	.228	1.000	-.79	.55
	Same-Sex Marriage	.070	.228	1.000	-.60	.74
	Ban Assault Weapons	.769*	.256	.042	.01	1.53
	No-Cause Control	-.182	.231	1.000	-.86	.50
No-Cause Control	End Child Abuse	.132	.232	1.000	-.55	.81
	Housing for Veterans	.061	.200	1.000	-.53	.65
	Same-Sex Marriage	.252	.199	1.000	-.34	.84
	Ban Assault Weapons	.951*	.232	.001	.27	1.63
	Dream Act	.182	.231	1.000	-.50	.86

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

### Oneway

#### ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Brand_Match	Between Groups	44.590	4	11.147	4.193	.002
	Within Groups	1217.588	458	2.658		
	Total	1262.177	462			
Brand_Fit	Between Groups	65.906	4	16.476	5.931	.000
	Within Groups	1272.289	458	2.778		
	Total	1338.194	462			
Brand_Alignment	Between Groups	73.385	4	18.346	6.500	.000
	Within Groups	1292.710	458	2.823		
	Total	1366.095	462			

**Post Hoc Tests**

**Multiple Comparisons**

Bonferroni

Dependent Variable	(I) Ad_Type_code	(J) Ad_Type_code	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Brand_Match	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.109	.242	1.000	-.79	.57
		Same-Sex Marriage	.367	.242	1.000	-.31	1.05
		Ban Assault Weapons	.792*	.272	.038	.03	1.56
		Dream Act	.060	.271	1.000	-.70	.82
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.109	.242	1.000	-.57	.79
		Same-Sex Marriage	.476	.208	.226	-.11	1.06
		Ban Assault Weapons	.900*	.242	.002	.22	1.58
		Dream Act	.169	.241	1.000	-.51	.85
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.367	.242	1.000	-1.05	.31
		Housing for Veterans	-.476	.208	.226	-1.06	.11
		Ban Assault Weapons	.425	.242	.794	-.26	1.11
		Dream Act	-.307	.241	1.000	-.99	.37
	Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-.792*	.272	.038	-1.56	-.03
		Housing for Veterans	-.900*	.242	.002	-1.58	-.22
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.425	.242	.794	-1.11	.26
		Dream Act	-.732	.271	.071	-1.50	.03

	Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.060	.271	1.000	-.82	.70
		Housing for Veterans	-.169	.241	1.000	-.85	.51
		Same-Sex Marriage	.307	.241	1.000	-.37	.99
		Ban Assault Weapons	.732	.271	.071	-.03	1.50
Brand_Fit	End Child Abuse	Housing for Veterans	-.047	.248	1.000	-.75	.65
		Same-Sex Marriage	.404	.247	1.000	-.29	1.10
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.056*	.278	.002	.27	1.84
		Dream Act	.116	.277	1.000	-.67	.90
	Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.047	.248	1.000	-.65	.75
		Same-Sex Marriage	.451	.213	.342	-.15	1.05
		Ban Assault Weapons	1.103*	.248	.000	.40	1.80
		Dream Act	.163	.247	1.000	-.53	.86
	Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.404	.247	1.000	-1.10	.29
		Housing for Veterans	-.451	.213	.342	-1.05	.15
		Ban Assault Weapons	.651	.247	.086	-.05	1.35
		Dream Act	-.288	.246	1.000	-.98	.41
	Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-1.056*	.278	.002	-1.84	-.27
		Housing for Veterans	-1.103*	.248	.000	-1.80	-.40
		Same-Sex Marriage	-.651	.247	.086	-1.35	.05
		Dream Act	-.940*	.277	.007	-1.72	-.16

Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.116	.277	1.000	-.90	.67
	Housing for Veterans	-.163	.247	1.000	-.86	.53
	Same-Sex Marriage	.288	.246	1.000	-.41	.98
	Ban Assault Weapons	.940*	.277	.007	.16	1.72
Brand_Allig nment	End Child Abuse	-.146	.250	1.000	-.85	.56
	Same-Sex Marriage	.258	.249	1.000	-.44	.96
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.056*	.280	.002	.27	1.85
	Dream Act	.006	.279	1.000	-.78	.79
Housing for Veterans	End Child Abuse	.146	.250	1.000	-.56	.85
	Same-Sex Marriage	.404	.214	.599	-.20	1.01
	Ban Assault Weapons	1.202*	.250	.000	.50	1.91
	Dream Act	.152	.249	1.000	-.55	.85
Same-Sex Marriage	End Child Abuse	-.258	.249	1.000	-.96	.44
	Housing for Veterans	-.404	.214	.599	-1.01	.20
	Ban Assault Weapons	.798*	.249	.014	.10	1.50
	Dream Act	-.252	.248	1.000	-.95	.45
Ban Assault Weapons	End Child Abuse	-1.056*	.280	.002	-1.85	-.27
	Housing for Veterans	-1.202*	.250	.000	-1.91	-.50
	Same-Sex Marriage	-.798*	.249	.014	-1.50	-.10
	Dream Act	-1.050*	.279	.002	-1.84	-.26
Dream Act	End Child Abuse	-.006	.279	1.000	-.79	.78
	Housing for Veterans	-.152	.249	1.000	-.85	.55
	Same-Sex Marriage	.252	.248	1.000	-.45	.95

Ban Assault Weapons	1.050*	.279	.002	.26	1.84
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\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## Appendix 6 Study I Questionnaire

### About Brand

- Do you shop at CVS-Walgreens/use VISA-Mastercard? Click the option that best represents your behavior. Frequently-Occasionally-Never
- My overall impression of CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard is... 7-point semantic differential Very unfavorable/Very favorable
- My overall impression of CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard is... 7-point semantic differential Very negative/Very positive

### Elaborative Processing

Show ad. Randomize:

- To what degree did you pay attention to the message in this ad? 7-point semantic differential Very little/A lot
- How deeply did you think about the message in this ad? 7-point semantic differential Very little/A lot
- How personally involved did you feel with the issue shown in the ad? 7-point semantic differential Very little/A lot

### Affective Response to Ad

After seeing this ad, please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with the following statements... 7-point semantic differential Strongly disagree/Strongly agree

Show ad. Randomize:

- I feel emotionally involved in the ad
- I was able to connect with the ad emotionally
- This ad hooked me in terms of my feelings

### Attitudes Towards the Ad

After seeing this ad, please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with the following statements... 7-point semantic differential Strongly disagree/Strongly agree

Show ad. Randomize:

- I dislike the ad

- The ad is appealing to me
- The ad is interesting to me
- I think the ad is bad

### **Moral Emotions**

After seeing this ad, how would you express the degree of which you felt the following emotions? 7-point semantic differential Not at all/Extremely strong

Randomize:

- Contempt
- Disgust
- Anger
- Offended
- Empathy
- Sympathy
- Compassion
- Hope

### **Ad Moral Assessment**

Show ad. Randomize:

- I think this ad is... 7-point semantic differential Morally wrong/Morally right
- I think my family and friends would find this ad to be... 7-point semantic differential Totally unacceptable/Totally acceptable
- Are you pro, against or neutral about supporting same-sex marriage/the Dream Act/ending child abuse/housing solutions for homeless veterans?

### **Cause Importance**

- Do you think same-sex marriage/the Dream Act/ending child abuse/housing solutions for homeless veterans is an important social issue? 7-point semantic differential Not at all important/Extremely important
- How important is to you to express your position on same-sex marriage/the Dream Act/ending child abuse/housing solutions for homeless veterans to others? 7-point semantic differential Not at all important/Extremely important

### **Attitude Towards Brand After Ad**

After seeing this ad, please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements... 7-point semantic differential Strongly disagree/Strongly agree

Show ad. Randomize:

- I react favorably to CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I dislike CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I'm more interested in CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard as a result of seeing the ad
- I feel negatively towards CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard

### **Brand Overall after Ad**

Show ad. Randomize:

- My overall impression of CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard is... 7-point semantic differential  
Very unfavorable/Very favorable
- My overall impression of CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard is... 7-point semantic differential  
Very negative/Very positive
- Did the ad affect your overall impression of CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard? 7-point  
semantic differential Not at all/A Lot

### **Purchase Intention for Brand Users**

After seeing this ad, please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements. 7-point semantic differential Strongly disagree/Strongly agree

Show ad. Randomize:

- I intend to keep shopping/using CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- In the near future, I will NOT shop at/use CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard because of this ad
- I would be more likely to buy from/use CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard as a result of the sponsorship expressed in the ad

### **Purchase Intention for Brand Users**

After seeing this ad, please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements... 7-point semantic differential Strongly disagree/Strongly agree

Show ad. Randomize:

- If there was a CVS/Walgreens in my area, I would likely choose to shop at CVS/Walgreens /
- If I had the opportunity, I would likely switch to CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I would be more likely to buy from/use CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard as a result of the sponsorship expressed in the ad

### **Word of Mouth**



Please indicate how likely you would be to do each of the following... 7-point semantic differential  
Very Unlikely/Very Likely

Show ad. Randomize:

- Say positive things about CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- Recommend CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- Say negative things about CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- Advise against CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard

### **Boycott/Boycott**

After seeing this ad, please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements... 7-point semantic differential Strongly disagree/Strongly agree

Show ad. Randomize:

- I would show my opposition to this ad by NOT shopping at/using CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I would encourage my friends/my family to boycott CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I would show my support to this ad by shopping/using more at CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I would encourage my friends/my family to purchase from/use CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- I would feel better about myself if I purchase at CVS/Walgreens instead of other drugstores / use more VISA/Mastercard

### **Social Media**

Assuming you participate in social media (such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat), please indicate how likely you would do the following... 7-point semantic differential Very Unlikely/Very Likely

Show ad. Randomize:

- Share this ad if you saw it posted by CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- Share this ad if you saw it posted by one of your contacts
- Comment on this ad if you saw it posted by CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard
- Comment on this ad if you saw it posted by one of your contacts
- Express your opinion by clicking an emoji if you saw this ad posted by CVS/Walgreens/VISA/Mastercard

- Express your opinion by clicking an emoji if you saw this ad posted by one of your contacts

#### Other questions

- Please select the emoji you would use to express how you feel about this ad If you participate in Facebook (if you don't please imagine you do)



- What comment would you write about this ad in social media (if you do not participate in social media please imagine you do) I would not write a comment/ My comment would be (text box)

#### Gift Card Selection

You are going to be entered into a raffle to win one of two gift cards that you can use to shop in store or online. Please choose which gift card you want to be entered into the raffle:

- Cause Supporter, Random

- \$25 Gift Card Brand/ \$25 Gift Card Competition
- \$25 Gift Card Brand/ \$30 Gift Card Competition
- \$40 Gift Card Brand/ \$50 Gift Card Competition

If failed to support

- If you win, how would you feel about not choosing the gift card of the drugstore/credit card that sponsors a cause that you support? 7-point semantical differential Very bad/Very good

- Cause Opposer, Random

- \$25 Gift Card Brand/ \$25 Gift Card Competition
- \$30 Gift Card Brand/ \$25 Gift Card Competition
- \$50 Gift Card Brand/ \$40 Gift Card Competition

If failed to oppose

- If you win, how would you feel about choosing the gift card of the drugstore/credit card that sponsors a cause that you oppose? 7-point semantical differential Very bad/Very good

- No-Cause/Control, Random

- \$25 Gift Card Brand/ \$25 Gift Card Competition
- \$25 Gift Card Brand/ \$30 Gift Card Competition

- \$40 Gift Card Brand/ \$50 Gift Card Competition
- \$30 Gift Card Brand/ \$25 Gift Card Competition
- \$50 Gift Card Brand/ \$40 Gift Card Competition

### **Appendix 7 Study I Pre-screen Questionnaire**

- How important is religion in your life? I am not religious/ Not important at all, although I consider myself religious/ Moderately important/ Very important/ Center of my life
- What is your age? Under 18/ 18 – 24/ 25 – 34/ 35 – 44/ 45 – 54/ 55 – 64/ 65 – 74/ 75 – 84/ 85 or older
- What is your gender identity? Male/ Female/ Other - prefer not to answer
- How would you characterize your political orientation? very liberal/ liberal/ middle of the road/ conservative/ very conservative
- What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? Less than high school degree/ High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)/ Some college but no degree/ Associate degree/ Bachelor degree/ Graduate degree
- How much did yourself earn last year? \$0 -\$9,999/ \$10,000 - \$24,999/ \$25,000 - \$49,999/ \$50,000 - \$74,999/ \$75,000-\$99,999/ \$100,000 - \$124,999/ \$125,000 - \$149,999/ \$150,000 - \$174,999/ \$175,000 - \$199,999/ \$200,000 and up
- Do you have a Visa, Master Card or Discover Credit Card? Yes/ No
- Have you ever used an electric scooter? (including a rental scooters from companies like Uber, Lyft, Lime, Bird, etc. or an electric scooter owned by yourself, family or friends) Yes / No
- In the past 3 months, have you used any video meeting app (e.g., Zoom, Google Hangouts, Google Meet, Skype, GoToMeeting, or any other)? Yes/ No
- How do you feel about same-sex marriage? I support it/ I oppose it/ I am neutral
- How do you feel about the Dream Act (Give young immigrants that were brought to this country You qualify for the full/bonus survey, you will be paid \$1.20 for participating. Would you like to participate? Yes/ No

## Appendix 8 Scales Reliability

### Scale: Brand Perception Overall

#### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

#### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.936	.936	2

#### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Before Brand Overall 1	5.33	1.148	774
Before Brand Overall 2	5.42	1.123	774

#### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	5.374	5.329	5.419	.089	1.017	.004	2
Item Variances	1.289	1.261	1.318	.058	1.046	.002	2

#### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Before Brand Overall 1	5.42	1.261	.880	.775	.
Before Brand Overall 2	5.33	1.318	.880	.775	.

#### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
10.75	4.848	2.202	2

### Scale: Elaborative Process

#### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

#### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.763	.763	3

#### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Attention to Ad	5.96	1.335	774
Thinking on Ad	4.77	1.820	774
Personal Involvement on Ad	4.05	2.026	774

#### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.929	4.054	5.963	1.908	1.471	.929	3
Item Variances	3.066	1.783	4.103	2.321	2.302	1.392	3

#### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Attention to Ad	8.83	12.615	.456	.249	.824
Thinking on Ad	10.02	7.781	.751	.570	.487
Personal Involvement on Ad	10.73	7.520	.639	.497	.645

#### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
14.79	18.718	4.326	3

#### Scale: Ad Emotional Involvement

##### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

#### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.969	.969	3

#### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Emotional Involvement on Ad	4.14	2.000	774
Emotional Connection with Ad	4.25	1.954	774
Ad Hooks my Feelings	4.13	1.972	774

#### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.170	4.125	4.248	.123	1.030	.005	3
Item Variances	3.902	3.817	3.999	.183	1.048	.008	3

#### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Emotional Involvement on Ad	8.37	14.646	.942	.887	.948
Emotional Connection with Ad	8.26	15.115	.930	.867	.956
Ad Hooks my Feelings	8.39	15.003	.927	.861	.958

#### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
12.51	33.057	5.750	3

#### Scale: Attitude Towards Ad

#### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

#### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.906	.906	4

#### Item Statistics

Mean	Std. Deviation	N
------	----------------	---

I dislike the ad reversed	4.88	2.074	774
Ad is Bad Reversed	5.01	2.059	774
Ad Appeal	4.28	1.933	774
Ad is interesting	4.32	1.891	774

### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.622	4.279	5.008	.729	1.170	.141	4
Item Variances	3.964	3.577	4.302	.726	1.203	.130	4

### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
I dislike the ad reversed	13.61	27.188	.832	.821	.863
Ad is Bad Reversed	13.48	28.211	.779	.796	.882
Ad Appeal	14.21	29.180	.793	.755	.877
Ad is interesting	14.17	30.235	.753	.730	.891

### Scale Statistics



Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
18.49	49.479	7.034	4



### Statistics

		Ad Appeal	Ad Interesting	Dislike Ad Reversed	Ad is Bad Reversed
N	Valid	800	800	800	800
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		4.30	4.34	4.8950	5.0287
Median		5.00	5.00	6.0000	6.0000
Mode		6	5	7.00	7.00
Std. Deviation		1.919	1.878	2.06684	2.04283
Variance		3.684	3.527	4.272	4.173

### Histogram







### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.919	2

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Ad Appeal	4.34	3.527	.850	.
Ad Interesting	4.30	3.684	.850	.

**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
8.64	13.342	3.653	2

**Scale: Attitude Towards Brand**

**Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	96.8
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	26	3.3
	Total	800	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.838	4

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Favorable reaction to brand	14.9444	19.121	.766	.757
More interest in Brand	16.0917	20.748	.478	.883
Dislike Brand Reversed	14.3269	18.883	.732	.768
React Negatively to Brand Reversed	14.4005	17.935	.740	.763


### Scale Statistics



Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
19.9212	32.337	5.68653	4


### Statistics

		Favorable reaction to brand	More interest in Brand	Dislike Brand Reversed	React Negatively to Brand Reversed
N	Valid	774	774	774	774
	Missing	26	26	26	26
Mean		4.98	3.83	5.5943	5.5207
Median		5.00	4.00	6.0000	6.0000
Mode		6	4	7.00	7.00
Std. Deviation		1.594	1.864	1.67418	1.78798
Variance		2.540	3.474	2.803	3.197

### Histogram







**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.791	2

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Favorable reaction to brand	3.83	3.474	.663	.
More interest in Brand	4.98	2.540	.663	.

**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
8.81	9.952	3.155	2

**Scale: Total Moral Emotions**

### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.755	.753	8

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Contempt	2.34	1.910	774
Disgust	2.22	1.932	774
Anger	2.16	1.849	774
Offence	2.15	1.882	774
Empathy	4.11	2.111	774
Sympathy	3.97	2.173	774
Compassion	4.22	2.108	774
Hope	3.86	2.099	774

### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	3.130	2.146	4.218	2.072	1.966	.965	8
Item Variances	4.046	3.418	4.724	1.306	1.382	.260	8

### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Contempt	22.69	77.902	.407	.575	.737

Disgust	22.82	79.369	.354	.800	.746
Anger	22.88	77.035	.457	.748	.728
Offence	22.89	81.635	.297	.736	.755
Empathy	20.93	71.826	.531	.850	.713
Sympathy	21.06	69.815	.571	.760	.705
Compassion	20.82	72.083	.524	.872	.715
Hope	21.18	74.348	.456	.720	.728

### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
25.04	95.274	9.761	8

### Scale: Negative Moral Emotions

#### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.924	.924	4

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Contempt	2.34	1.910	774
Disgust	2.22	1.932	774
Anger	2.16	1.849	774
Offence	2.15	1.882	774

### Summary Item Statistics



	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	2.218	2.146	2.345	.199	1.093	.008	4
Item Variances	3.585	3.418	3.731	.313	1.092	.018	4

#### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item- Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Contempt	6.53	28.006	.744	.555	.927
Disgust	6.65	25.734	.879	.791	.882
Anger	6.71	27.162	.836	.729	.897
Offence	6.72	26.816	.838	.713	.896

#### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
8.87	46.690	6.833	4

#### Scale: Positive Moral Emotions

#### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

#### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.948	.949	4

#### Item Statistics

Mean	Std. Deviation	N
------	----------------	---

Empathy	4.11	2.111	774
Symphaty	3.97	2.173	774
Compassion	4.22	2.108	774
Hope	3.86	2.099	774

#### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.042	3.862	4.218	.357	1.092	.024	4
Item Variances	4.508	4.406	4.724	.317	1.072	.021	4

#### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item- Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Empathy	12.05	35.190	.911	.848	.921
Symphaty	12.19	35.688	.849	.752	.941
Compassion	11.95	34.899	.928	.868	.916
Hope	12.31	37.196	.815	.696	.951

#### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
16.17	62.471	7.904	4

#### Scale: Ad Moral Assessment

##### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

#### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.898	.902	2

#### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Moral Value	5.08	2.028	774
Ad Others Acceptance	5.16	1.789	774

#### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	5.118	5.078	5.158	.080	1.016	.003	2
Item Variances	3.656	3.199	4.113	.914	1.286	.418	2

#### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Moral Value	5.16	3.199	.822	.676	.
Ad Others Acceptance	5.08	4.113	.822	.676	.

#### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
10.24	13.275	3.643	2

#### Scale: Cause Importance

##### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	655	84.6
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	119	15.4
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.755	.755	2

**Item Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Cause Importance	5.46	1.853	655
Importance to express cause position	4.77	1.898	655

**Summary Item Statistics**

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	5.117	4.774	5.460	.685	1.144	.235	2
Item Variances	3.519	3.435	3.603	.168	1.049	.014	2

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Cause Importance	4.77	3.603	.606	.368	.
Importance to express cause position	5.46	3.435	.606	.368	.

**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
10.23	11.305	3.362	2

**Scale: Favorable Reaction Towards Brand After Ad  
Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.838	.843	4

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Favorable reaction to brand	4.98	1.594	774
More interest in Brand	3.83	1.864	774
DislikeBrandRev	5.59	1.674	774
ReactNegativeBrandRev	5.52	1.788	774

### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.980	3.829	5.594	1.765	1.461	.664	4
Item Variances	3.004	2.540	3.474	.934	1.368	.171	4

### Item-Total Statistics

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Favorable reaction to brand	14.94	19.121	.766	.623	.757
More interest in Brand	16.09	20.748	.478	.452	.883
DislikeBrandRev	14.33	18.883	.732	.840	.768
ReactNegativeBrandRev	14.40	17.935	.740	.841	.763

### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
19.92	32.337	5.687	4

**Scale: Positive Word of Mouth**

**Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.952	.952	2

**Item Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Positive Brand WOM	4.80	1.723	774
Recommend Brand	4.80	1.719	774

**Summary Item Statistics**

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.801	4.798	4.804	.005	1.001	.000	2
Item Variances	2.962	2.955	2.968	.012	1.004	.000	2

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Positive Brand WOM	4.80	2.955	.909	.826	.
Recommend Brand	4.80	2.968	.909	.826	.

**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
9.60	11.306	3.362	2

**Scale: Negative Word of Mouth**

**Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.931	.931	2

**Item Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Negative Brand WOM	2.22	1.691	774
Advise Against Brand	2.20	1.771	774

**Summary Item Statistics**

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	2.208	2.199	2.217	.018	1.008	.000	2
Item Variances	2.998	2.858	3.138	.279	1.098	.039	2

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Negative Brand WOM	2.20	3.138	.871	.759	.
Advise Against Brand	2.22	2.858	.871	.759	.

**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
4.42	11.214	3.349	2

**Scale: Boycott Intention**

**Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.901	.901	3

**Item Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Boycott Brand	2.21	1.752	774
Tell others to boycott Brand	2.26	1.765	774
Feel good about boycotting brand	2.26	1.788	774

**Summary Item Statistics**

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	2.241	2.208	2.258	.050	1.023	.001	3
Item Variances	3.127	3.068	3.196	.128	1.042	.004	3

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Boycott Brand	4.51	11.135	.795	.647	.866
Tell others to boycott Brand	4.47	11.201	.777	.611	.882
Feel good about boycotting	4.46	10.541	.841	.708	.827



**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
6.72	23.497	4.847	3

**Scale: Boycott Intention**

**Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.928	.929	3

**Item Statistics**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Boycott Brand	3.94	1.900	774
Thell others to boycott brand	4.21	1.753	774
Feel good about boycott Brand	3.93	1.810	774

**Summary Item Statistics**

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	4.026	3.925	4.211	.286	1.073	.026	3
Item Variances	3.320	3.075	3.611	.537	1.175	.074	3

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted

Boycott Brand	8.14	11.512	.853	.727	.897
Thell others to boycott brand	7.87	12.469	.854	.729	.895
Feel good about boycott	8.15	12.099	.853	.729	.895

### Scale Statistics

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
12.08	26.119	5.111	3

### Scale: Social Media Engagement

#### Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	774	100.0
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	0	.0
	Total	774	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

### Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.954	.955	6

### Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Share Brand Post	2.74	2.064	774
Share Contact Post	2.77	2.033	774
Comment on Brand Post	2.92	2.073	774
Comment on Contact Post	3.05	2.091	774
Emoji Brand Post	3.67	2.235	774
Emoji Contact Post	3.66	2.254	774

### Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Maximum / Minimum	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	3.137	2.743	3.672	.929	1.339	.181	6

Item Variances	4.522	4.131	5.078	.947	1.229	.165	6
----------------	-------	-------	-------	------	-------	------	---

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Share Brand Post	16.08	94.359	.847	.879	.947
Share Contact Post	16.05	94.460	.860	.883	.946
Comment on Brand Post	15.90	92.859	.887	.851	.943
Comment on Contact Post	15.77	92.523	.887	.848	.942
Emoji Brand Post	15.15	91.889	.833	.886	.949
Emoji Contact Post	15.16	91.395	.838	.888	.948

**Scale Statistics**

Mean	Variance	Std. Deviation	N of Items
18.82	132.587	11.515	6

**Appendix 9 Brand Activism Model PROCESS Outputs**

Run MATRIX procedure:

\*\*\*\*\* PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.2 \*\*\*\*\*

Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D. [www.afhayes.com](http://www.afhayes.com)  
 Documentation available in Hayes (2018). [www.guilford.com/p/hayes3](http://www.guilford.com/p/hayes3)

\*\*\*\*\*

**Model 8 Elaborative Processing**

Model : 8  
 Y : ElabProc  
 X : Cau\_Ty  
 M : MoralEm  
 W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
 Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p	
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----  
 Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty Cau_Imp MoralEm .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000 -2.117 2.628
  2.000 -2.117 2.601
  1.000 .383 3.195
  2.000 .383 3.541
  1.000 1.883 3.535
  2.000 1.883 4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH MoralEm BY Cau_Ty .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

ElabProc

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.685	.469	1.150	143.744	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	3.207	.174	18.482	.000	2.867	3.548
Cau_Ty	-.080	.095	-.844	.399	-.268	.107
MoralEm	.516	.040	12.881	.000	.437	.595
Cau_Imp	.214	.081	2.623	.009	.054	.374
Int_1	.116	.064	1.801	.072	-.010	.242

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.003	3.245	1.000	650.000	.072

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.326	.186	-1.754	.080	-.690	.039
.383	-.036	.092	-.392	.695	-.217	.145
1.883	.138	.133	1.035	.301	-.123	.399

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

```
Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  ElabProc  .  
BEGIN DATA.  
  1.000  -2.117  4.102  
  2.000  -2.117  3.777  
  1.000   .383  4.926  
  2.000   .383  4.890  
  1.000  1.883  5.420  
  2.000  1.883  5.558  
END DATA.  
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
```

Cau\_Imp WITH ElabProc BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.326	.186	-1.754	.080	-.690	.039
.383	-.036	.092	-.392	.695	-.217	.145
1.883	.138	.133	1.035	.301	-.123	.399

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> ElabProc

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.014	.099	-.208	.180
.383	.179	.048	.087	.276
1.883	.294	.071	.159	.441

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.077	.035	.011	.147

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Ad Emotions

Model : 8

Y : AdEmot

X : Cau\_Ty

M : MoralEm

W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Ty Cau\_Imp MoralEm .

BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	2.628
2.000	-2.117	2.601
1.000	.383	3.195
2.000	.383	3.541

```

1.000  1.883  3.535
2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
Cau_Imp WITH MoralEm BY Cau_Ty .

```

\*\*\*\*\*

```

OUTCOME VARIABLE:
AdEmot

```

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.662	.438	2.168	126.439	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.057	.238	8.631	.000	1.589	2.525
Cau_Ty	.183	.131	1.401	.162	-.074	.441
MoralEm	.614	.055	11.170	.000	.506	.722
Cau_Imp	.400	.112	3.578	.000	.180	.620
Int_1	.055	.088	.621	.535	-.119	.228

Product terms key:

```

Int_1 : Cau_Ty x Cau_Imp

```

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.000	.386	1.000	650.000	.535

-----

```

Focal predict: Cau_Ty (X)
Mod var: Cau_Imp (W)

```

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

```

Cau_Ty Cau_Imp AdEmot .
BEGIN DATA.
1.000 -2.117 3.269
2.000 -2.117 3.337
1.000 .383 4.406
2.000 .383 4.611
1.000 1.883 5.089
2.000 1.883 5.375
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

```



Cau\_Imp WITH AdEmot BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	.067	.255	.264	.792	-.433	.568
.383	.204	.126	1.619	.106	-.044	.453
1.883	.287	.183	1.571	.117	-.072	.645

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> AdEmot

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.017	.120	-.258	.213
.383	.213	.060	.099	.332
1.883	.351	.089	.186	.536

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.092	.043	.011	.179

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Attitude Towards Ad

Run MATRIX procedure:

\*\*\*\*\* PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.5.2 \*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

Model : 8  
 Y : Att2Ad2  
 X : Cau\_Ty  
 M : MoralEm  
 W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
 Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/  
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .  
BEGIN DATA.  
  1.000  -2.117  2.628  
  2.000  -2.117  2.601  
  1.000   .383  3.195  
  2.000   .383  3.541  
  1.000  1.883  3.535  
  2.000  1.883  4.105  
END DATA.  
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=  
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
Att2Ad2

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.649	.421	2.055	118.168	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.972	.232	12.808	.000	2.516	3.427
Cau_Ty	.061	.127	.480	.631	-.189	.312
MoralEm	.393	.054	7.346	.000	.288	.499
Cau_Imp	.715	.109	6.571	.000	.502	.929
Int_1	-.122	.086	-1.421	.156	-.291	.047

Product terms key:  
Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.002	2.019	1.000 650.000	.156

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/  
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  Att2Ad2  .
```

BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	3.052
2.000	-2.117	3.372
1.000	.383	4.535
2.000	.383	4.550
1.000	1.883	5.425
2.000	1.883	5.257

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Imp WITH Att2Ad2 BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	.320	.248	1.289	.198	-.167	.807
.383	.014	.123	.117	.907	-.227	.256
1.883	-.169	.178	-.950	.343	-.518	.180

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> Att2Ad2

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.011	.077	-.168	.139
.383	.136	.041	.060	.221
1.883	.224	.061	.113	.351

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.059	.028	.009	.117

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Attitude Towards Brand

Model : 8  
Y : Att2Bnd2  
X : Cau\_Ty  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
MoralEm

#### Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

#### Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

#### Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

#### Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

#### Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000  .383  3.195
  2.000  .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 Att2Bnd2

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.584	.341	1.735	84.147	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	3.349	.213	15.705	.000	2.930	3.767
Cau_Ty	.140	.117	1.194	.233	-.090	.370
MoralEm	.268	.049	5.449	.000	.172	.365
Cau_Imp	.595	.100	5.948	.000	.399	.792
Int_1	-.120	.079	-1.518	.130	-.275	.035

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.002	2.303	1.000	650.000	.130

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Ty Cau\_Imp Att2Bnd2 .  
BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	3.352
2.000	-2.117	3.745
1.000	.383	4.540
2.000	.383	4.634
1.000	1.883	5.253
2.000	1.883	5.167

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Imp WITH Att2Bnd2 BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	.394	.228	1.726	.085	-.054	.841
.383	.094	.113	.831	.406	-.128	.316
1.883	-.086	.163	-.526	.599	-.407	.235

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> Att2Bnd2

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.008	.052	-.114	.095
.383	.093	.029	.040	.156
1.883	.153	.044	.074	.248

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.040	.019	.006	.081

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Positive Word of Mouth**

Model : 8

Y : PWOM

X : Cau\_Ty

M : MoralEm

W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822



Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000   .383  3.195
  2.000   .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 PWOM

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.468	.219	2.322	45.450	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	3.821	.247	15.490	.000	3.336	4.305
Cau_Ty	.108	.136	.801	.424	-.158	.375
MoralEm	.249	.057	4.367	.000	.137	.360
Cau_Imp	.378	.116	3.269	.001	.151	.606
Int_1	-.007	.091	-.072	.942	-.186	.173

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.000	.005	1.000	650.000	.942

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Ty Cau\_Imp PWOM .  
BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	3.948
2.000	-2.117	4.070
1.000	.383	4.877
2.000	.383	4.983
1.000	1.883	5.435
2.000	1.883	5.531

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Imp WITH PWOM BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	.122	.264	.464	.643	-.395	.640
.383	.106	.131	.810	.418	-.151	.363
1.883	.096	.189	.508	.611	-.275	.467

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> PWOM

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.007	.049	-.108	.088
.383	.086	.029	.035	.150
1.883	.142	.045	.065	.238

Index of moderated mediation:

Cau_Imp	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
	.037	.019	.005	.077

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Buycott**

Model : 8

Y : Buycott

X : Cau\_Ty

M : MoralEm

W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000   .383  3.195
  2.000   .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 Buycott

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.593	.351	1.955	87.951	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.415	.226	10.670	.000	1.970	2.859
Cau_Ty	.090	.124	.723	.470	-.154	.334
MoralEm	.460	.052	8.805	.000	.357	.562
Cau_Imp	.465	.106	4.380	.000	.257	.674
Int_1	-.055	.084	-.651	.515	-.219	.110

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p	
X*W	.000	.424	1.000	650.000	.515

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Ty Cau\_Imp Buycott .  
BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	3.126
2.000	-2.117	3.331
1.000	.383	4.152
2.000	.383	4.221
1.000	1.883	4.768
2.000	1.883	4.755

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Imp WITH Buycott BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	.205	.242	.849	.396	-.270	.681
.383	.069	.120	.575	.566	-.167	.304
1.883	-.013	.173	-.074	.941	-.353	.327

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> Buycott

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.013	.090	-.189	.164
.383	.159	.045	.075	.250
1.883	.262	.065	.143	.396

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.069	.031	.009	.131

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Negative Word of Mouth**

Model : 8

Y : NWOM

X : Cau\_Ty

M : MoralEm

W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000  .383  3.195
  2.000  .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 NWOM

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.459	.211	2.291	43.474	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	.750	.245	3.060	.002	.269	1.231
Cau_Ty	-.403	.135	-2.994	.003	-.667	-.139
MoralEm	.634	.057	11.210	.000	.523	.745
Cau_Imp	-.209	.115	-1.823	.069	-.435	.016
Int_1	-.141	.091	-1.558	.120	-.320	.037

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.003	2.428	1.000	650.000	.120

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Ty Cau\_Imp NWOM .  
BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	3.144
2.000	-2.117	3.040
1.000	.383	2.267
2.000	.383	1.810
1.000	1.883	1.740
2.000	1.883	1.071

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Imp WITH NWOM BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.104	.262	-.396	.692	-.618	.411
.383	-.457	.130	-3.521	.000	-.712	-.202
1.883	-.669	.188	-3.567	.000	-1.038	-.301

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> NWOM

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.018	.123	-.250	.233
.383	.219	.062	.102	.349
1.883	.362	.088	.193	.543

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.095	.042	.012	.177

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.



NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Boycott**

Model : 8

Y : Boycott

X : Cau\_Ty

M : MoralEm

W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000   .383  3.195
  2.000   .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 Boycott

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.475	.226	2.129	47.447	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	.723	.236	3.060	.002	.259	1.186
Cau_Ty	-.477	.130	-3.675	.000	-.732	-.222
MoralEm	.696	.055	12.777	.000	.589	.803
Cau_Imp	-.139	.111	-1.257	.209	-.357	.078
Int_1	-.143	.087	-1.637	.102	-.315	.029

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.003	2.681	1.000	650.000	.102

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
```

```

Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  Boycott  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117   3.101
  2.000  -2.117   2.928
  1.000   .383   2.395
  2.000   .383   1.863
  1.000   1.883   1.971
  2.000   1.883   1.225
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
Cau_Imp WITH  Boycott BY  Cau_Ty  .

```

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.174	.253	-.688	.492	-.670	.322
.383	-.532	.125	-4.248	.000	-.778	-.286
1.883	-.747	.181	-4.128	.000	-1.102	-.391

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> Boycott

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.019	.136	-.280	.259
.383	.241	.067	.116	.379
1.883	.397	.093	.219	.589

Index of moderated mediation:

Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.104	.046	.015 .195

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Social Media Engagement**

Model : 8

Y : SMEng  
X : Cau\_Ty  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000   .383  3.195
  2.000   .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 SMEng

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.645	.415	2.570	115.515	4.000	650.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	.840	.259	3.236	.001	.330	1.349
Cau_Ty	-.086	.143	-.601	.548	-.366	.194
MoralEm	.868	.060	14.486	.000	.750	.985
Cau_Imp	.267	.122	2.192	.029	.028	.506
Int_1	.062	.096	.648	.517	-.126	.251

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.000	.420	1.000	650.000	.517

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
```

Cau\_Ty Cau\_Imp SMEng .  
 BEGIN DATA.

1.000	-2.117	2.870
2.000	-2.117	2.652
1.000	.383	3.693
2.000	.383	3.631
1.000	1.883	4.187
2.000	1.883	4.218

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=  
 Cau\_Imp WITH SMEng BY Cau\_Ty .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.218	.277	-.784	.433	-.762	.327
.383	-.062	.138	-.449	.653	-.332	.208
1.883	.032	.199	.159	.874	-.359	.422

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> SMEng

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.024	.165	-.348	.295
.383	.300	.081	.143	.461
1.883	.495	.116	.274	.732

Index of moderated mediation:

Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.130	.057	.019 .243

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Supported Cause Position with Gift Card Selection**

Model : 8

Y : GCSup  
X : Cau\_Ty  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 655

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.440	.194	1.101	52.119	3.000	651.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.819	.129	21.867	.000	2.566	3.073
Cau_Ty	.289	.093	3.118	.002	.107	.471
Cau_Imp	.077	.080	.967	.334	-.079	.233
Int_1	.150	.063	2.389	.017	.027	.273

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.007	5.708	1.000	651.000	.017

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.028	.182	-.154	.878	-.385	.329
.383	.346	.089	3.889	.000	.171	.521
1.883	.571	.128	4.452	.000	.319	.822

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  2.628
  2.000  -2.117  2.601
  1.000   .383  3.195
  2.000   .383  3.541
  1.000  1.883  3.535
  2.000  1.883  4.105
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Ty  .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

GCSup

Coding of binary Y for logistic regression analysis:

```
GCSup  Analysis
.00    .00
1.00   1.00
```

Model Summary

-2LL	ModelLL	df	p	McFadden	CoxSnell	Nagelkrk
862.671	30.331	4.000	.000	.034	.045	.061

Model

	coeff	se	Z	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	-.211	.336	-.626	.531	-.869	.448
Cau_Ty	-.092	.184	-.499	.617	-.453	.269
MoralEm	.194	.079	2.462	.014	.040	.349
Cau_Imp	.057	.159	.359	.720	-.255	.369
Int_1	.101	.126	.802	.423	-.146	.349

These results are expressed in a log-odds metric.

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Ty x Cau\_Imp

Likelihood ratio test(s) of highest order unconditional interactions(s):

	Chi-sq	df	p
X*W	.651	1.000	.420



-----  
 Focal predict: Cau\_Ty (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Ty  Cau_Imp  GCSup  prob  .
BEGIN DATA.
  1.000  -2.117  -.007  .498
  2.000  -2.117  -.314  .422
  1.000   .383   .389   .596
  2.000   .383   .336   .583
  1.000   1.883   .626   .652
  2.000   1.883   .725   .674
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH GCSup BY Cau_Ty .
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Imp WITH prob BY Cau_Ty .
```

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	Z	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.117	-.306	.359	-.854	.393	-1.010	.397
.383	-.053	.179	-.297	.767	-.403	.297
1.883	.099	.264	.375	.708	-.418	.616

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Ty -> MoralEm -> GCSup

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.117	-.005	.042	-.093	.079
.383	.067	.032	.013	.139
1.883	.111	.051	.022	.222

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.029	.018	.001	.071

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:  
95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:  
10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:  
Cau\_Imp

NOTE: Direct and indirect effects of X on Y are on a log-odds metric.

----- END MATRIX -----

## Appendix 10 Cause Importance Correlation Analysis

### Bootstrap Specifications

Sampling Method	Simple
Number of Samples	1000
Confidence Interval Level	95.0%
Confidence Interval Type	Percentile

### CORRELATIONS

```

/VARIABLES=Cau_Imp MoralEm
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG FULL
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES /CI CILEVEL(95)
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.

```

### Correlations

### Descriptive Statistics

		Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Int	
					Lower	Up
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.07	4.98	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.001	.046	1.589	
	N	655	0	0	655	

Total Moral Emotions	Mean	3.24	.00	.04	3.15
	Std. Deviation	1.166	-.002	.034	1.097
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Total Moral Emotions		
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0		
		Std. Error	0		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
			Upper	1	
Total Moral Emotions	Pearson Correlation	.409**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	-.001		
		Std. Error	.031		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.348	
			Upper	.472	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2-tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Total Moral Emotions	.409	.000	.343	.471

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

## Descriptive Statistics

		Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup>	
					95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.06	4.99	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.001	.044	1.599	
	N	655	0	0	655	
Elaborative Processing	Mean	3.96	.00	.05	3.85	
	Std. Deviation	1.334	.000	.028	1.279	
	N	655	0	0	655	

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

## Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale		Elaborative Processing	
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation			1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N			655	
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias			0
		Std. Error			0
	95% Confidence Interval	Lower			1
		Upper			1
Elaborative Processing	Pearson Correlation			.595**	
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.000	
	N			655	
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias			.000
		Std. Error			.031
	95% Confidence Interval	Lower			.531
		Upper			.654

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2- tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Elaborative Processing	.595	.000	.543	.642

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

	Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Int	
				Lower	Up
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.07	4.98
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.003	.045	1.594
	N	655	0	0	655
Emotional Involvement with Ad	Mean	4.3084	.0003	.0752	4.1558
	Std. Deviation	1.95738	-.00384	.03730	1.87617
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Emotic Involve with A	
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1		
	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	N	655		
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0	
		Std. Error	0	
	95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
	Upper	1		
Emotional Involvement with Ad	Pearson Correlation	.563**		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		

N		655
Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	.000
	Std. Error	.033
95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.500
	Upper	.628

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2- tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Emotional Involvement with Ad	.563	.000	.509	.614

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

	Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Int	
				Lower	Up
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.07	4.99	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	.045	1.590	
	N	655	0	0	655
Attitude to Ad	Mean	4.75	.06	4.62	
	Std. Deviation	1.653	.036	1.580	
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

	Cause Importance Scale	Attitude
--	------------------------------	----------

Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation		1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
	N		655
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0
		Std. Error	0
	95% Confidence Interval		Lower
		Upper	1
Attitude to Ad	Pearson Correlation		.573**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N		655
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	.001
		Std. Error	.030
	95% Confidence Interval		Lower
		Upper	.631

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2-tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Attitude to Ad	.573	.000	.519	.622

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

	Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup>	
				95% Confidence Int	Up
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.01	.06	5.00
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.004	.043	1.588
	N	655	0	0	655
Brand Attitude	Mean	4.94	.00	.06	4.84
	Std. Deviation	1.486	-.002	.040	1.402
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Brand Attitude		
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0		
		Std. Error	0		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
			Upper	1	
Brand Attitude	Pearson Correlation	.487**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	.001		
		Std. Error	.033		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.416	
			Upper	.552	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2-tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Brand Attitude	.487	.000	.426	.543

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics



		Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup>	
					Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.07	4.98	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.002	.044	1.593	
	N	655	0	0	655	
Positive Brand WOM	Mean	4.77	.00	.07	4.63	
	Std. Deviation	1.719	-.001	.043	1.635	
	N	655	0	0	655	

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Positive Brand WOM		
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0		
		Std. Error	0		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
			Upper	1	
Positive Brand WOM	Pearson Correlation	.439**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	-.002		
		Std. Error	.035		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.367	
			Upper	.506	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2- tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Positive Brand WOM	.439	.000	.375	.499

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

		Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Int	
					Lower	Up
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.07	4.98	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.004	.046	1.584	
	N	655	0	0	655	
Boycott Brand	Mean	4.02	.00	.07	3.89	
	Std. Deviation	1.730	-.002	.036	1.661	
	N	655	0	0	655	

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Boycott	
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1		
	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	N	655		
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0	
		Std. Error	0	
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1
			Upper	1
Boycott Brand	Pearson Correlation	.520**		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		
	N	655		
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	.000	
		Std. Error	.030	

95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.459
	Upper	.576

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2-tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Buycott Brand	.520	.000	.461	.573

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

	Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup>	
				95% Confidence Interval Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.07	4.99	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	.046	1.591	
	N	655	0	0	655
Negative Brand WOM	Mean	2.23	.07	2.10	
	Std. Deviation	1.699	.048	1.595	
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Negative WOM
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
	N	655	

	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0	
		Std. Error	0	
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1
			Upper	1
		Negative Brand WOM	Pearson Correlation	-.232**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
N	655			
Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias		.001	
	Std. Error		.041	
	95% Confidence Interval	Lower	-.311	
Upper		-.147		

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2- tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Negative Brand WOM	-.232	.000	-.304	-.159

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

	Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Int	
				Lower	Up
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.07	4.98	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	.045	1.584	
	N	655	0	0	655
Boycott Brand	Mean	2.30	.06	2.18	
	Std. Deviation	1.653	.047	1.558	
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

## Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Boycott Brand		
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>c</sup>	Bias	0		
		Std. Error	0		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
			Upper	1	
Boycott Brand	Pearson Correlation	-.157**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>c</sup>	Bias	.000		
		Std. Error	.039		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	-.235	
			Upper	-.083	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

c. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

## Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2- tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Boycott Brand	-.157	.000	-.231	-.082

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

## Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Int	
			Lower	Upper

Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.07	4.99
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.004	.045	1.586
	N	655	0	0	655
Social Media Engagement	Mean	3.55	.00	.08	3.38
	Std. Deviation	2.091	-.002	.034	2.019
	N	655	0	0	655

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Social Media Engagement		
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	0		
		Std. Error	0		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
			Upper	1	
Social Media Engagement	Pearson Correlation	.469**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>b</sup>	Bias	.000		
		Std. Error	.030		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.408	
			Upper	.528	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2-tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
		Lower	Upper

Cause Importance Scale - Social Media Engagement	.469	.000	.407	.527
--	------	------	------	------

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Descriptive Statistics

		Statistic	Bias	Std. Error	Bootstrap <sup>a</sup> 95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale	Mean	5.12	.00	.06	4.98	
	Std. Deviation	1.681	-.001	.043	1.593	
	N	655	0	0	655	
Supported with Gift Card	Mean	.58	.00	.02	.54	
	Std. Deviation	.495	.000	.003	.488	
	N	655	0	0	655	

a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Correlations

		Cause Importance Scale	Supported with Gift Card		
Cause Importance Scale	Pearson Correlation	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>c</sup>	Bias	0		
		Std. Error	0		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	1	
			Upper	1	
Supported with Gift Card	Pearson Correlation	.188**			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
	N	655			
	Bootstrap <sup>c</sup>	Bias	.000		
		Std. Error	.038		
		95% Confidence Interval	Lower	.111	
			Upper	.261	

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

c. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples

### Confidence Intervals

	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2-tailed)	95% Confidence Intervals (2- tailed) <sup>a</sup>	
			Lower	Upper
Cause Importance Scale - Supported with Gift Card	.188	.000	.113	.260

a. Estimation is based on Fisher's r-to-z transformation.

### Appendix 11 Moral Emotion One way ANOVA Outputs

ONEWAY MoralEm BY CauS\_N  
/STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES  
/PLOT MEANS  
/MISSING ANALYSIS  
/CRITERIA=CILEVEL(0.95).

### Descriptives

Total Moral Emotions

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Cause	119	2.51	1.330	.122	2.27	2.76	1	
Cause	655	3.24	1.166	.046	3.15	3.33	1	
Total	774	3.13	1.220	.044	3.04	3.22	1	


### ANOVA

Total Moral Emotions

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	53.392	1	53.392	37.562	.000
Within Groups	1097.340	772	1.421		
Total	1150.732	773			



## Means Plots



## Descriptives

Total Moral Emotions

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Controversial	424	3.03	1.082	.053	2.93	3.14	1	5
NonControversial	231	3.62	1.219	.080	3.47	3.78	1	5
No Cause	119	2.51	1.330	.122	2.27	2.76	1	5

Total	774	3.13	1.220	.044	3.04	3.22	1
-------	-----	------	-------	------	------	------	---

## ANOVA

Total Moral Emotions

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	105.351	2	52.676	38.850	.000
Within Groups	1045.380	771	1.356		
Total	1150.732	773			

## Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons


Dependent Variable: Total Moral Emotions

Bonferroni

(I) Cause Type	(J) Cause Type	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Controversial	NonControversial	-.589*	.095	.000	-.82	
	No Cause	.520*	.121	.000	.23	
NonControversial	Controversial	.589*	.095	.000	.36	
	No Cause	1.110*	.131	.000	.79	
No Cause	Controversial	-.520*	.121	.000	-.81	
	NonControversial	-1.110*	.131	.000	-1.42	

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## Means Plots



**Appendix 12 Position on Controversial Social Cause Model PROCESS Outputs**

**Model 8 Elaborative Process**

Model : 8  
 Y : ElabProc  
 X : Cau\_Pos  
 M : MoralEm  
 W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
 Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

ElabProc

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.745	.556	.811	130.918	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.038	.140	14.547	.000	1.763	2.314
Cau_Pos	.157	.022	7.127	.000	.114	.200
MoralEm	.516	.044	11.619	.000	.429	.603
Cau_Imp	.227	.035	6.512	.000	.159	.296
Int_1	.050	.012	4.348	.000	.027	.073

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
---------	---	-----	-----	---

X\*W .020 18.907 1.000 419.000 .000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.042	.036	1.185	.237	-.028	.112
.211	.167	.022	7.629	.000	.124	.210
2.211	.267	.032	8.293	.000	.204	.331

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.042	.036	1.185	.237	-.028	.112
.211	.167	.022	7.629	.000	.124	.210
2.211	.267	.032	8.293	.000	.204	.331

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> ElabProc

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.072	.019	-.109	-.036
.211	-.017	.011	-.041	.005
2.211	.026	.017	-.009	.060

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.022	.006	.010	.034

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Emotional Involvement with Ad**

Model : 8  
Y : AdEmot  
X : Cau\_Pos  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
MoralEm

Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:  
Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----  
Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Pos  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  -3.679  -2.289  2.752
  1.321  -2.289  2.052
  2.321  -2.289  1.912
  -3.679  .211  3.111
  1.321  .211  2.942
  2.321  .211  2.908
  -3.679  2.211  3.399
  1.321  2.211  3.654
  2.321  2.211  3.705
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Pos WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Imp .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 AdEmot

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.725	.526	1.954	116.350	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	1.722	.218	7.914	.000	1.294	2.149
Cau_Pos	.345	.034	10.099	.000	.278	.412
MoralEm	.682	.069	9.887	.000	.546	.817
Cau_Imp	.218	.054	4.032	.000	.112	.325
Int_1	.064	.018	3.559	.000	.028	.099

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.014	12.670	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.199	.055	3.601	.000	.091	.308
.211	.358	.034	10.523	.000	.291	.425
2.211	.485	.050	9.699	.000	.387	.584

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Pos  Cau_Imp  AdEmot  .
BEGIN DATA.
  -3.679  -2.289  2.556
  1.321  -2.289  3.553
  2.321  -2.289  3.752
  -3.679  .211  2.517
  1.321  .211  4.309
  2.321  .211  4.667
  -3.679  2.211  2.486
  1.321  2.211  4.913
  2.321  2.211  5.399
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Pos WITH  AdEmot BY  Cau_Imp .
```

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.199	.055	3.601	.000	.091	.308
.211	.358	.034	10.523	.000	.291	.425
2.211	.485	.050	9.699	.000	.387	.584

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> AdEmot

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.095	.026	-.149	-.047
.211	-.023	.016	-.056	.005
2.211	.035	.023	-.011	.080

Index of moderated mediation:

Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-------	--------	----------	----------



Cau\_Imp .029 .008 .013 .046  
---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:  
95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:  
10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:  
Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Attitude Towards Ad

Model : 8  
Y : Att2Ad2  
X : Cau\_Pos  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
MoralEm

#### Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

#### Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp MoralEm .  
BEGIN DATA.

```
-3.679 -2.289 2.752
1.321 -2.289 2.052
2.321 -2.289 1.912
-3.679 .211 3.111
1.321 .211 2.942
2.321 .211 2.908
-3.679 2.211 3.399
1.321 2.211 3.654
2.321 2.211 3.705
```

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH MoralEm BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

Att2Ad2

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.822	.676	1.310	218.519	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.549	.178	14.312	.000	2.199	2.900
Cau_Pos	.490	.028	17.531	.000	.435	.545

MoralEm	.439	.056	7.784	.000	.328	.550
Cau_Imp	.238	.044	5.374	.000	.151	.326
Int_1	.057	.015	3.922	.000	.029	.086

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.012	15.386	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.359	.045	7.917	.000	.270	.448
.211	.502	.028	18.017	.000	.448	.557
2.211	.617	.041	15.057	.000	.536	.698

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp Att2Ad2 .

BEGIN DATA.

```
-3.679 -2.289 2.016
 1.321 -2.289 3.811
 2.321 -2.289 4.170
-3.679 .211 2.084
 1.321 .211 4.596
 2.321 .211 5.098
-3.679 2.211 2.139
 1.321 2.211 5.224
 2.321 2.211 5.841
```

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH Att2Ad2 BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.359	.045	7.917	.000	.270	.448
.211	.502	.028	18.017	.000	.448	.557

2.211 .617 .041 15.057 .000 .536 .698

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> Att2Ad2

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.062	.017	-.096	-.030
.211	-.015	.010	-.037	.004
2.211	.022	.015	-.007	.051

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.019	.005	.009	.029

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:  
95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:  
10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:  
Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Attitude Towards Brand

Model : 8  
Y : Att2Bnd2  
X : Cau\_Pos  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*  
OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp MoralEm .

BEGIN DATA.

-3.679 -2.289 2.752  
1.321 -2.289 2.052  
2.321 -2.289 1.912  
-3.679 .211 3.111  
1.321 .211 2.942  
2.321 .211 2.908  
-3.679 2.211 3.399  
1.321 2.211 3.654  
2.321 2.211 3.705

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=  
 Cau\_Pos WITH MoralEm BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 Att2Bnd2

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.751	.565	1.322	135.894	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	3.090	.179	17.263	.000	2.738	3.441
Cau_Pos	.391	.028	13.916	.000	.336	.446
MoralEm	.295	.057	5.200	.000	.183	.406
Cau_Imp	.209	.045	4.696	.000	.122	.297
Int_1	.062	.015	4.226	.000	.033	.091

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.019	17.858	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.249	.046	5.464	.000	.159	.338
.211	.404	.028	14.425	.000	.349	.459
2.211	.528	.041	12.830	.000	.447	.609

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp Att2Bnd2 .

BEGIN DATA.

```
-3.679 -2.289 2.590
1.321 -2.289 3.834
2.321 -2.289 4.083
-3.679 .211 2.542
```

1.321	.211	4.562
2.321	.211	4.966
-3.679	2.211	2.503
1.321	2.211	5.145
2.321	2.211	5.673

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH Att2Bnd2 BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.249	.046	5.464	.000	.159	.338
.211	.404	.028	14.425	.000	.349	.459
2.211	.528	.041	12.830	.000	.447	.609

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> Att2Bnd2

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.041	.012	-.067	-.019
.211	-.010	.007	-.025	.003
2.211	.015	.010	-.005	.035

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.013	.004	.005	.020

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Positive Word of Mouth**

Model : 8  
 Y : PWOM  
 X : Cau\_Pos  
 M : MoralEm  
 W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
 Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:



Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Pos  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  -3.679  -2.289  2.752
  1.321  -2.289  2.052
  2.321  -2.289  1.912
  -3.679  .211  3.111
  1.321  .211  2.942
  2.321  .211  2.908
  -3.679  2.211  3.399
  1.321  2.211  3.654
  2.321  2.211  3.705
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Pos WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Imp .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
PWOM

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.646	.417	1.930	74.831	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	3.487	.216	16.125	.000	3.062	3.912
Cau_Pos	.393	.034	11.582	.000	.326	.460
MoralEm	.304	.069	4.438	.000	.169	.439
Cau_Imp	.094	.054	1.750	.081	-.012	.200
Int_1	.058	.018	3.290	.001	.024	.093

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.015	10.827	1.000	419.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.259	.055	4.714	.000	.151	.368
.211	.405	.034	11.980	.000	.339	.472
2.211	.522	.050	10.499	.000	.424	.620

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Pos Cau_Imp PWOM .
BEGIN DATA.
  -3.679 -2.289 3.239
  1.321 -2.289 4.536
  2.321 -2.289 4.795
  -3.679 .211 2.937
  1.321 .211 4.964
  2.321 .211 5.370
  -3.679 2.211 2.696
  1.321 2.211 5.307
  2.321 2.211 5.829
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Pos WITH PWOM BY Cau_Imp .
```

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.259	.055	4.714	.000	.151	.368
.211	.405	.034	11.980	.000	.339	.472
2.211	.522	.050	10.499	.000	.424	.620

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> PWOM

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.043	.015	-.074	-.018
.211	-.010	.007	-.027	.003
2.211	.016	.011	-.005	.038

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.013	.005	.005	.023

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:  
95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:  
10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:  
Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Buycott**

Model : 8  
Y : Buycott  
X : Cau\_Pos  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
 Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Pos  Cau_Imp  MoralEm  .
BEGIN DATA.
  -3.679  -2.289  2.752
  1.321  -2.289  2.052
  2.321  -2.289  1.912
  -3.679  .211  3.111
  1.321  .211  2.942
  2.321  .211  2.908
  -3.679  2.211  3.399
  1.321  2.211  3.654
  2.321  2.211  3.705
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Pos WITH  MoralEm BY  Cau_Imp .
```

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
 Buycott

Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	.742	.550	1.418	128.080	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.046	.185	11.039	.000	1.682	2.410
Cau_Pos	.355	.029	12.184	.000	.297	.412
MoralEm	.502	.059	8.551	.000	.387	.618
Cau_Imp	.182	.046	3.948	.000	.091	.273

Int\_1 .075 .015 4.920 .000 .045 .105

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.026	24.202	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.183	.047	3.883	.000	.090	.276
.211	.370	.029	12.764	.000	.313	.427
2.211	.520	.043	12.195	.000	.436	.604

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp Buycott .

BEGIN DATA.

-3.679 -2.289 2.479  
1.321 -2.289 3.395  
2.321 -2.289 3.578  
-3.679 .211 2.246  
1.321 .211 4.097  
2.321 .211 4.468  
-3.679 2.211 2.059  
1.321 2.211 4.659  
2.321 2.211 5.179

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH Buycott BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	.183	.047	3.883	.000	.090	.276
.211	.370	.029	12.764	.000	.313	.427
2.211	.520	.043	12.195	.000	.436	.604

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> Buycott

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.070	.019	-.109	-.035
.211	-.017	.011	-.040	.004
2.211	.026	.017	-.008	.060

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.021	.006	.010	.035

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Negative Word of Mouth

Model : 8

Y : NWOM

X : Cau\_Pos

M : MoralEm

W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp MoralEm .

BEGIN DATA.

```
-3.679 -2.289 2.752
 1.321 -2.289 2.052
 2.321 -2.289 1.912
-3.679 .211 3.111
 1.321 .211 2.942
 2.321 .211 2.908
-3.679 2.211 3.399
 1.321 2.211 3.654
 2.321 2.211 3.705
```

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH MoralEm BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
NWOM

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.626	.392	1.900	67.552	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	.442	.215	2.058	.040	.020	.863
Cau_Pos	-.350	.034	-10.397	.000	-.416	-.284
MoralEm	.694	.068	10.202	.000	.560	.827
Cau_Imp	-.137	.053	-2.573	.010	-.242	-.032
Int_1	-.062	.018	-3.518	.000	-.097	-.027

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.018	12.380	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.208	.055	-3.815	.000	-.316	-.101
.211	-.363	.034	-10.817	.000	-.429	-.297
2.211	-.487	.049	-9.870	.000	-.584	-.390

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp NWOM .

BEGIN DATA.

```

-3.679 -2.289 3.627
 1.321 -2.289 2.585
 2.321 -2.289 2.377
-3.679 .211 3.853
 1.321 .211 2.037
 2.321 .211 1.674
-3.679 2.211 4.035

```



1.321 2.211 1.599  
2.321 2.211 1.111

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH NWOM BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.208	.055	-3.815	.000	-.316	-.101
.211	-.363	.034	-10.817	.000	-.429	-.297
2.211	-.487	.049	-9.870	.000	-.584	-.390

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> NWOM

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.097	.025	-.147	-.049
.211	-.024	.015	-.051	.006
2.211	.035	.025	-.011	.089

Index of moderated mediation:

Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.029	.009	.012 .048

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

**Model 8 Boycott**

Model : 8  
 Y : Boycott  
 X : Cau\_Pos  
 M : MoralEm  
 W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
 Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

	R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
	.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp MoralEm .

BEGIN DATA.

-3.679	-2.289	2.752
1.321	-2.289	2.052
2.321	-2.289	1.912
-3.679	.211	3.111
1.321	.211	2.942
2.321	.211	2.908
-3.679	2.211	3.399
1.321	2.211	3.654
2.321	2.211	3.705

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH MoralEm BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

Boycott

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.679	.461	1.621	89.746	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	.282	.198	1.423	.155	-.107	.672
Cau_Pos	-.385	.031	-12.388	.000	-.447	-.324
MoralEm	.776	.063	12.353	.000	.652	.899
Cau_Imp	-.053	.049	-1.073	.284	-.150	.044
Int_1	-.071	.016	-4.348	.000	-.103	-.039

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.024	18.903	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.223	.050	-4.431	.000	-.323	-.124
.211	-.400	.031	-12.906	.000	-.461	-.339
2.211	-.542	.046	-11.883	.000	-.631	-.452

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
 Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

```
DATA LIST FREE/
  Cau_Pos  Cau_Imp  Boycott  .
BEGIN DATA.
  -3.679  -2.289  3.579
  1.321  -2.289  2.462
  2.321  -2.289  2.238
  -3.679  .211  4.097
  1.321  .211  2.096
  2.321  .211  1.695
  -3.679  2.211  4.512
  1.321  2.211  1.803
  2.321  2.211  1.261
END DATA.
GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=
  Cau_Pos WITH  Boycott BY  Cau_Imp  .
```

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.223	.050	-4.431	.000	-.323	-.124
.211	-.400	.031	-12.906	.000	-.461	-.339
2.211	-.542	.046	-11.883	.000	-.631	-.452

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> Boycott

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.109	.028	-.165	-.054
.211	-.026	.016	-.056	.007
2.211	.040	.028	-.011	.099

Index of moderated mediation:

Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.033	.010	.014

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:  
10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:  
Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Social Media Engagement

Model : 8  
Y : SMEng  
X : Cau\_Pos  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample  
Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:  
MoralEm

#### Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

#### Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:  
Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp MoralEm .  
BEGIN DATA.

-3.679 -2.289 2.752  
1.321 -2.289 2.052  
2.321 -2.289 1.912  
-3.679 .211 3.111  
1.321 .211 2.942  
2.321 .211 2.908  
-3.679 2.211 3.399  
1.321 2.211 3.654  
2.321 2.211 3.705

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH MoralEm BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

SMEng

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.689	.474	2.220	94.439	4.000	419.000	.000

Model

	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	.168	.232	.725	.469	-.288	.624
Cau_Pos	-.010	.036	-.276	.783	-.082	.062
MoralEm	.967	.073	13.161	.000	.823	1.112
Cau_Imp	.376	.058	6.516	.000	.263	.490
Int_1	.067	.019	3.545	.000	.030	.105

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.016	12.565	1.000	419.000	.000

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.165	.059	-2.787	.006	-.281	-.048
.211	.004	.036	.116	.908	-.067	.076
2.211	.139	.053	2.608	.009	.034	.244

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp SMEng .  
 BEGIN DATA.

```
-3.679 -2.289 2.847
 1.321 -2.289 2.024
 2.321 -2.289 1.860
-3.679 .211 3.166
 1.321 .211 3.187
 2.321 .211 3.192
-3.679 2.211 3.422
 1.321 2.211 4.118
 2.321 2.211 4.257
```

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH SMEng BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.165	.059	-2.787	.006	-.281	-.048
.211	.004	.036	.116	.908	-.067	.076
2.211	.139	.053	2.608	.009	.034	.244

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> SMEng

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.135	.033	-.199	-.069
.211	-.033	.021	-.073	.008
2.211	.049	.033	-.015	.114

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.041	.011	.019	.064

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:

95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:

10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:

Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

----- END MATRIX -----

### Model 8 Gift Card Supporting Position on Cause

Model : 8

Y : GCSup  
X : Cau\_Pos  
M : MoralEm  
W : Cau\_Imp

Sample

Size: 424

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

MoralEm

Model Summary

R	R-sq	MSE	F	df1	df2	p
.412	.169	.979	28.546	3.000	420.000	.000

Model



	coeff	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	2.923	.058	50.389	.000	2.809	3.037
Cau_Pos	-.043	.024	-1.780	.076	-.090	.004
Cau_Imp	.300	.035	8.464	.000	.230	.370
Int_1	.042	.012	3.403	.001	.018	.067

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s):

	R2-chng	F	df1	df2	p
X*W	.023	11.582	1.000	420.000	.001

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)

Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s):

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.039	-3.628	.000	-.216	-.064
.211	-.034	.024	-1.410	.159	-.081	.013
2.211	.051	.035	1.443	.150	-.018	.120

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

Cau\_Pos Cau\_Imp MoralEm .

BEGIN DATA.

```
-3.679 -2.289 2.752
1.321 -2.289 2.052
2.321 -2.289 1.912
-3.679 .211 3.111
1.321 .211 2.942
2.321 .211 2.908
-3.679 2.211 3.399
1.321 2.211 3.654
2.321 2.211 3.705
```

END DATA.

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=

Cau\_Pos WITH MoralEm BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\*

OUTCOME VARIABLE:

GCSup

Coding of binary Y for logistic regression analysis:

GCSup	Analysis
.00	.00
1.00	1.00

Model Summary

-2LL	ModelLL	df	p	McFadden	CoxSnell	Nagelkrk
553.922	28.421	4.000	.000	.049	.065	.087

Model

	coeff	se	Z	p	LLCI	ULCI
constant	-.807	.331	-2.440	.015	-1.455	-.159
Cau_Pos	-.083	.052	-1.603	.109	-.184	.018
MoralEm	.324	.106	3.048	.002	.116	.532
Cau_Imp	.225	.082	2.743	.006	.064	.386
Int_1	.025	.027	.920	.358	-.028	.078

These results are expressed in a log-odds metric.

Product terms key:

Int\_1 : Cau\_Pos x Cau\_Imp

Likelihood ratio test(s) of highest order unconditional interactions(s):

	Chi-sq	df	p
X*W	.848	1.000	.357

-----

Focal predict: Cau\_Pos (X)  
Mod var: Cau\_Imp (W)

Data for visualizing the conditional effect of the focal predictor:

Paste text below into a SPSS syntax window and execute to produce plot.

DATA LIST FREE/

```
Cau_Pos Cau_Imp GCSup prob .
BEGIN DATA.
-3.679 -2.289 .176 .544
1.321 -2.289 -.524 .372
2.321 -2.289 -.663 .340
-3.679 .211 .508 .624
1.321 .211 .121 .530
2.321 .211 .043 .511
-3.679 2.211 .774 .684
1.321 2.211 .637 .654
2.321 2.211 .609 .648
END DATA.
```

GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=  
 Cau\_Pos WITH GCSup BY Cau\_Imp .  
 GRAPH/SCATTERPLOT=  
 Cau\_Pos WITH prob BY Cau\_Imp .

\*\*\*\*\* DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y \*\*\*\*\*

Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y:

Cau_Imp	Effect	se	Z	p	LLCI	ULCI
-2.289	-.140	.083	-1.677	.094	-.303	.024
.211	-.077	.052	-1.503	.133	-.178	.024
2.211	-.028	.076	-.361	.718	-.177	.122

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

INDIRECT EFFECT:

Cau\_Pos -> MoralEm -> GCSup

Cau_Imp	Effect	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
-2.289	-.045	.019	-.088	-.014
.211	-.011	.008	-.030	.003
2.211	.017	.013	-.005	.046

Index of moderated mediation:

	Index	BootSE	BootLLCI	BootULCI
Cau_Imp	.014	.006	.004	.028

---

\*\*\*\*\* ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS \*\*\*\*\*

Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output:  
 95.0000

Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals:  
 10000

W values in conditional tables are the 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles.

NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis:  
 Cau\_Imp Cau\_Pos

NOTE: Direct and indirect effects of X on Y are on a log-odds metric.

----- END MATRIX -----

## Appendix 13. Post-Hoc Study 1 Discussion Section

### Positive and negative moral emotions in response to non-controversial social causes ads.

		Cause Type		Statistic		Std. Error	
Positive Moral Emotions	NonControversial	Mean		4.9199		.10387	
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	4.7152			
			Upper Bound	5.1246			
		5% Trimmed Mean		5.0045			
		Median		5.0000			
		Variance		2.492			
		Std. Deviation		1.57876			
		Minimum		1.00			
		Maximum		7.00			
		Range		6.00			
		Interquartile Range		2.25			
		Skewness		-.687		.160	
		Kurtosis		-.260		.319	
		Negative Moral Emotions	NonControversial	Mean		2.3268	
95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound			2.1114			
	Upper Bound			2.5422			
5% Trimmed Mean				2.1688			
Median				1.7500			
Variance				2.761			
Std. Deviation				1.66152			
Minimum				1.00			
Maximum				7.00			
Range				6.00			
Interquartile Range				2.25			
Skewness				1.208		.160	
Kurtosis				.429		.319	

### Elaborative Processing by Position on Social Cause

	Descriptives							
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Social Cause	119	3.59	1.345	.123	3.35	3.83	1	6
Non-Controversial	231	4.36	1.216	.080	4.21	4.52	1	6
Controversial - Pro	265	4.24	1.157	.071	4.10	4.38	1	6
Controversial - Against	159	2.88	1.199	.095	2.70	3.07	1	6
Total	774	3.90	1.341	.048	3.81	3.99	1	6

## ANOVA

Elaborative Processing

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	256.238	3	85.413	57.988	.000
Within Groups	1134.171	770	1.473		
Total	1390.409	773			

### Post Hoc Tests

#### Multiple Comparisons


Dependent Variable: Elaborative Processing

Bonferroni

(I) Social Cause	(J) Social Cause	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	-.774*	.137	.000	-1.14	-.41
	Controversial - Pro	-.654*	.134	.000	-1.01	-.30
	Controversial - Against	.704*	.147	.000	.32	1.09
Non-Controversial	No Social Cause	.774*	.137	.000	.41	1.14
	Controversial - Pro	.120	.109	1.000	-.17	.41
	Controversial - Against	1.479*	.125	.000	1.15	1.81
Controversial - Pro	No Social Cause	.654*	.134	.000	.30	1.01
	Non-Controversial	-.120	.109	1.000	-.41	.17
	Controversial - Against	1.359*	.122	.000	1.04	1.68
Controversial - Against	No Social Cause	-.704*	.147	.000	-1.09	-.32
	Non-Controversial	-1.479*	.125	.000	-1.81	-1.15
	Controversial - Pro	-1.359*	.122	.000	-1.68	-1.04

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

### Means Plots



### Social Media Engagement by Moral Emotions

I run a One-Way ANOVA to compare social media engagement intentions by moral emotions sign. As it can be seen in Table 34 and Figure 24, I find a significant difference amongst all groups ( $M_{noME} = 1.55$ ,  $M_{negME} = 2.67$ ,  $M_{posME} = 3.45$ ,  $M_{dualME} = 4.40$ ,  $p \leq .05$ ).

### Descriptives

#### Social Media Engagement

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Moral Emotions	67	1.55	1.091	.133	1.28	1.81	1	7
Only Negative Moral Emotions	89	2.67	1.714	.182	2.31	3.03	1	7
Only Positive Moral Emotions	404	3.45	2.004	.100	3.25	3.64	1	8
Dual Moral Emotions	214	4.40	2.029	.139	4.13	4.67	1	8
Total	774	3.46	2.073	.075	3.31	3.60	1	8

### ANOVA

Social Media Engagement

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	489.931	3	163.310	44.400	.000
Within Groups	2832.190	770	3.678		
Total	3322.121	773			

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Social Media Engagement

Bonferroni

(I) Moral Emotions Sign	(J) Moral Emotions Sign	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Moral Emotions	Only Negative Moral Emotions	-1.125*	.310	.002	-1.95	-.30
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	-1.901*	.253	.000	-2.57	-1.23
	Dual Moral Emotions	-2.854*	.268	.000	-3.56	-2.14
Only Negative Moral Emotions	No Moral Emotions	1.125*	.310	.002	.30	1.95
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	-.776*	.225	.003	-1.37	-.18
	Dual Moral Emotions	-1.729*	.242	.000	-2.37	-1.09
Only Positive Moral Emotions	No Moral Emotions	1.901*	.253	.000	1.23	2.57
	Only Negative Moral Emotions	.776*	.225	.003	.18	1.37
	Dual Moral Emotions	-.953*	.162	.000	-1.38	-.52
Dual Moral Emotions	No Moral Emotions	2.854*	.268	.000	2.14	3.56
	Only Negative Moral Emotions	1.729*	.242	.000	1.09	2.37
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	.953*	.162	.000	.52	1.38

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 34. One-way ANOVA Social media engagement by moral emotions sign.

Means Plots



**Figure 24.** Means Plot Social media engagement by moral emotions sign.

### Willingness to Sacrifice Money by Moral Emotions

As can be seen in the following tables and figure there is no significant difference in willingness to sacrifice money between conditions (MnoME= -0.21, MpME= -0.66, MdualME= -0.27,  $p > .1$ ). Nevertheless, the difference is significant between no moral emotions and positive, negative, or dual moral emotions (MnoME= -3.25, MnME= -0.21,  $p \leq .05$ ; MnoME= -3.25, MpME= -0.66,  $p \leq .05$ ; MnoME= -3.25, MdualME= -0.27,  $p \leq .05$ ).

### Descriptives

Sacrifice to Support

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
No Moral Emotions	67	-3.2537	5.81884	.71088	-4.6731	-1.8344	-10.00	10.00
Only Negative Moral Emotions	89	-.2135	6.69883	.71007	-1.6246	1.1976	-10.00	10.00
Only Positive Moral Emotions	404	-.6609	6.47318	.32205	-1.2940	-.0278	-10.00	10.00
Dual Moral Emotions	214	-.2710	6.66512	.45562	-1.1691	.6271	-10.00	10.00
Total	774	-.7261	6.53678	.23496	-1.1873	-.2649	-10.00	10.00

### ANOVA

Sacrifice to Support



	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	497.480	3	165.827	3.925	.009
Within Groups	32532.453	770	42.250		
Total	33029.933	773			

## Post Hoc Tests

### Multiple Comparisons


Dependent Variable: Sacrifice to Support

Bonferroni

(I) Moral Emotions Sign	(J) Moral Emotions Sign	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No Moral Emotions	Only Negative Moral Emotions	-3.04025*	1.05134	.024	-5.8211	-.2594
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	-2.59284*	.85742	.015	-4.8608	-.3249
	Dual Moral Emotions	-2.98270*	.90996	.007	-5.3896	-.5758
Only Negative Moral Emotions	No Moral Emotions	3.04025*	1.05134	.024	.2594	5.8211
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	.44741	.76112	1.000	-1.5658	2.4606
	Dual Moral Emotions	.05754	.81985	1.000	-2.1110	2.2261
Only Positive Moral Emotions	No Moral Emotions	2.59284*	.85742	.015	.3249	4.8608
	Only Negative Moral Emotions	-.44741	.76112	1.000	-2.4606	1.5658
	Dual Moral Emotions	-.38986	.54955	1.000	-1.8435	1.0638
Dual Moral Emotions	No Moral Emotions	2.98270*	.90996	.007	.5758	5.3896
	Only Negative Moral Emotions	-.05754	.81985	1.000	-2.2261	2.1110
	Only Positive Moral Emotions	.38986	.54955	1.000	-1.0638	1.8435

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## Means Plots



## Buycott and Boycott Execution

Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost \* Social Causes Position Crosstabulation

			Social Causes Position				
			No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	Controversial - Pro	Controversial - Against	Total
Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Failed	Count	65	71	102	57	295
		% within Social Causes Position	71.4%	52.2%	57.6%	53.3%	57.7%
	Executed	Count	26	65	75	50	216
		% within Social Causes Position	28.6%	47.8%	42.4%	46.7%	42.3%
Total	Count	91	136	177	107	511	
	% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

**Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost \* Social Causes Position \* Potential Buycotter or Boycotter Crosstabulation**


Potential Buycotter or Boycotter				Social Causes Position				Total
				No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	Controversial - Pro	Controversial - Against	
No Boycott nor Boycott	Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Failed	Count	42	44	58	45	189
			% within Social Causes Position	79.2%	80.0%	85.3%	67.2%	77.8%
	Executed	Failed	Count	11	11	10	22	54
			% within Social Causes Position	20.8%	20.0%	14.7%	32.8%	22.2%
	Total	Failed	Count	53	55	68	67	243
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Potential Buycotter	Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Failed	Count	21	20	36	4	81
			% within Social Causes Position	63.6%	29.4%	39.6%	66.7%	40.9%
	Executed	Failed	Count	12	48	55	2	117
			% within Social Causes Position	36.4%	70.6%	60.4%	33.3%	59.1%
	Total	Failed	Count	33	68	91	6	198
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Potential Boycotter	Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Failed	Count	2	7	8	8	25
			% within Social Causes Position	40.0%	53.8%	44.4%	23.5%	35.7%
	Executed	Failed	Count	3	6	10	26	45
			% within Social Causes Position	60.0%	46.2%	55.6%	76.5%	64.3%
	Total	Failed	Count	5	13	18	34	70
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Executed Buycott /Boycott with Cost	Failed	Count	65	71	102	57	295
			% within Social Causes Position	71.4%	52.2%	57.6%	53.3%	57.7%
	Executed	Failed	Count	26	65	75	50	216
			% within Social Causes Position	28.6%	47.8%	42.4%	46.7%	42.3%
	Total	Failed	Count	91	136	177	107	511
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%




**Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost \* Social Causes Position \* Potential Buycotter or Boycotter Crosstabulation**

Potential Buycotter or Boycotter				Social Causes Position				Total
				No Social Cause	Non-Controversial	Controversial - Pro	Controversial - Against	
No Boycott nor Boycott	Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Failed	Count	13	9	9	14	45
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	27.3%	23.1%	41.2%	37.8%
	Executed	Count	0	24	30	20	74	
		% within Social Causes Position	0.0%	72.7%	76.9%	58.8%	62.2%	
	Total		Count	13	33	39	34	119
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Potential Buycotter	Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Failed	Count	11	4	1	2	18
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	8.2%	2.7%	50.0%	17.8%
	Executed	Count	0	45	36	2	83	
		% within Social Causes Position	0.0%	91.8%	97.3%	50.0%	82.2%	
	Total		Count	11	49	37	4	101
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Potential Boycotter	Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Failed	Count	4	6	0	3	13
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	46.2%	0.0%	21.4%	30.2%
	Executed	Count	0	7	12	11	30	
		% within Social Causes Position	0.0%	53.8%	100.0%	78.6%	69.8%	
	Total		Count	4	13	12	14	43
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Executed Buycott /Boycott with No Cost	Failed	Count	28	19	10	19	76
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	20.0%	11.4%	36.5%	28.9%
	Executed	Count	0	76	78	33	187	
		% within Social Causes Position	0.0%	80.0%	88.6%	63.5%	71.1%	
	Total		Count	28	95	88	52	263
			% within Social Causes Position	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Appendix 14. Pre-Selected Social Media Posts**



**Budweiser Post**



**Budweiser**   
June 27 ·   
This Bud's for #PRIDE. 


# Budweiser

   6.4K      2.4K Comments 811 Shares

**Budweiser**   
April 22, 2019 · 

### Budweiser | Earth Day

We're proud to be brewed with 100% renewable electricity from wind power. Here's to Earth Day for generations to come.   See Less



 Like     Comment     Share

   690 · 170 Comments

**Budweiser**  
May 18, 2019

For over 100 years, Anheuser-Busch has proudly supported our men and women in uniform.

That's why for every case of Discovery Reserve sold, we're donating \$1 to the Folds of Honor to help provide educational sponsorships to military families.\* For Armed Forces Day, we raise a Bud to those who protect our country. This Bud's For You.

\*Up to \$100,000

988 122 Comments 271 Shares

Like Comment Share

Most Relevant

Xavier Von Bavarian Vote for Budweiser for President.  
Like · Reply · 32w

Erick Scott Thanks #Budweiser and #Lego

## Gillette



Gillette · Follow

**We Believe: The Best Men Can Be | Gillette**



"Boys will be boys"? Isn't it time we stopped excusing bad behavior? Re-think and take action by joining us at [TheBestMenCanBe.org](http://TheBestMenCanBe.org).

1:28


Like

Comment

Share



Benjamin Alvo, Vicky Garbarino and 220K others · 109K Comments



1.9K

376 Comments 1.1K Shares



Gillette  
April 22

On #EarthDay 🌍, we're proud to partner with TerraCycle to let you recycle blades and razors from any brand. This is the first step in our journey to reach zero waste-to-landfill and help keep our home beautiful.



104

36 Comments 14 Shares

**Gillette** ✓  
 April 13 · 🌐

When our employees heard healthcare workers and first responders are short on PPE, they used their engineering skills and Gillette's manufacturing capability to develop a face shield prototype. This week, we're distributing the first 10,000 to healthcare organizations around Massachusetts. We will be producing and donating 100,000 in the next few weeks. Head to [gillette.com/en-us/covid-19/](http://gillette.com/en-us/covid-19/) to learn more about our efforts.

👍❤️👏 2K      134 Comments 861 Shares

**Starbucks** ✓  
 June 18, 2018 · 🌐

All together now. ❤️ #Pride

👍❤️👏 7.4K      2K Comments 586 Shares 115K Views





Starbucks ✓  
May 18 · 🌐



Some Good News ✓  
May 18 · 🌐

Introducing the OFFICIAL [#SomeGoodMerch](#) store! Inspired by each and every one of you, our store features designs submitted by our talented community with 100% of the proceeds going to whichever featured charity you choose. Even better, The Starbucks Foundation is donating \$1Million to match every purchase made so that your dollar goes twice as far. Shop the collection now on [Sevenly](#).



SEVENLY.ORG

Some Good News Brings You Some Good Merch For Some Great Causes




👍❤️👏 1.2K

99 Comments 85 Shares



Starbucks ✓  
June 1 · 🌐



23,718 Views


Born This Way Foundation ✓  
June 1 · 🌐

👍 Like Page

Celebrate Pride with Born This Way Foundation and Starbucks!  
The Starbucks Foundation will match all June donations to Born This Way Foundation - up to \$250k! - made through this unique giving site:  
<https://bornthisway.foundation/starbucks...> #BTWFxStarbucks

👍❤️👏 2.9K

965 Comments 234 Shares




Through innovative mobile food pantries, Feeding America is bringing relief to the millions of Americans who may face hunger due to the impacts of COVID-19.

Starbucks continues to support Feeding America with an additional \$1 million donation to help our neighbors in need. If you are in a position to donate or volunteer, join us at [sbux.co/Hunger](https://sbux.co/Hunger)



1.4K

289 Comments 61 Shares



Starbucks June 1, 2020

126K 13K Comments 9.8K Shares

Like Comment Share

Most Relevant

**Sam Hobart**  
Glad to see this Starbucks! Whats your plan of action? Whats your first step? No offense but until I see it I will belive this ad to be your attempt to profit from tragedy  
Like Reply 31w Edited 4

View 1 more reply

**Starbucks**  
Hi, Sam. The Starbucks Foundation announced it will commit \$1 million in Neighborhood Grants to promote racial equity and create more inclusive and just communities. Nominated by Starbucks partners (employees), these grants will support efforts in over...

## Walmart



Walmart

July 20 at 8:56 AM · 🌐



There are millions of reasons to wear a mask. For the people, families, and communities we live in, we now require masks in all of our stores. Live better. Together.



👍❤️😬 6.4K

7.6K Comments 1.1K Shares



Walmart   
June 14 · 



Walmart proud. 



   17K

10K Comments 1K Shares

Walmart 1d · 🌐

We asked, and you all showed up for families across the country in an amazing way. We're so proud to announce that together, we've raised \$39M for [Children's Miracle Network Hospitals](#). 🙌 So thank you, from the bottom of our hearts and theirs. 🧡

**Cheers to you  
for raising  
more than \$39 million  
during the  
2020 campaign!**

Walmart   

👍🧡🙌 1.2K 149 Comments 125 Shares

**“Black Lives Matter. It is all of our responsibilities to embrace that fact in what we say and what we do. There’s no way to live our values if we don’t. Let’s push even harder to create an inclusive and equitable culture.”**

—Walmart CEO, Doug McMillon  
to our associates

Walmart June 12, 2020 · 🌐

We're listening. We're learning. We're taking action. Last week, Walmart and the Walmart Foundation committed \$100 million over five years to address racism head-on and accelerate meaningful change in communities across the country. Learn more here: <https://bit.ly/2Yx34rE>

👍🧡🙌 9.6K 13K Comments 1.4K Shares

👍 Like 💬 Comment ➦ Share

Most Relevant ▾

 **Christiana White**  
Thank you Walmart... And to the "all lives matter" crew that is always ringing in... You're missing the entire point of the Black Lives Matter movement and I hope you will open your minds sooner than later

30w · Edited 🧡🙌 234

↳ 175 Replies

 **Shelle White**

Screen capture of Walmart on Facebook



## Appendix 15. Study 2 Marketing Experts Questionnaire

Introduction: Please respond to the next questions according to your best judgement as a Marketing Expert. You will be asked to evaluate posts on Facebook done by four brands (four posts by each brand) that will appear in an aleatory order. Your responses will help us decide what posts to include in our academic research. Your position/company will be only used to validate you as a Marketing Expert and never mentioned. We will only use aggregated data. Thank you in advance for your help!

Q1: How would you rate this campaign (very good campaign/good campaign/neither good nor bad campaign/bad campaign/very bad campaign)

Q2: Would you consider this campaign (is about a controversial social issue/is a about a non-controversial social issue/ is not about a social cause)

## Appendix 16. Study 2 Facebook Posts

**Starbucks**  
**Controversial**

Pride	25-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158684565693057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158684565693057</a>
Black Lives Matter	12-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/photos/a.152298483056/101586422913380">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/photos/a.152298483056/101586422913380</a>
<b>Non-Controversial</b>		
Starbucks Feeding America	16-Apr-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158436037328057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158436037328057</a>
<b>Branding</b>		
How to make coffee	15-Apr-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158432172388057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158432172388057</a>
Cold Brew	29-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/photos/a.152298483056/101586894878580">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/photos/a.152298483056/101586894878580</a>
Iced Matcha Dragon Drink	24-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158681444678057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158681444678057</a>
First Drink	13-Jul-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158742933228057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158742933228057</a>
Starbucks App	16-Jul-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158753443413057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158753443413057</a>
Breakfast Sandwich	21-Jul-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158767194288057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158767194288057</a>
Refresher	17-Jul-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158754737913057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158754737913057</a>
S'mores	29-May-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158593115248057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158593115248057</a>
Shades of Summer	22-May-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158569072813057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158569072813057</a>
	21-May-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158568396373057">https://www.facebook.com/Starbucks/posts/10158568396373057</a>

**Walmart**

**Controversial**

Pride 2020	17-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015871661863423">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015871661863423</a>
Black Lives Matter	12-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015870185312923">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015870185312923</a>

**Non-Controversial**

Feeding America	10-Aug-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/videos/289647275662414">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/videos/289647275662414</a>
<b>Branding</b>		
Father's Day Chef	21-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015872900882923">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015872900882923</a>
Serrano College Shopping	20-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=981960178885810&amp;ref=watch_permalink">https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=981960178885810&amp;ref=watch_permalink</a>
S'mores	11-Aug-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/posts/10158882614414236">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/posts/10158882614414236</a>
Camp Painted Mask	6-Jul-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015877990637423">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015877990637423</a>
	8-Jul-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/posts/10158785437464236">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/posts/10158785437464236</a>
Heroes	11-Jun-20	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015869783822423">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015869783822423</a>
	27-May	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015864989005423">https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015864989005423</a>

Prescriptions

App 26-May <https://www.facebook.com/walmart/posts/10158647232494236>

Seniors 19-May-20 <https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015862365849423>

Snacks 15-May-20 <https://www.facebook.com/walmart/photos/a.385715789235/1015861053608423>

## Appendix 17 Chi-Square Test Engagement Proportions

### Starbucks

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	21792	100.0%	.600	0.0%	21792.600	100.0%

#### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

		Campaign			
		Branding Starbucks	Pride Starbucks	Total	
Impact	Positive	Count	15665	3252	18917
		% within Campaign	89.0%	77.6%	86.8%
		Adjusted Residual	19.6	-19.6	
	Neutral	Count	917	137	1054
		% within Campaign	5.2%	3.3%	4.8%
		Adjusted Residual	5.3	-5.3	
	Negative	Count	1019	802	1821
		% within Campaign	5.8%	19.1%	8.4%
		Adjusted Residual	-28.1	28.1	
Total	Count	17601	4191	21792	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	798.701 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	662.317	2	.000



N of Valid Cases	21792		
------------------	-------	--	--

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 202.70.

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	125339	100.0%	0	0.0%	125338.600	100.0%

### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

			Campaign		Total
			BLM Starbucks	Branding Starbucks	
Impact	Positive	Count	57709	15665	73374
		% within Campaign	53.6%	89.0%	58.5%
		Adjusted Residual	-88.5	88.5	
	Neutral	Count	11505	917	12422
		% within Campaign	10.7%	5.2%	9.9%
		Adjusted Residual	22.5	-22.5	
	Negative	Count	38524	1019	39543
		% within Campaign	35.8%	5.8%	31.5%
		Adjusted Residual	79.3	-79.3	
Total		Count	107738	17601	125339
		% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8008.600 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	9601.448	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	125339		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1744.39.

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	73566	100.0%	0	0.0%	73566.000	100.0%

### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact			Campaign		Total
			Branding Starbucks	Controversial Starbucks	
	Positive	Count	15665	31514	47179
		% within Campaign	89.0%	56.3%	64.1%
		Adjusted Residual	78.9	-78.9	
	Neutral	Count	917	5797	6714
		% within Campaign	5.2%	10.4%	9.1%
		Adjusted Residual	-20.7	20.7	
	Negative	Count	1019	18654	19673
		% within Campaign	5.8%	33.3%	26.7%
		Adjusted Residual	-72.0	72.0	
Total	Count	17601	55965	73566	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6418.308 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	7608.558	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	73566		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1606.36.

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	24086	100.0%	0	0.0%	24085.600	100.0%

### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact			Campaign		Total
			Branding Starbucks	Feeding America Starbucks	
	Positive	Count	15665	5331	20996
		% within Campaign	89.0%	82.2%	87.2%
		Adjusted Residual	14.0	-14.0	
	Neutral	Count	917	15	932
		% within Campaign	5.2%	0.2%	3.9%
		Adjusted Residual	17.8	-17.8	
	Negative	Count	1019	1139	2158
		% within Campaign	5.8%	17.6%	9.0%
		Adjusted Residual	-28.4	28.4	
Total	Count	17601	6485	24086	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1061.926 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	1129.800	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	24086		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 250.93.

**Walmart**

USE ALL.

COMPUTE filter\_\$=(BrandCode=2 & (PostCode=5 or PostCode=1)).

VARIABLE LABELS filter\_\$ 'BrandCode=2 & (PostCode=5 or PostCode=1) (FILTER)'.  
 VALUE LABELS filter\_\$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.

FORMATS filter\_\$ (f1.0).

FILTER BY filter\_\$.

EXECUTE.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=Impact BY Campaign  
 /FORMAT=DVALUE TABLES  
 /STATISTICS=CHISQ  
 /CELLS=COUNT COLUMN ASRESID  
 /COUNT ROUND CELL.

**Crosstabs**

**Notes**

Output Created		31-MAY-2021 22:49:45
Comments		
Input	Data	/Users/karinusachfranck/Documents/PHD/Thesis Research/Field Research/FacebookFreqTable.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet7
	Filter	BrandCode=2 & (PostCode=5 or PostCode=1) (FILTER)
	Weight	FreqEngagement

	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	6
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each table are based on all the cases with valid data in the specified range(s) for all variables in each table.
Syntax		CROSSTABS /TABLES=Impact BY Campaign /FORMAT=DVALUE TABLES /STATISTICS=CHISQ /CELLS=COUNT COLUMN ASRESID /COUNT ROUND CELL.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00.01
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.00
	Dimensions Requested	2
	Cells Available	524245

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	22261	100.0%	0	0.0%	22260.600	100.0%

### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact	Positive	Count	Campaign		Total
			Branding Walmart	Pride Walmart	
		5080	10871	15951	
		% within Campaign	82.6%	67.5%	71.7%

	Adjusted Residual	22.3	-22.3	
Neutral	Count	358	1305	1663
	% within Campaign	5.8%	8.1%	7.5%
	Adjusted Residual	-5.8	5.8	
Negative	Count	715	3932	4647
	% within Campaign	11.6%	24.4%	20.9%
	Adjusted Residual	-21.0	21.0	
Total	Count	6153	16108	22261
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	521.133 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	562.442	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	22261		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 459.66.

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	47826	100.0%	0	0.0%	47826.000	100.0%

#### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact	Positive	Campaign		Total
		BLM Walmart	Branding Walmart	
	Count	17993	5080	23073
	% within Campaign	43.2%	82.6%	48.2%

	Adjusted Residual	-57.7	57.7	
Neutral	Count	2696	358	3054
	% within Campaign	6.5%	5.8%	6.4%
	Adjusted Residual	1.9	-1.9	
Negative	Count	20984	715	21699
	% within Campaign	50.4%	11.6%	45.4%
	Adjusted Residual	57.0	-57.0	
Total	Count	41673	6153	47826
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3500.257 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	3894.906	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	47826		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 392.91.

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	35043	100.0%	.100	0.0%	35043.100	100.0%

#### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact	Positive	Campaign		Total
		Branding Walmart	Controversial Walmart	
	Count	5080	14429	19509
	% within Campaign	82.6%	49.9%	55.7%
	Adjusted Residual	46.8	-46.8	

Neutral	Count	358	2004	2362
	% within Campaign	5.8%	6.9%	6.7%
	Adjusted Residual	-3.2	3.2	
Negative	Count	715	12457	13172
	% within Campaign	11.6%	43.1%	37.6%
	Adjusted Residual	-46.3	46.3	
Total	Count	6153	28890	35043
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2317.696 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	2622.068	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	35043		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 414.73.

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	8743	100.0%	.600	0.0%	8743.600	100.0%

#### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact	Positive	Count	Campaign		Total
			Branding Walmart	Feeding America Walmart	
		5080	2199	7279	
		82.6%	84.9%	83.3%	



	Adjusted Residual	-2.7	2.7	
Neutral	Count	358	9	367
	% within Campaign	5.8%	0.3%	4.2%
	Adjusted Residual	11.6	-11.6	
Negative	Count	715	382	1097
	% within Campaign	11.6%	14.7%	12.5%
	Adjusted Residual	-4.0	4.0	
Total	Count	6153	2590	8743
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	145.385 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	203.901	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	8743		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 108.72.

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Impact * Campaign	8743	100.0%	.600	0.0%	8743.600	100.0%

#### Impact \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Impact	Positive	Count	Campaign		Total
			Branding Walmart	Feeding America Walmart	
			5080 <sup>a</sup>	2199 <sup>b</sup>	7279

	% within Campaign	82.6%	84.9%	83.3%
	Adjusted Residual	-2.7	2.7	
Neutral	Count	358 <sub>a</sub>	9 <sub>b</sub>	367
	% within Campaign	5.8%	0.3%	4.2%
	Adjusted Residual	11.6	-11.6	
Negative	Count	715 <sub>a</sub>	382 <sub>b</sub>	1097
	% within Campaign	11.6%	14.7%	12.5%
	Adjusted Residual	-4.0	4.0	
Total	Count	6153	2590	8743
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Campaign categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each other at the .05 level.

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	145.385 <sup>a</sup>	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	203.901	2	.000
N of Valid Cases	8743		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 108.72.

### Appendix 18 Chi-square Test Negative Comments

#### Starbucks

#### Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
NegativityType * Campaign	876	100.0%	.144	0.0%	876.144	100.0%

## NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

			Campaign		Total
			Branding Starbucks	Pride Starbucks	
NegativityType	On Topic	Count	256	216	
		% within Campaign	51.8%	56.5%	53
		Adjusted Residual	-1.4	1.4	
	Other Topics	Count	238	166	
		% within Campaign	48.2%	43.5%	46
		Adjusted Residual	1.4	-1.4	
Total	Count	494	382		
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100	

## Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.933 <sup>a</sup>	1	.164		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	1.748	1	.186		
Likelihood Ratio	1.935	1	.164		
Fisher's Exact Test				.172	.093
N of Valid Cases	876				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 176.17.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
NegativityType * Campaign	17892	100.0%	.329	0.0%	17892.329	100.0%

### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

		Campaign			
		BLM Starbucks	Branding Starbucks	Total	
NegativityType	On Topic	Count	12511	256	12767
		% within Campaign	71.9%	51.8%	71.9%
		Adjusted Residual	9.7	-9.7	0.0
	Other Topics	Count	4887	238	5225
		% within Campaign	28.1%	48.2%	28.1%
		Adjusted Residual	-9.7	9.7	0.0
Total	Count	17398	494	17892	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	94.843 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	93.863	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	86.357	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	17892				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 141.50.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
NegativityType * Campaign	8909	100.0%	0	0.0%	8908.934	100.0%

### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

NegativityType			Campaign		Total
			Branding Starbucks	Controversial Starbucks	
On Topic	Count		256	5785	6041
		% within Campaign	51.8%	68.7%	67.7%
		Adjusted Residual	-7.8	7.8	
	Other Topics	Count	238	2630	2868
		% within Campaign	48.2%	31.3%	32.3%
		Adjusted Residual	7.8	-7.8	
Total	Count	494	8415	8909	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	61.228 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	60.455	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	57.668	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	8909				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 159.03.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
NegativityType * Campaign	1055	100.0%	.240	0.0%	1055.240	100.0%

#### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

Campaign | Total

			Branding Starbucks	Feeding America Starbucks	
NegativityType	On Topic	Count	256	102	
		% within Campaign	51.8%	18.2%	33
		Adjusted Residual	11.5	-11.5	
	Other Topics	Count	238	459	
		% within Campaign	48.2%	81.8%	66
		Adjusted Residual	-11.5	11.5	
Total	Count	494	561	1	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	132.599 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	131.103	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	135.496	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	1055				

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 167.63.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

### Walmart

### Crosstabs

#### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	NegativityType * Campaign	2109	100.0%	0	0.0%	2108.120

### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

		Campaign			
		Branding Walmart	Pride Walmart	Total	
NegativityType	On Topic	Count	56	791	
		% within Campaign	16.1%	44.9%	40
		Adjusted Residual	-10.0	10.0	
	Other Topics	Count	291	971	1
		% within Campaign	83.9%	55.1%	59
		Adjusted Residual	10.0	-10.0	
Total	Count	347	1762	2	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	99.738 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	98.545	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	110.549	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	2109				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 139.36.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
NegativityType * Campaign	10437	100.0%	0	0.0%	10436.412	100.0

### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

NegativityType			Campaign		Total
			BLM Walmart	Branding Walmart	
On Topic	Count		8324	56	8380
		% within Campaign	82.5%	16.1%	80.6%
		Adjusted Residual	30.6	-30.6	
	Other Topics	Count	1766	291	2057
		% within Campaign	17.5%	83.9%	19.4%
		Adjusted Residual	-30.6	30.6	
Total	Count	10090	347	10437	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	933.513 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	929.324	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	695.065	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	10437				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 68.39.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	NegativityType * Campaign	6273	100.0%	0	0.0%	6272.266

### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation



NegativityType			Campaign		Total
			Branding Walmart	Controversial Walmart	
NegativityType	On Topic	Count	56	4558	4614
		% within Campaign	16.1%	76.9%	73.0%
		Adjusted Residual	-24.9	24.9	
	Other Topics	Count	291	1368	1659
		% within Campaign	83.9%	23.1%	26.0%
		Adjusted Residual	24.9	-24.9	
Total	Count	347	5926	6273	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	622.473 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	619.352	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	537.212	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	6273				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 91.77.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
	NegativityType * Campaign	536	100.0%	0	0.0%	535.374

### NegativityType \* Campaign Crosstabulation

		Campaign		Total	
		Branding Walmart	Feeding America Walmart		
NegativityType	On Topic	Count	56	147	37
		% within Campaign	16.1%	77.8%	
		Adjusted Residual	-14.1	14.1	
	Other Topics	Count	291	42	62
		% within Campaign	83.9%	22.2%	
		Adjusted Residual	14.1	-14.1	
Total	Count	347	189	536	
	% within Campaign	100.0%	100.0%		

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (2- sided)	Exact Sig. (1- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	197.576 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	194.965	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	204.260	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	536				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 71.58.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table